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On the day she died—January 22nd, 1901—Victoria was Britain’s longest reign-
ing monarch. Britain (and the world) had been transformed during her reign.
It had elected ten prime ministers, including Russell, Palmerston, and Disraeli
twice; Derby and Salisbury thrice; and Gladstone four times. The United States
had elected eighteen presidents. Van Buren was inaugurated only 481 days be-
fore her coronation. McKinley was shot only 227 days after her death. Between
1837 and 1901, Britain’s population had more than doubled. Where in 1837 there
was little but arable- or pasture-land, in 1901 there were cities, roads, railroads,
new industries, and new forms of local government. This transformation, how-
ever salutary, was profoundly disruptive. There was immigration into Britain.
There was immigration within Britain. Infrastructure was built. Vaccinations
were discovered. The business cycle displaced meteorology as the most impor-
tant source of economic uncertainty. In the following three essays, I explore
three reactions to these sundry disruptions.
In the first essay, I explore the Public Health Act of 1848—England’s first at-
tempt at systematic sanitation reform—and, in so doing, I provide quantitative
evidence of the effect of public health interventions on mortality in a decidedly
developing country. Between 1848 and 1870, the Public Health Act oversaw the
adoption of more than 600 local boards of health (which, combined, affected
roughly one-quarter of the English population). The Act endowed these boards
with the power to tax, borrow, regulate, provide sanitary services, and build,
re-build, seize, or otherwise alter local infrastructure. Since the jurisdictions of
local boards of health and the jurisdictions of Poor Law unions (i.e., the local
geographical units within which mortality statistics were recorded) were not
coterminous, the mortality effects of the Public Health Act have been largely
unexplored. I introduce a new panel dataset that maps the jurisdictions of local
boards of health into the jurisdictions of Poor Law unions. I then leverage vari-
ation in both the timing and extent of board adoption across Poor Law unions
in order to estimate the cumulative effect of the adoption of a local board of
health on mortality 1, 2, 3, and 4 years after adoption. My estimates suggest
that the adoption of a union-wide local board of health reduced mortality by
14.2 percent after four years, that approximately 225,000 lives were saved by
local boards of health between 1848 and 1870, and that the aggregate English
mortality rate was 3.7 percent lower in 1870 than it would have been had the
Public Health Act not been passed.
In the second essay, I explore the relationship between welfare generosity and
welfare caseloads. Between 1601 and 1948, the English welfare system was the
Poor Law. It provided working-class men, women, and children with a vital, if
meager, guarantee of support in the event that they sustained a negative income
shock. According to many contemporaries, it also encouraged indolence. In the
late 1860s and 1870s, objections to any guarantee of support grew more vocal
and more politically formidable. Some localities began to relieve a significantly
greater proportion of welfare recipients in workhouses—deliberately disagree-
able dwellings intended to disincentivize welfare recipiency. This movement
was, in effect, a de facto, decentralized welfare reform. I use variation in the
change in the proportion of welfare recipients relieved in workhouses between
1865 and 1880 across English localities to estimate the effect of workhouse use
on the rate of welfare recipiency. First, I introduce a new panel dataset of Poor
Law unions—local geographical units that administered the Poor Law, of which
there were approximately 600. Second, I employ a difference-in-differences
model to estimate whether and to what extent the workhouse affected the rate
of welfare recipiency. I find that approximately three in four welfare applicants
to whom the workhouse was offered as a ”test” refused the offer. I also find
that this ”workhouse effect” was insufficiently large to meaningfully reduce the
costs associated with the workhouse. Third, I employ a triple-difference model
to estimate whether welfare applicants to whom the workhouse was offered
were more likely to reject the offer if the workhouses in which they would be
relieved were deficient in ventilation, water supply, general sanitation, or diet.
I find that they were not.
In the third essay, I explore the relationship between wealth and welfare gen-
erosity. Were, for example, wealthier people or places more or less likely to favor
redistributive policies, such as a welfare system, because of their wealth? I isolate
quasi-experimental variation in per capita property wealth across English Poor
Law unions to quantify the causal effect of wealth on welfare generosity. Poor
Law unions were local geographical units, of which there were approximately
600 in 1881, that administered the English welfare system. They were, for all in-
tents and purposes, autonomous mini-welfare states, in each of which a board
of guardians determined the level of generosity. They were also agglomera-
tions of parishes—hyper-local geographical units, of which there were approx-
imately 14,000 in 1881. Each parish was entitled to a certain, pre-determined
number of guardians to represent it on the board of the Poor Law union to
which it belonged. Guardians were rarely apportioned to parishes in proportion
to their population. Some parishes—typically the wealthiest, least populous
parishes within a Poor Law union—were over-represented. Others—typically
the poorest, most populous parishes within a Poor Law union—were under-
represented. Moreover, the extent of the over-representation of the wealthiest
parishes varied across Poor Law unions. This is the variation that I leverage.
I introduce a new dataset that includes the number of guardians, the popula-
tion, and the property wealth of each English parish, as well as two distinct
measures of the welfare generosity of each English Poor Law union. I then use a
measure of the malapportionment of guardians—and, consequently, of the over-
representation of wealth on boards of guardians—as an instrument for wealth.
This instrument is both strongly correlated with wealth (by construction) and
uncorrelated with all other union-level variables that are both available and po-
tentially related to welfare generosity. I find that wealth itself caused neither an
increase nor a decrease in welfare generosity.
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CHAPTER 1
THE MORTALITY EFFECTS OF LOCAL BOARDS OF HEALTH IN
ENGLAND, 1848-70
1.1 Introduction
The health improvement that the developed world has achieved since the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century has been well-documented [42, 32, 102]. Infants
are more likely to reach adolescence, adolescents are more likely to reach adult-
hood, adults are more likely to reach old-age, and many of the key killers of the
nineteenth century (e.g., tuberculosis, typhoid, typhus, cholera) have been all
but eliminated. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate this achievement. Life expectancy
at birth increased by at least 60 percent between 1800 and 1950 in France, Ger-
many, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Average
height, for which both nutrition and exposure to disease are in part responsi-
ble, also increased in each of these countries between 1850 and 1900 and again
between 1900 and 1950.
What is less well-documented is the extent to which public health interven-
tions, especially early public health interventions, contributed to this health im-
provement. Rising incomes and the emergence of modern medicine have con-
founded attempts to quantify the importance of, for instance, the introduction of
sewage systems, water pumping plants, water treatment plants, and industrial
regulations. McKeown & Record (1962) and McKeown (1976), using mortality
records from England and Wales, demonstrate that a decline in communicable
disease was largely responsible for the decline in mortality during the second
half of the nineteenth century, and that this decline in communicable disease
1
pre-dated, by decades, the discoveries of any medical solutions thereto (e.g.,
vaccinations) [81, 80].1 Instead, they attribute the bulk of the decline in mor-
tality to increased nutritional intake made possible by rising incomes. Szreter
(1988, 1997), on the other hand, argues that public health interventions played
a leading role in the mortality decline between 1870 and 1900 [104, 106]. Cutler
& Miller (2005), Watson (2006), Ferrie & Troesken (2008), and Alsan & Goldin
(2015) corroborate the significance of public health interventions in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, but only for selected cities in the United
States [31, 110, 40, 15].
Evidence suggests that it is in the midst of a country’s transition from rural to
urban and from agricultural to industrial that it is most susceptible to negative
health shocks, and hence is most in need of intervention. Table 1.1 demonstrates
that rapid health improvement tended to lag the rapid economic improvement
generated by industrialization by between 25 and 50 years. Table 1.2 demon-
strates that industrialization and its concomitants (e.g., slum formation, over-
crowded cities, insufficient infrastructure) adversely affected health, as proxied
by height, in the short run. Today’s transitioning economies are hardly immune
to these concomitants, however ameliorated they are by higher incomes and the
knowledge of, if not access to, modern medicine.2 As such, an understanding
of the capacity of early public health interventions serves a dual role as both
historical description and contemporary prescription.
1Vaccinations for the most important communicable diseases did not appear until the late
1870s: cholera (1879), typhoid (1896), diphtheria (1896), tuberculosis (1921), whooping cough
(1926), typhus (1937). It was not until around 1900 that the germ theory of disease began to
displace ”misguided miasma theories” [92, p. 6].
2In India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, for example, the incidence of tuberculosis is be-
tween 70 and 130 times higher, the percent of deaths by communicable disease is between 2
and 4 times higher, and the rate of infant mortality is between 3 and 6 times higher than it is
in the United States. Consequently, the life expectancy at birth in these countries is between
10 and 11 years shorter than it is in the United States (as of 2015). See World Bank Database:
data.worldbank.org.
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In this essay, I evaluate the mortality effects of the Public Health Act of
1848—England’s first attempt at systematic sanitation improvement—and, in
so doing, I provide clear quantitative evidence of the relationship between pub-
lic health and mortality in the context of a transitioning economy. The state
of English sanitation on the eve of the Act was grim. Englanders in the 1840s
died at roughly three times the rate at which Englanders die today and, pro-
portionally speaking, about as many Englanders died from cholera, diarrhea,
diphtheria, dysentery, respiratory organs, tuberculosis, typhus, and whooping
cough (8.5 per 1,000 persons) as die from any cause today (9.3 per 1,000 per-
sons).3 Neither the quantity nor the quality of infrastructure was sufficient to
meet the drainage and water supply requirements of a rapidly growing urban
population in a rapidly industrializing economy. In the half-century before the
Act, England’s population had doubled (from 7.75 to 15.25 million) and had be-
come increasingly concentrated in urban centers (from 33.8 to 54.0 percent). The
number of cities of more than 3,000, 10,000, and 20,000 people roughly doubled,
tripled, and quadrupled, respectively. In 1801, London was the only English
city of more than 100,000 people. By 1851, it was one of nine [64].
It was against this backdrop, and as a result of the efforts of a great many
sanitary reformers, that the Public Health Act was passed. The Act oversaw the
adoption of more than 600 local boards of health between 1848 and 1870, and
by 1870 the jurisdictions of these local boards of health accounted for approx-
imately one-quarter of the English population. Each local board of health was
endowed with a variety of powers by which to effect sanitation improvement,
including the power to tax, to borrow, to provide certain services (e.g., street
3The mortality rate was significantly higher for English infants, who died at a rate of no less
than 125 per 1,000 births until the 1910s, roughly 30 times the rate at which they die today. I use
1859 cause-of-death data from the twenty-fourth Annual Report of the Registrar-General (1861),
the first of these reports to disaggregate mortality by cause at the registration district level.
3
sweeping, the removal of refuse and rubbish), to regulate certain activities (e.g.,
new construction, the disposal of industrial waste), and to build, re-build, seize,
or alter local infrastructure such as sewers or other waterworks. Local boards
were adopted, for all intents and purposes, voluntarily, upon the petition of at
least ten percent of the taxpayers within a given ”area.” Since ”area” was un-
defined by the Act, the jurisdictions of local boards did not match—except by
accident—the jurisdictions of any other administrative subdivision of England,
including the administrative subdivision within which mortality statistics were
recorded and reported (i.e., the Poor Law union). This geographical mismatch
has heretofore made it impossible to estimate the effect of the adoption of a local
board of health on mortality.
I make two principal contributions. First, I construct a new, comprehensive
dataset of local boards of health adopted in England between 1848 and 1870
from a variety of overlooked or otherwise unused primary sources. I overcome
the geographical mismatch between local boards of health and Poor Law unions
by mapping each local board of health into the Poor Law union or unions within
which it was adopted. I then characterize each Poor Law union, of which there
were approximately 600, by the proportion of its population that fell under the
jurisdiction of a local board of health in each year. Figure 1.3 illustrates the vari-
ation that I observe in the extent of local board adoption across unions and over
time. This variation enables me to adopt a difference-in-differences framework
that accounts for fixed differences across unions and, thereby, to improve upon
existing time-series analyses of the role played by public health interventions
in England’s nineteenth century mortality decline. Without geographical varia-
tion, these analyses have been compelled to compare the timing of the decline of
aggregate English mortality, often disaggregated by age or cause-of-death, with
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the timing of other England-wide changes.4 Since aggregate English mortality,
presented in Figure 1.4, did not begin to decline precipitously until the 1870s,
the implicit consensus of this literature is that English public health efforts prior
to 1870 were non-existent, ineffectual, or obstructed by municipal inactivism.
This consensus takes for granted that mortality between 1848 and 1870 would
not have been higher had the Public Health Act of 1848 not been passed.
Second, I conduct the first (to my knowledge) econometric study of the ef-
fect of a national public health intervention on pre-1870 mortality rates. I use
an event study model that leverages variation in both the timing and the extent
of local board adoption across unions. My estimates reveal a clear and statisti-
cally significant break in relative mortality trends in the year of board adoption.
Following Finkelstein (2007), I interpret the difference between pre- and post-
adoption trends as an estimate of the impact of the adoption of a local board of
health [41]. I calculate that the adoption of a union-wide local board of health
would have reduced mortality by 14.2 percent after four years. Accounting for
the proportion of the English population that fell under the jurisdiction of a lo-
cal board of health, this amounts to a 3.7 percent reduction in aggregate English
mortality by 1870, or approximately 225,000 lives saved. I also calculate that
the benefits of the adoption of a local board of health, as measured by the total
statistical value of the lives that they saved, exceeded the costs of the adoption
4This literature dates to the nineteenth century. See [69], [90], [44], [68], [81], [80], [104], [48],
[105], and [106]. One of the advantages of my approach is that I need not rely on notoriously
unreliable cause-of-death data. It was not until 1845 that the General Register Office (GRO)
began to issue medical practitioners printed forms for the purpose of certification, not until 1860
that more than 80% of registered deaths were certified, not until the Registration Act of 1874 that
the procedure for certification was standardized, and not until the 1880s that GRO statisticians
were empowered to submit confidential inquiries to double check ambiguous death certificates.
Moreover, misdiagnoses were commonplace. The quality of medical science and of medical
practitioners was not what it is today, and socially sensitive causes of death such as alcoholism,
syphilis, or suicide were very often intentionally misdiagnosed for the sake of the reputations
of the families of the deceased. See [37], [38], [70], [52], and [17] for a more comprehensive
discussion of the shortcomings of mid-nineteenth century cause-of-death statistics.
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of a local board of health, as measured by total board expenditure, under all but
the unlikeliest of assumptions about the relationship between board borrowing
(which I do observe) and board spending (which I do not).
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I provide
a brief sketch of relevant English local government areas; enumerate the sources
from which my dataset is drawn; illustrate the procedure by which local boards
were adopted, created, and composed; summarize the powers endowed to local
boards; and assess the extent to which these powers were exercised. In Section
1.3, I introduce my empirical model, discuss identification and potential threats
to identification, interpret my results, and conduct a back-of-the-envelope cost-
benefit analysis of local board adoption. In Section 1.4, I conclude.
1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 English Local Government Areas & Data
English local government areas in the nineteenth century were, in a word, a
”chaos” [67, p. 79].5 Inhabitants of municipal boroughs, for example, ”lived
in a fourfold area for local government purposes—the borough, the parish, the
union, and the county,” and this is to say nothing of the hundred, the riding,
the ward, the cinque port, the police district, or the parliamentary constituency.
In this section, I illustrate the geography of and the relationships between each
of the three administrative subdivisions of England upon which the rest of this
5Of English local government, George Goschen wrote in 1871 that ”we have a chaos as re-
gards authorities, a chaos as regards rates, and a worse chaos than all as regards areas.”
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essay relies: (i) the parish, (ii) the union, and (iii) the local board of health. I also
introduce the data that I employ within each subdivision and the sources from
which these data are drawn and transcribed. A more detailed description of the
way in which my dataset is constructed can be found in the Data Appendix.
The Parish. A descendent of the Saxon ”vill” or township, the parish was, in
its infancy, the ecclesiastical counterpart to the feudal manor [67, p. 24]. By the
beginning of the nineteenth century it had acquired a hodgepodge of admin-
istrative functions, including, but not limited to, the keeping of the peace, the
repression of vagrancy, and the relief of destitution [111, p. 4]. For the purposes
of this essay, the parish is significant because it was the smallest subdivision in
the hierarchy of English local government, and therefore the subdivision in rela-
tion to which both the union and the local board of health were defined [94, pp.
22-23]. There were approximately 13,000 parishes in England by the middle of
the nineteenth century. Panel A of Figure 1.5, for example, plots the boundaries
of each of the 242 parishes within the county of Berkshire.
The Union. The union was conceived as an intermediary between the parish
and the county by the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, which required an
administrative subdivision that would be, on the one hand, large enough that
its tax base could conceivably finance the construction and operation of a work-
house, and, on the other hand, small enough that the average commute for wel-
fare recipients and welfare administrators would not be prohibitively lengthy.
Parishes failed the first test. Counties failed the second. The solution was to
agglomerate parishes into approximately 600 unions of parishes that, when
brought into existence, would become ”by far the most complete governmental
organization in the country” [28, pp. 62-63]. Panel B of Figure 1.5, for example,
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plots the boundaries of each of the 12 unions in the county of Berkshire, as well
as the boundaries of the parishes of which these unions were made up. This
organization was subsequently used to superintend a new, secular system for
the registration of births, deaths, and marriages. Registration data were com-
piled and reported annually by the General Register Office, and it is from the
tenth through the thirty-third of these Reports (1849-72) that I obtain the num-
ber of deaths in each union in each year between 1847 and 1870. I obtain the
population, the percent of adults working in agriculture, the area in acres, and
the names of the constituent parishes of each union in 1841, 1851, 1861, and
1871 from Decennial Census Reports (1841-71). I obtain the political affiliation,
the proportion of acreage that consisted of water (i.e., harbors, creeks, rivers,
etc.), the proportion of population that fell under the jurisdiction of a munici-
pal government, and indicators for whether coal or cotton-textiles were ”special
occupations” of each union from the Census Report of 1851.6 Political affiliation
is defined as the proportion of the members of Parliament representing each
union that belonged to a conservative political party in 1852 according to the
Guide to the House of Commons (1857). I obtain the per capita welfare expendi-
ture of each union from the Fourth Annual Report of the Poor Law Board (1851).
Welfare expenditure is defined as the amount ”expended for in-maintenance,
for out-relief, and for other expenses of or immediately connected with [the
English Poor Law].” I obtain the rateable value (i.e., property wealth) of each
union in the years 1856 and 1868 from the Return of the Gross Estimated Rental
Property (1861) and the Return of Rateable Value (1869), respectively. Lastly, I ob-
tain measures of the religiosity and the religious affiliation of the inhabitants of
each union from the Religious Supplement to the Census of 1851. I define religios-
6Neither the boundaries of parliamentary constituencies nor the boundaries of municipal
boroughs matched the boundaries of poor law unions. See the Data Appendix for the method
by which I match these areas to one another.
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ity as the percent of population that attended any church service on March 30th,
1851. I define religious affiliation as the percent of church sittings that were
non-conformist (i.e., non-Anglican Protestant) in 1851.
The Local Board of Health. The Public Health Act of 1848 introduced an addi-
tional administrative subdivision—the local board of health—atop of the exist-
ing network of parishes and unions. Local board districts were defined as the
parishes or parts of parishes of which they were made up, and were neither con-
strained nor informed by the boundaries of unions. There was, therefore, only
coincidental geographical agreement between the administrative subdivision
within which mortality statistics were reported (i.e., the union) and the admin-
istrative subdivision for which mortality reduction was the raison d’eˆtre (i.e.,
the local board of health). I match the two administrative subdivisions in the
following way. First, I obtain the population, the adoption date, and the names
of the parishes partly or wholly within the districts of each local board of health
adopted between 1848 and 1866 from the Return of Local Boards (1868).7 Second,
I match the parishes partly or wholly within the districts of each local board
of health to the union or unions to which they belonged. Third, I determine
the fraction of each union’s population that fell within the jurisdiction of a local
board in every year between 1848 and 1866. I then characterize each union by
(i) the extent to which it was ”treated” by the adoption of a local board of health
and (ii) the year in which this ”treatment” occurred. The Wallingford Poor Law
Union, for example, consisted of 29 parishes, five of which combined to form the
Wallingford Local Board of Health in 1863. These five parishes (i.e., Allhallows,
St. Leonard, St. Mary-the-More, St. Peter, and Wallingford Castle) accounted
for 31.5 percent of the Wallingford Union’s population. I therefore consider the
7This Return also enumerates the area in acres and the rateable value of each of these local
boards.
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Wallingford Poor Law Union to have been 31.5 percent treated, beginning in
1863, by the Public Health Act. Panel C of Figure 1.5 plots the boundaries of
each of the three local boards of health adopted between 1848 and 1866 in the
country of Berkshire.
Throughout the remainder of the essay I use the union-year as my unit of
observation. It is therefore necessary to (i) merge boards adopted in the same
union in the same year and (ii) divide boards that crossed union boundaries.8
These modifications yield 444 board adoptions in 272 distinct unions between
1848 and 1866. Of these 272 adoption unions, about two-thirds (176 unions)
experienced only one board adoption and about one-third (96 unions) experi-
enced more than one board adoption during this period. The remaining 304
unions did not adopt a local board of health. Figure 1.6 plots the distribution
of board adoptions per union. Figure 1.7 demonstrates that the diffusion of lo-
cal boards of health across England was gradual and, even by 1866, far from
comprehensive—in that year, only 26.6 percent of England’s population and
19.7 percent of England’s rateable value fell under the jurisdiction of a local
board of health.
I exclude two types of unions from my dataset. First, I exclude all 27
8Here I give two examples. The first example demonstrates board-merging. Two boards
were adopted in the Altrincham Union in 1863: the Lymm Local Board on March 6th, con-
sisting of the 3,750-person parish of Lymm, and the Hollingworth Local Board on Decem-
ber 7th, consisting of the 2,300-person parish of Hollingworth. I consider these as one 6,050-
person board. The second example demonstrates board-dividing. The Kingston-upon-Hull
Local Board, adopted in 1851, consisted of the entirety of the 55,000-person Kingston-upon-
Hull Union as well as the 2,000-person parish of Drypool, the 2,000-person parish of Garri-
son Side, the 27,000-person parish of Sculcoates, the 2,000-person parish of Southcoates, and
the 8,000-person parish of Sutton in the Sculcoates Union. I consider this as two boards—one
55,000-person board in the Kingston-upon-Hull Union and another 41,000-person board in the
Sculcoates Union. Since local boards were disproportionately adopted in high-population areas,
and since unions were typically ”arranged in a circle, taking a market town as [their] centre, and
comprehending those surrounding parishes whose inhabitants [were] accustomed to resort to
the same market,” it was relatively rare for a local board to cross union boundaries. See [3] and
[67, p. 4].
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metropolitan London unions since metropolitan London was excluded from the
Public Health Act.9 This leaves 549 total unions and 272 adoption unions. Sec-
ond, I exclude all 20 unions within which at least one local board was adopted
between 1867 and 1870. Although I observe where these boards were adopted,
I do not observe their exact adoption date, and therefore cannot characterize
the post-adoption period of their corresponding unions with any precision.10
This leaves 529 total unions and 252 adoption unions, each of which has a well-
defined post-period through 1870.
Table 1.3 presents summary statistics for all of England, for England exclud-
ing metropolitan London, for adoption unions, and for adoption unions that re-
main in my sample. I find that adoption unions tended to be somewhat poorer,
less agricultural, less conservative, and more likely to produce coal or cotton-
textiles. A comparison of the second and third columns of Table 1.3 shows that
the exclusion of the 20 unions within which a local board of health was adopted
between 1867 and 1870 does not significantly alter the composition of unions in
my dataset. Likewise, a comparison of the fifth and sixth columns of Table 1.3
shows that this exclusion does not significantly alter the composition of boards
in my dataset.
1.2.2 The General Board of Health
In order to oversee the adoption of local boards of health, the Public Health
Act established a national, three-member General Board of Health, equipped
9It was believed that metropolitan London ”required special legislation because of its size”
[50, p. 590]. This legislation consisted of the Metropolitan Commission of Sewers Act of 1848
and the Metropolis Management Act of 1855.
10Board adoptions between 1867 and 1870 are enumerated in the Return of Number & Names
of Local Boards (1870).
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this Board with a veritable army of clerks, servants, and inspectors, and de-
fined the precise procedure by which a ”city, town, borough, parish, or place”
could adopt a local board. Since the language of the Act did not require that the
boundaries of boards conform to or lie within any other boundary, a board of
any size could be adopted anywhere, no matter how small or large, how com-
pact or straggling. Adoption, furthermore, could be voluntary or involuntary, at
least in principle. Voluntary adoption required a petition containing the signa-
tures of at least 10 percent of the inhabitants rated to the relief of the poor in
a particular area. Involuntary adoption required an imposition by the General
Board. If the General Board ascertained that the death rate in a particular area
exceeded 23 per 1,000 persons for a period of no less than seven years, then it
was authorized to impose a local board upon an area without the consent of its
inhabitants.11 In practice, however, local boards were rarely, if ever, imposed
on areas ”without substantial local enthusiasm” [50, p. 590]. Since sanitary im-
provements were undertaken at the discretion of the boards themselves, any
attempt to impose a board on an area disinclined to sanitize itself would accom-
plish nothing. The General Board could impose adoption but could not compel
action.
My data corroborate this point. By 1855, at least one local board was adopted
in only 55 of the 120 non-London unions within which the average death rate
between 1847 and 1853 exceeded 23 per 1,000 persons. In only 12 of these 55
adoption unions did this adoption occur in 1854 or 1855, when the mortality
statistics of the entire seven-year period would have been known to the Gen-
eral Board. These approximate proportions hold for every seven-year period
11This provision, ”in effect, set a mortality rate, the then national average, as a minimum
standard of health and as an administrative cue to permit action by the central health authority”
[37, p. 340].
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between 1847 (the first year in which the General Register Office reported mor-
tality statistics at the union level) and 1858 (the year in which the Local Gov-
ernment Act replaced the General Board of Health with the Local Government
Act Office, and, in so doing, made the clause in the Public Health Act that au-
thorized the involuntary adoption of local boards inoperative).12 Thereafter,
adoption was entirely optional with inhabitants in both principle and practice.
1.2.3 The Creation and Composition of Local Boards of Health
Both the creation and the composition of local boards of health depended on the
geographical boundaries that they took.
Creation. A superintending inspector was sent to every area that petitioned for
adoption to assess its general sanitary state and the sanitary state of its inhabi-
tants. If, after inspection, the General Board determined that the Act should be
applied ”within the same boundaries as those of an [existing] city, town, bor-
ough, parish, or place,” local board adoption required only an Order in Council
(i.e., an order of the Queen acting by and with the advice and consent of her
Privy Council). If, however, the General Board determined that the Act should
be applied within new boundaries—within boundaries ”not being the same as
those of an [existing] city, town, borough, parish, or place”—local board adop-
tion required a Provisional Order (i.e., an order by the General Board to be con-
firmed by Parliament). I find that roughly half of all boards were created by
12Originally intended to expire in 1854, after a five-year phase-in period, the General Board
was renewed annually four times. These acts of renewal were the Public Health Act of 1854,
the General Board of Health Continued Act of 1855, the General Board of Health Act of 1856,
and the General Board of Health Act of 1857. The Local Government Act of 1858 abolished the
General Board of Health, permitted a counter-petition of 5 percent of an area’s inhabitants, and
permitted town councils of municipal boroughs to file for adoption directly. See [71, p. 38] and
[63, pp. 123-124].
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Provisional Order.13 The boundaries, therefore, of roughly half of all boards did
not previously exist for any other administrative purpose.
Composition. Members of local boards were either elected or appointed. If a
board’s jurisdiction consisted exclusively of a municipal borough (or a part of a
municipal borough), then all board members were to be appointed from among
the borough’s town councilors (by the borough’s town council). If a board’s
jurisdiction consisted of no part of any municipal borough, then all board mem-
bers were to be elected by ratepayers. If a board’s jurisdiction consisted of both
a municipal borough (or a part of a municipal borough) as well as other areas,
then some board members were to be appointed and some board members were
to be elected. This proportion was fixed by the Order in Council or Provisional
Order by which the board was created.
The Act, in effect, established a distinct voting scale for each of these two
types of local board members. Elected members, on the one hand, were elected
directly according to a plural voting scale by which the wealthiest ratepayers
were awarded disproportionate electoral influence. Ratepayers could receive
up to six votes for property owned and up to six votes for property occupied.14
Appointed members, on the other hand, were elected indirectly. Municipal vot-
ers (called ”burgesses”) elected town councilors on a one man, one vote basis.
Town councilors, in turn, were entitled (if appointed) to serve on local boards
of health. The dramatic difference in voting scales for directly- and indirectly-
13Among all local boards of health adopted in England and Wales between 1848 and 1858, 45
percent were created by Order in Council, 50 percent were created by Provisional Order, and the
other 5 percent were created by Local Acts. Boards created by Local Acts were called improve-
ment commissions. In this essay I do not distinguish between local boards and improvement
commissions insofar as these commissions ”incorporated parts, at least, of the Public Health
Act.” See Return of Districts where PHA is in Force (1867).
14The voting scale used for local board elections was identical to the scale established for the
election of Poor Law boards of guardians by the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1844 [59, p. 229].
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elected board members generated an asymmetry in power among voting blocs
that varied with the location of the board. The plural voting scale used to elect
board members in non-municipal areas concentrated power in the hands of the
haute bourgeoisie. The singular voting scale used to elect town councilors in
municipal boroughs concentrated power in the hands of the petite bourgeoisie,
who were more numerous than their wealthier counterparts and still wealthy
enough to qualify for the franchise. Table 1.4 provides a side-by-side compar-
ison of who, precisely, qualified for the franchise in local board and municipal
elections.
Szreter (1997) argues that this asymmetry effectively countermanded the
Public Health Act—that the domination of a unified (and uniquely parsimo-
nious) petite bourgeoisie over municipal politics obstructed urban sanitation ef-
forts until the Municipal Franchise Act of 1869 extended the municipal fran-
chise to the upper tier of the working class, whereupon the stranglehold of the
so-called ”shopocracy” was broken [106]. The evidence that I present in this
essay, however, contradicts this argument. First, I find that the reach of mu-
nicipal politics was limited. In 1851, municipal boroughs contained less than
one-quarter of the total English population and less than one-half of the English
population living in towns of greater than 2,000 inhabitants. More than 50 towns
returning members to Parliament (i.e., parliamentary boroughs) were not regu-
lated by the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 and, therefore, any local boards
adopted within them would not have faced the penny-pinching pressures of an
ascendant petite bourgeoisie.15 Figure 1.8, which juxtaposes population density
15According to the 1851 Census Report, there were 465 English towns of more than 2,000 in-
habitants, 176 of which were municipal boroughs, 52 of which were parliamentary boroughs
that were not also municipal boroughs, and 237 of which were neither a municipal nor a parlia-
mentary borough. Therefore, only 37% of all such English towns were regulated by the Munici-
pal Corporations Act of 1835. There were 10,329,249 persons living in these 465 towns (roughly
60 percent of the English population), 4,300,864 of which lived in a municipal borough, 4,743,441
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with the location of municipal boroughs by parish, illustrates the scope of mu-
nicipal boroughs more clearly. Second, I find that there is a positive correlation
between the percent of union population that fell under the jurisdiction of a
municipal borough in 1851 and the percent of union population that fell un-
der the jurisdiction of a local board of health by 1866, and that this correlation
persists even after controlling for differences in population density (see Section
1.3.1 for a more detailed discussion of the determinants of board adoption). If
municipal governments and the petite bourgeoisie that they disproportionately
represented were, in fact, opposed to the adoption of local boards of health,
there is little evidence that they succeeded in their opposition.
If municipal politics did not deter local board adoption, what, precisely, in-
duced it? Why would the wealthier inhabitants of a given area (i.e., ratepayers)
voluntarily pay for the provision of sanitation improvement, and in so doing
subsidize the poorer inhabitants (i.e., non-ratepayers), to whom many, if not
most, of the benefits of sanitation improvement would accrue? The answer lies
in the proximity of the wealthy to the poor. ”Close to the splendid houses of
the rich,” wrote Engels in 1845, ”the bitterest poverty [is often] found” [36, p.
28]. Booth (1889) corroborates this point [21]. Figure 1.9 illustrates that behind
and adjacent to the middle-class residences that lined the boulevards of Lon-
don were some of the city’s poorest residences. In most English cities of the
nineteenth century, there was no enclave to which the rich retreated. Rich and
poor lived side-by-side, and the consequences of an outbreak of disease in a
city slum would quickly spill over elsewhere. It was in the self-interest of the
wealthy ratepayer to prevent this from happening. The next section describes
of which lived in a parliamentary borough that was not also a municipal borough, 146,639 of
which lived in a parliamentary borough that was also a municipal borough but outside of the
boundaries of the municipal part, and 1,138,305 of which lived in a town that was neither a
municipal nor a parliamentary borough.
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the means by which local boards of health could do so.
1.2.4 The Powers of Local Boards of Health
Once formed, local boards were required to hold meetings at least once a month
and to appoint Inspectors of Nuisances to investigate industrial emissions,
unsanitary dwellings, and accumulations of refuse and sewage, among other
things. Local boards were also encouraged to appoint legally qualified medical
practitioners as Officers of Health, though ”what such officers [were] to do re-
mained vague” [50, p. 590].16 In what follows, I divide the powers endowed to
local boards by the Public Health Act into four broad categories: (i) large capital
outlays, (ii) small capital outlays, (iii) regulations, and (iv) revenues.
Large Capital Outlays. This category contains two classic public health expen-
ditures: sewers and waterworks. Edwin Chadwick, the architect of the Public
Health Act, ”had envisaged every urban house connected to both a clean water
supply and to a waterborne mains sewerage system” [106, p. 708]. Though the
realization of this vision took more than a few decades, its seed was sown in
1848. Boards could construct, repair, enlarge, redirect, clean, or empty sewers
as they saw fit. All sewers, ”whether existing or made at any time thereafter,”
were to be ”entirely under the management and control of the local board of
health.”17 Likewise, boards could construct waterworks ”to provide their dis-
trict with such a supply of water as [was considered] proper and sufficient,” so
long as no for-profit company was willing to do the same. If necessary, boards
16All questions were to be decided by a majority vote of local board members during these
meetings.
17An exception was made for sewers ”made by any person or persons for his or their own
profit.” Nevertheless, boards were authorized to ”purchase or contract for the use of any such
sewers.”
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were authorized to ”purchase, take upon lease, sell, or exchange any lands or
premises” within their districts.
Small Capital Outlays. This category contains less ambitious but more imme-
diate infrastructure improvements. Public streets could be ”swept, cleansed,
and watered” by local boards, and any ”dust ashes, rubbish, filth, dung, or
soil thereon” could be ”collected and removed.” Boards could pave, re-pave,
repair, channel, level, or otherwise alter any street in order to minimize fetid
standing water. Boards could also provide and maintain ”boxes for the tempo-
rary deposit or collection of rubbish” and ”waterclosets, privies, or other similar
conveniences for public accommodation.”
Regulations. Boards could require the registration of houses, businesses, or
other individuals in order to ensure compliance with regulations—or bye-
laws—that they passed. Once passed, bye-laws would be circulated in at least
one newspaper in the district for at least one month prior to their official adop-
tion, after which time they would be printed and hung in the office of the local
board. Bye-laws oversaw a number of activities and business entities. Among
them were the following.
New Construction. The builder of any house was required to report to
the local board the ”intended level of the lowest floor” and the ”situa-
tion and construction of any privies or cesspools” at least fourteen days
before groundbreaking. It was unlawful to build or re-build a house with-
out ”a covered drain for proper and effectual drainage,” and if the house
was within one-hundred feet of a public sewer, its drain was required to
communicate with it.
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Lodging Houses. It was unlawful for landlords to let ”cellars, vaults, or un-
derground rooms” that were ”ineffectually drained,” less than seven feet
in height, or less than three feet in ”height above the surface of the street or
ground adjoining.” Occupancy, ventilation, and sanitation standards were
to be set by local boards.
Offensive Trades. Inspectors of nuisances were authorized to enter any
slaughterhouse ”at all reasonable times” in order to dispose of ”unfit
meat.” Likewise, any ”blood boiler, bone boiler, or other noxious or offen-
sive business, trade or manufacture” was subject to periodic inspection.
Burial Grounds. If it was determined that a graveyard was ”in such a state
as to be dangerous to the health of the persons living in the neighborhood
thereof, by reason of the surcharged state of the vaults or graves,” and that
”sufficient means of interment [existed] within a convenient distance,” it
was made unlawful to ”bury any further corpses or coffins within it.”
Other. Any undue accumulation of ”waste, stagnant water, manure, dung,
soil, or filth, or any other offensive or noxious matter” was prohibited.
More generally, if a house was kept ”in such a filthy or unwholesome con-
dition that the health of any person [was] affected or endangered thereby,”
the local board could require that the owner or occupier of the house
”whitewash, cleanse, or purify the same.” Lastly, manufacturers were li-
able to penalty (and would incur the cost of the examination) if they were
found to have ”fouled” any ”stream, reservoir, conduit, aqueduct, or other
waterwork.” By-products of gasworks manufactures were singled out by
the language of the Act.
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Revenues. Boards had access to two types of property taxes—the ”general dis-
trict rate” and the ”special district rate,” intended to defray short- and long-term
expenditures, respectively—and boards could borrow on the security of either
tax. Debt was necessary to finance lumpy public works projects that could not
be built ”bit by bit out of annual income” [49, p. 278]. The Exchequer offered
subsidized loans for this purpose, subject to the approval, after inspection, of
the General Board. Of relatively minor importance were fines and private im-
provement rates collected from offenders of bye-laws. Fine amounts were set
at the discretion of local boards, though they could not exceed £5 per offense,
and in the case of a continuing offense any additional penalty could not exceed
forty shillings for each day after written notice. Private improvement rates were
reimbursements made to boards by non-compliant individuals for any improve-
ments undertaken by boards on their behalf. Lastly, private water rates might
be levied ”in respect of water supplied to private properties” in proportion to
the ”net annual values of the premises.”
To what extent did boards actually exercise these powers? The literature sug-
gests that they did so sparingly, only when it benefited industry, or not at all.18
My claim is twofold. First, boards that did not spend with abandon need not
have been inactive or ineffective. Regulation was such that disobedient indi-
18Rosen (1958) claims that ”even the most elementary proposals for the improvement of
drainage and water supplies were opposed [by vested interests] in the sacred names of prop-
erty and human freedom” [97, p. 125]. Hassan (1985) and Szreter (1997) emphasize that ”the
significance of water as an industrial raw material was often the primary consideration, with
commercial demand consuming in many cases half of the extra urban water supply capacity
created after 1848” [53, p. 540]. Only when ”key local businessmen could see a commercial ad-
vantage was an initiative taken” [106, p. 708]. Michael (1874) and Lipman (1949) refer to boards
adopted ”with the express intention of doing nothing under the [Public] Health Acts, but of
avoiding liabilities incident to their districts” [83, p. 443]. After the passage of the Highway Act
of 1862, for example, parishes feared that ”if they were put into a highway district, they would
always be paying for the roads in the next parish.” Small parishes, therefore, saw a ”convenient
loophole.” Since local board of health districts retained control of their own highways, ”these
small parishes rushed to acquire the status of local boards, with no intention in fact of ever
building a sewer or providing a drain” [67].
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viduals, households, or businesses—not district ratepayers—bore the cost of
improvement. Furthermore, even trivial expenditures may well have yielded
nontrivial improvements given the abysmal state of nineteenth century sanita-
tion. Second, boards were spending. The Return of Local Boards of Health (1857)
and the first through twelfth Annual Reports of the Home Secretary (1858-70) reveal
that more than £7 million were borrowed by local boards from the Exchequer
between 1848 and 1870. This amounts to approximately $805 million in 2017
U.S. dollars.19 Since I observe neither loans secured by local boards from pri-
vate sources nor direct expenditures by local boards from out of general, private
improvement, or private water rates, I interpret loans secured by local boards
from the Exchequer as a lower bound for public health expenditures.
Table 1.5 illustrates these data in greater detail, by location and by type of
borrowing. Somewhat surprisingly, I find that debt was neither limited to nor
concentrated in industrial areas. On the contrary, local boards in unions that
specialized in coal or cotton-textile production borrowed slightly less per person
than did the average board between 1848 and 1870. Furthermore, nearly 62
percent of all borrowing by local boards between 1858 and 1870 was earmarked
for what I have called ”large capital outlays” (i.e., drainage, water supply, land
purchases, and other permanent works).
19See [88] for conversion.
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1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Model
My empirical strategy exploits two dimensions of variation—(i) the timing of
local board adoption and (ii) the share of union population under the jurisdic-
tion of a local board—in order to identify the effect of local boards on mortality
rates. Figure 1.10 illustrates the first dimension of variation. There were two
ill-defined waves of local board adoption: one in the early 1850s and another
in the early-to-mid 1860s. Figure 1.11 illustrates the second dimension of vari-
ation. The share of union population under the jurisdiction of a local board
varied widely, from 1.5 to 100 percent among adoption unions, but the vast
majority of local boards accounted for less than half of the population of the
union within which they were adopted. I estimate an event study model that
accommodates both of these dimensions of variation. Formally, I estimate the
following equation.
DRut = β0+
j=−2∑
j=−4
pi j · 1(EYut = j) · BFRACu, j=0
+
j=4∑
j=0
pi j · 1(EYut = j) · BFRACut
+β1BFRACut + β2Xut + ηu + γt + ut
(1.1)
The subscript u indexes unions (from 1 to 522) and the subscript t indexes years
(from 1847 to 1870). DRut is the crude death rate in union u in year t and Xut
is a vector of time-varying union-specific covariates that includes population
density, rateable value per capita, and percent of adults employed in agriculture.
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EYut is the number of years (as of year t) since the first board adoption in union
u (i.e., event years). I set EYut equal to −4 for all event years less than or equal
to −4 and to 4 for all event years greater than or equal to 4. BFRACut is the
share of union u’s population that fell under the jurisdiction of a local board of
health in year t. BFRACu, j=0 is the share of union u’s population that fell under
the jurisdiction of the first local board of health adopted within union u (i.e., the
share of union u’s population that fell under the jurisdiction of a local board of
health in event year j = 0). For unions within which no local board of health
was adopted between 1848 and 1870, BFRACut = BFRACu, j=0 = 0 for all t. For
unions within which only one local board of health was adopted between 1848
and 1870, BFRACut = BFRACu, j=0 > 0 for all event years j > 0. For unions
within which more than one local board of health was adopted between 1848
and 1870, BFRACut exceeds BFRACu, j=0 in some event years j > 0 in order to
account for the effect of subsequent board adoptions on mortality. ηu are union
fixed-effects. These control for any fixed differences in death rates across unions.
γt are year fixed-effects. These control for any England-wide trends in death
rates. ut is an error term. All variables except EYut, BFRACut, and BFRACu, j=0
are in logarithms, each union-year observation is weighted by population, and
standard errors are clustered at the union level in order to account for within-
union serial correlation.
The coefficients of interest are the set of pi j. I interpret these as the flexibly
estimated pattern of death rates in adoption unions relative to non-adoption
unions, accounting for differences in board-share (i.e., BFRACut) among adop-
tion unions. I suppress pi−1, therefore each pi j for all j , −1 is measured relative
to the year before the year of first board adoption. This amounts to normal-
izing pi−1 to β1—the estimated difference in death rates between adoption and
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non-adoption unions that is independent of event-time, again accounting for
differences in board-share among adoption unions. Since Equation 1.1 does not
privilege any one event year over another, a downward break in the trend of
this pattern at j = 0 would indicate that local board adoption did, in fact, reduce
mortality. A pattern without a trend break, or with a trend break that occurs ei-
ther before or after j = 0, would indicate that local board adoption played an
insignificant role in English mortality trends between 1848 and 1870.
Because of the possibility that boards were adopted when, where, and to
the extent that they were adopted because mortality was worsening, I follow
Finkelstein (2007) and interpret the change in relative mortality trends before
and after adoption as my estimate of the impact of the adoption of a local board
of health [41]. Formally, I calculate p˜i j, the cumulative mortality effect of the
adoption of a union-wide local board of health j years after adoption, using
my estimates of pi j from Equation 1.1:
p˜i j = pˆi j − j + 13 (pˆi−4) for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} (1.2)
This amounts to measuring all post-adoption estimates of pi j against the relative
pre-trend defined by the line formed between the points (−4, pˆi−4) and (−1, pˆi−1),
where the first coordinate refers to event year and the second coordinate refers
to estimated percent mortality change. I also calculate the incremental mortality
effect of the adoption of a union-wide local board of health in the jth year after
adoption by subtracting p˜i j−1 from p˜i j for all j > 0. I calculate standard errors
using the delta method.
This interpretation (and my empirical strategy more generally) relies on
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three main assumptions. First, I assume that the variation that I observe in
the timing and extent of local board adoption across unions is largely idiosyn-
cratic, and not simply an artifact of pre-Public Health Act differences in union
characteristics that might themselves be correlated with mortality. Despite that
I control for many of these characteristics (either explicitly or implicitly using
union fixed-effects), there remains the possibility that the relationship between
these characteristics and the timing and/or extent of local board adoption is
nearly deterministic, leaving little exogenous variation with which to identify
Equation 1.1. Since board adoption was, for all intents and purposes, volun-
tary with the taxpayers in a given area, this possibility is of genuine concern. In
order to test for this, I use various pre-Public Health Act union characteristics
to predict (i) whether unions adopted local boards of health, (ii) the extent to
which unions adopted local boards of health, and (iii) the year in which unions
adopted local boards of health. Formally, I estimate the following equations:
BOARDu = α0 + α1PRECHARACTERISTICSu + u (1.3)
BFRACu,1866 = δ0 + δ1PRECHARACTERISTICSu + u (1.4)
ADOPTYEARu = µ0 + µ1PRECHARACTERISTICSu + u (1.5)
I define BOARDu as a dummy that takes a value of 1 if any portion of union u
fell under the jurisdiction of a local board of health by 1866, BFRACu,1866 as the
fraction of union u’s population that fell under the jurisdiction of a local board of
health by 1866, ADOPTYEARu as the year of first local board of health adoption
in union u, and PRECHARACTERISTICSu as a vector of union-specific charac-
teristics that includes the mortality rate in 1847, the population growth rate be-
tween 1841 and 1851, population density in 1847, the percent of adults working
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in agriculture in 1847, dummies for whether coal or cotton-textiles were ”spe-
cial occupations” in 1851, the proportion of acreage that consisted of water (i.e.,
harbors, creeks, rivers, etc.) in 1851, rateable value per capita in 1847, welfare
expenditure per capita (used here as a proxy for poverty) in 1851, and the pro-
portion of population that fell under the jurisdiction of a municipal borough in
1851.20
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 report the results of Equations 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5. I find that
less agricultural, less dense, and less impoverished unions were more likely
to adopt a local board of health; that less agricultural and less dense unions
within which population was growing more quickly and a greater share of pop-
ulation was under the jurisdiction of a municipal borough were more likely to
adopt a bigger local board of health (as a percentage of population); and that
richer and less agricultural unions with higher rates of initial mortality were
more likely to adopt a local board of health earlier.21 Nevertheless, the quan-
titative importance of these predictors is small. More than 74 percent of the
variation in BOARDu, more than 66 percent of the variation in BFRACu,1866, and
more than 88 percent of the variation in ADOPTYEARu remains unexplained by
PRECHARACTERISTICSu. I interpret the weakness of the fit of these models as
evidence of the strength of my identification strategy. Put differently, the vast
majority of the variation in both the timing and extent of board adoptions across
unions appears to be idiosyncratic—a consequence, for instance, of variation in
the capacity to act collectively, as opposed to variation in mortality-related en-
20Data limitations require that I draw some ”pre”-characteristics from the 1851 Census Re-
port, despite that these characteristics (i.e., coal and cotton-textile dummies, percent water, and
percent municipal borough) are measured three years after the Public Health Act was passed.
21The (counterintuitive) correlation between population density and board adoption is a con-
sequence of a small number of very populous unions within which no board, or only a very
small board, was adopted. When log(density) is included in lieu of density, the direction of this
correlation is reversed.
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vironmental or social conditions.
Second, I assume that relative mortality trends before board adoption would
have continued into the post-adoption period had no local boards of health
been adopted (i.e., the mortality rate in adoption unions would have contin-
ued to worsen at the same rate relative to the mortality rate in non-adoption
unions had the Public Health Act not been passed). This assumption is implicit
in Equation 1.2.
Third, I assume that that there are no unaccounted-for changes within
unions over time that affected mortality and occurred contemporaneously with
board adoption. I address three potentially confounding factors: (i) shifts in age
distributions, (ii) the Lancashire Cotton Famine, and (iii) deaths in public institutions.
Shifts in Age Distributions. Mortality rates are extremely sensitive to the per-
centage of the population that is either very old or very young. Between 1841
and 1871, 65- to 74-year-olds died at roughly three times the rate of the English
population as a whole, and infants died at more than twice the rate of 65- to 74-
year-olds [81, p. 100]. Consequently, unions with disproportionately tail-heavy
age distributions had, ceteris paribus, disproportionately high mortality rates.
In order to account for the possibility that many unions simultaneously experi-
enced both a board adoption and a change in the share of the population that
was either very young or very old, I estimate two alternative specifications of
Equation 1.1. The first includes OLDut and YOUNGut, where OLDut is the per-
centage of union u’s population aged greater than 60 in year t and YOUNGut
is the percentage of union u’s population aged less than 5 in year t.22 The sec-
ond includes AGEutb, a 20-bin age-share spline, where AGEut1 is the percentage
22Census reports did not disaggregate infants from 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds within unions
until 1861.
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of union u’s population between 0 and 5 in year t, AGEut2 is the percentage of
union u’s population between 5 and 10 in year t, and so on. Demographic evi-
dence suggests that neither of these alternative specifications will significantly
alter my results. Figure 1.12 illustrates that it was not until the end of the nine-
teenth century that the English age distribution began its shift from a convex to
a more familiar concave shape. This shift was the result of a precipitous decline
in infant mortality and a slower, more persistent decline in the birth rate.23
Lancashire Cotton Famine. In the nineteenth century the United States was
England’s principal supplier of raw cotton. This commercial relationship was
temporarily severed during the American Civil War (1861-65), and England’s
cotton-textile manufacturing towns fell into a short but severe recession. In or-
der to account for any systematic relationship between board adoption, mortal-
ity, and textile manufacturing during these so-called ”famine years,” I include
(γt × COTTONu), where COTTONu is an indicator for whether union u special-
ized in cotton-textile production in 1851, and γt, as before, are year fixed-effects.
Deaths in Public Institutions. Deaths were registered where they occurred. It
is therefore likely that the reported number of deaths overstates the actual num-
ber of resident deaths in unions with large hospitals, workhouses, or asylums
that serviced non-residents. Since any changes in DRut as a result of the erection,
expansion, or demolition of such institutions are mechanical and unexplained
by Equation 1.1, any correlation between the timing of these changes and the
timing of board adoption will generate a bias in my estimates of pi j. Although
there is no comprehensive record of deaths in public institutions at the union
level until 1869, the evidence that does exist suggests that the number of, and
23See Decennial Census Reports (1841-1921) and Annual Reports of the Registrar-General (1841-
1921).
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the percentage of deaths in, public institutions changed minimally between 1851
and 1870. Figure 1.13 demonstrates that my sample predates the era of public
institution-building in London. Insofar as London’s experience reflects the ex-
perience of England as a whole (as it did between 1870 and 1900), it is unlikely
that hospitals, workhouses, or asylums played even a peripheral role in deter-
mining changes in union death rates prior to 1870.
1.3.2 Results
Table 1.8 reports the results of Equation 1.1. The first column reports the ba-
sic specification, the second column includes OLDut and YOUNGut, the third
column includes (γt × COTTONu), the fourth column includes region-by-year
fixed-effects (my preferred specification), and the fifth column includes AGEutb.
In each of these specifications the pattern of pˆi j over event time exhibits a clear
and considerable trend break in the year of board adoption (i.e., j = 0). Fig-
ure 1.14 plots this pattern. The upward-sloping pre-trend implies that mortal-
ity was worsening in adoption unions relative to non-adoption unions in the
years preceding adoption. This is unsurprising, since unions experiencing the
greatest deterioration in their sanitation conditions would have had the great-
est incentive to improve their sanitation conditions. The downward-sloping
post-trend implies that mortality was improving in adoption unions relative to
non-adoption unions in the years following adoption.
I transform these estimates of pi j into estimates of the effect of local board
adoption on mortality using Equation 1.2. Table 1.9 reports the results of this
calculation. The first row reports the cumulative effect of local board adoption
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on the mortality rate zero, one, two, three, and four years after adoption (i.e.,
p˜i0, p˜i1, p˜i2, p˜i3, p˜i4). These estimates suggest that the adoption of a union-wide lo-
cal board of health would have reduced mortality by 2.5 percent in the year of
adoption, 7.3 percent after one year, 10.7 percent after two years, 12.0 percent
after three years, and 14.2 percent after four years. This amounts to 34, 49, 55,
and 65 fewer deaths one, two, three, and four years after adoption, respectively,
in a union of 20,000 people with an average mortality rate (i.e., 23 deaths per
1,000 population). The second row reports the incremental effect of local board
adoption on the mortality rate in the year of adoption and in the first, second,
third, and fourth post-adoption years (i.e., p˜i0 − 0, p˜i1 − p˜i0, p˜i2 − p˜i1, p˜i3 − p˜i2, p˜i4 − p˜i3).
These estimates suggest that the effect of the adoption of a local board of health
was greatest in the first and second full years after adoption.
Figure 1.15 reports the implied effects of local board adoption on the aggre-
gate English mortality rate between 1848 and 1870, accounting for the propor-
tion of the English population that fell under j-year-old boards in each year.
Since boards were limited to less than one-fourth of the English population be-
fore 1865, less than one-sixth of the English population before 1860, and less
than one-tenth of the English population before 1851, these implied England-
wide effects are muted in comparison with the direct effects of local boards, but
are still quite large. In 1870, for instance, my estimates suggest that the aggre-
gate English mortality rate was 3.7 percent lower than it would have been had
the Public Health Act not been passed. Since there were approximately 525,000
total deaths in England in 1870, this implies that approximately 20,000 lives
were saved in 1870 as a result of local board adoption. Repeating this exercise
for each year between 1848 and 1870, I calculate that 227,598 lives were saved as
a result of the Public Health Act. Figure 1.16, which plots the actual English mor-
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tality rate alongside this counterfactual English mortality rate, demonstrates that
the relative ”flatness” of aggregate English mortality prior to 1870 should not
be interpreted as prima facie evidence of the ineffectiveness of local boards of
health. Furthermore, the mortality gains that local boards of health achieved at
the local level are no less significant for being nearly indiscernible at the national
level until the 1860s.
I perform three robustness checks. First, I re-estimate Equation 1.1 excluding
all non-adoption unions (i.e., unions within which no local board of health was
adopted between 1848 and 1870). The results, reported in Table 1.10, reveal no
significant changes. The up-and-down pattern of pˆi j over event-time persists,
and the implied effect of the adoption of a local board of health on mortality
after four years (i.e., p˜i4) is only slightly larger than the implied effect from my
preferred specification. Second, I estimate a modified, binary-treatment version
of Equation 1.1 for which BFRACut is replaced by BOARDu, which is defined as
before. Formally, I estimate:
DRut = β0 +
j=−2∑
j=−4
φ j · 1(EYut = j) · BOARDu
+
j=4∑
j=0
φ j · 1(EYut = j) · BOARDu
+ β2Xut + ηu + γt + ut
(1.6)
In this way, I identify the effect of the adoption of a local board of health on
mortality using only variation in the timing of local board adoption. The results,
reported in Table 1.11, reveal an attenuated pre- and post-trend in the pattern
of φˆ j relative to the pattern of pˆi j. The attenuation of the slope of the pre-trend
suggests that the timing of local board adoption is only partly responsible for
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the upward slope of pˆi j between j = −4 and j = −1. The attenuation of the slope
of the post-trend is the expected result of characterizing both low- and high-
share unions as adoption unions, without adjusting for exposure to adoption.
Adoption unions for which BFRACu, j=0 is low were, ipso facto, only nominally
affected by the adoption of a local board of health, and hence their inclusion
diminishes φˆ0, φˆ1, φˆ2, φˆ3, and φˆ4 relative to pˆi0, pˆi1, pˆi2, pˆi3, and φˆ4. Third, I re-
estimate Equation 1.6 separately for high-share unions and low-share unions.
The results, reported in Table 1.12, reveal that the effect of the adoption of a local
board of health on mortality is proportional to board share. High-share unions
saw greater post-adoption reductions in mortality than low-share unions. This
decomposition strongly suggests that the source of the trend-reversal in relative
mortality that I observe is board activity.
Lastly, I demonstrate the importance of the disaggregation of event-years
that an event study model affords. Since the trend-reversal that I observe in the
pattern of pˆi j is roughly symmetric about the year before board adoption (i.e.,
j = −1), a simple difference-in-differences model will underestimate the effect
of local boards of health on mortality by effectively canceling the post-trend
with the pre-trend. More formally, Table 1.13 reports estimates of a difference-
in-differences model of the form
DRut = β0 + pi(BFRACut × POSTut) + β1BFRACut
+ β2Xut + ηu + γt + ut
(1.7)
alongside estimates of my event study model (as defined in Equation 1.1) with
and without year fixed-effects, union fixed-effects, and controls (including pop-
ulation density, rateable value per capita, percent of adults employed in agricul-
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ture, percent of population aged less than 5, percent of population aged greater
than 60, and region-by-year fixed-effects). I define POSTut as a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 if union u had adopted a local board of health by year t
and 0 otherwise. The difference-in-differences estimates range from −0.018 to
0.029, and none of them can be distinguished, statistically speaking, from zero.
The corresponding event study estimates reveal that any simple before-after
analysis will mischaracterize a trend-reversal as a non-effect.
1.3.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis
In this section, I assess whether the Public Health Act was cost effective. More
precisely, I assess whether the statistical value of all lives saved by local boards
between 1848 and 1870 exceeded the total expenditure of local boards between
1848 and 1870.24 Since I observe only board borrowing from the Exchequer, and
neither board borrowing from private sources nor board spending, I proceed in
the following way. Rather than commit to any one assumption about the rela-
tionship between board borrowing from the Exchequer and board spending in
order to impute board spending, I ask the following question: Given a range of
plausible estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL), what is the strongest
assumption about the relationship between board borrowing from the Exche-
quer and board spending that I would have to make in order to conclude that
the benefits of local boards exceeded the costs?
In Section 1.2.4, I showed that boards borrowed £7,183,431 from the Exche-
24This definition of the benefits of the Public Health Act is almost certainly an understatement.
It assumes that local boards accrued no other benefits than the statistical value of the lives that
they saved. It does not include, for example, the benefit from reductions in non-fatal illnesses
or the aesthetic and social benefits of a cleaner environment as a result of the adoption of local
boards.
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quer between 1848 and 1870 and, in Section 1.3.2, I estimated that boards saved
227,598 lives between 1848 and 1870. If I assume that all money spent by local
boards was borrowed from the Exchequer, this implies that local boards cost
English taxpayers £31.56 per life saved. If, however, I assume that only half of
all money spent by local boards was borrowed from the Exchequer, and that the
other half, which I do not observe, was either borrowed from private sources or
spent directly from out of various rates, this implies that local boards cost En-
glish taxpayers £14,366,862 in total and £63.12 per life saved. In this way, I can
trace out a cost-per-life-saved curve that varies inversely with the proportion
of total board expenditure that I assume to be borrowed from the Exchequer.
Figure 1.17 plots this curve in 2000 U.S. dollars and overlays various modern
and historical VSL estimates.25 The point at which the cost-per-life-saved curve
intersects any particular VSL estimate is the break-even point. To the left of
this point, estimated costs exceed estimated benefits. To the right of this point,
estimated benefits exceed estimated costs.
Figure 1.17 plots four VSL estimates. The first estimate ($7.7 million in 2000
U.S. dollars) is a composite of 46 studies conducted on labor markets in seven
developed countries between 1974 and 2001 [109, pp. 19-21, 27-28].26 The sec-
ond estimate ($1.2 million in 2000 U.S. dollars) is a composite of seven stud-
ies conducted on labor markets in four developing countries between 1993 and
2001 [109, pp. 27-28].27 The third estimate ($156,000 in 2000 U.S. dollars) is from
Kim & Fishback’s (1993) study of accident risk among American railroad work-
25See [88] for conversion.
26I obtain the $7.7 million estimate by calculating the median of 46 separate VSL estimates
from the following seven countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
27I obtain the $1.2 million estimate by calculating the median of 7 separate VSL estimates
from the following four countries: Hong Kong, India, South Korea, and Taiwan. The distinction
between ”developed” and ”developing” is, in this case, arbitrary and irrelevant but for the
difference in the average income of the samples used.
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ers between 1893 and 1909, perhaps the best available historical VSL estimate [61,
p. 811]. All three of these estimates likely overstate the true VSL for a typical
nineteenth-century English laborer since safety is a normal good, and the aver-
age incomes of the samples from which these estimates are drawn are signifi-
cantly higher than average English incomes between 1848 and 1870 [108, 109].
To account for this, I derive a fourth estimate ($40,000 in 2000 U.S. dollars) from
the third estimate using (i) the difference in weekly incomes between English
agricultural laborers in 1870 and American railroad workers between 1893 and
1909 and (ii) an income elasticity of VSL of 0.5.28
This fourth VSL estimate intersects the cost-per-life-saved curve at approxi-
mately 10 percent of expenditure borrowed from the Exchequer, which implies
that local boards would have had to spend 10 times more than what I observe
them to borrow from the Exchequer in order for their total expenditure to ex-
ceed, in dollar terms, the statistical value of all of the lives that they saved. This
is extremely unlikely. The Public Health Act intended the Exchequer to provide
a secure source of long-term credit for the costliest of board activities. If, in fact,
expenditure on such activities amounted to less than one-tenth of total expen-
diture, it would mean that local boards spent at least £77 million between 1848
and 1870, or roughly $9 billion in today’s U.S. dollars. I therefore conclude that,
under reasonable assumptions, local boards not only saved lives, but did so in
a cost-effective manner.
28See Viscusi & Aldy (2003) for a discussion of ”the effects of income on the value of a sta-
tistical life” [109, pp. 36-43]. The relationship between VSL and income is calculated using a
meta-analysis of VSL estimates and the average incomes of the samples from which these esti-
mates derive. Based on Viscusi & Aldy (2003), 0.5 appears to be a middle-of-the-road estimate
of the income elasticity of VSL. I use Bowley’s (1898) estimate of the average wage of English
agricultural laborers in 1870.
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1.4 Conclusion
This essay examines the effect and cost-effectiveness of the sanitation efforts of
English local government in the period before 1870. The Public Health Act of
1848 endowed local boards of health with broad powers, including the right to
tax, to borrow, to construct infrastructure, to provide services, and to regulate
the activities of households, businesses, and other individuals. Contrary to the
prevailing view that English local government before 1870 was dominated by a
class of penny-pinching petty capitalists, I find that local boards did, in fact, ex-
ercise these powers. They borrowed more than £7 million from the Exchequer
between 1848 and 1870, about 62 percent of which was dedicated to the pur-
poses of drainage, water supply, land purchases, and other permanent works.
Moreover, the regulatory capacity of local boards should have enabled them to
effect sanitary improvement at minimal public expense.
I estimate that the adoption of a union-wide local board of health is associ-
ated with a 14.2 percent decrease in the mortality rate after four years. Account-
ing for incomplete board take-up, this implies that England’s mortality rate in
1870 was 3.7 percent lower than it would have been had no local boards been
adopted in the preceding 23 years. I calculate that more than 225,000 lives were
saved between 1848 and 1870, nearly ten times the number of British casual-
ties during the Crimean War. A back-of-the-envelope comparison of cost per
life saved with relevant VSL estimates suggests that the benefits of local board
adoption exceeded the costs under all but the most extreme assumptions about
the relationship between board borrowing and board spending.
More generally, this essay offers clear quantitative evidence of the capacity
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of public health interventions—even interventions that are decentralized and
effectively voluntary with local taxpayers—to reduce mortality amidst indus-
trialization. That English mortality was not increasing between 1848 and 1870,
as it may have been under the then-uncharted pressures of rapid industrializa-
tion, is at least in part a consequence of the adoption of local boards of health.
By extension, the precipitous decline in English mortality between 1870 and
1900 might be seen as a consequence of the Public Health Acts of 1872 and 1875,
in effect expansions of and extensions to the Public Health Act of 1848. The
former subdivided the whole of England into a geographically exhaustive net-
work of rural and urban sanitary districts not unlike local boards. The latter
made mandatory many of the provisions of the Act of 1848 that had been vol-
untary for local boards. All told, the large effects that I find should serve as
some encouragement to developing countries experiencing similarly high rates
of industrialization, urbanization, and population growth.
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1.5 Tables & Figures
Table 1.1: “Turning Points” in GDP per Capita & Life Expectancy at Birth
Approximate
Turning Point
(TP)
Level In Year
of Turning
Point
Change in Half-Century †
Before TP After TP
Panel A. GDP per Capita
(
1990 $
)
England & Wales 1820 1,756 0.4 1.3
Sweden 1850 1,289 0.2 1.3
France †† 1820 1,218 0.3 0.9
Japan 1870 741 0.1 1.7
Brazil 1900 737 0.1 1.7
Panel B. Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)
England & Wales 1871 41.0 3.0 12.0
Sweden 1875 45.4 4.6 17.2
France†† 1893 44.9 3.4 20.3
Japan 1923 42.6 5.8 30.8
Brazil 1940 36.7 8.0 28.9
Source: [34].
† In Panel A, these columns refer to the growth rate in real GDP per capita (in percent per year)
in the fifty years before and the fifty years after the approximate turning point. In Panel B, these
columns refer to the change in life expectancy at birth (in years) in the fifty years before and the
fifty years after the approximate turning point.
†† Female-only.
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Table 1.2: Declines in Stature During Industrialization
Decline? Birth Cohorts Amount
United Kingdom (Men) Yes 1820-50 5.4 cm
United Kingdom (Women) Yes 1835-55 2.5 cm
United States Yes 1830-90 4.0 cm
France No
Netherlands No
Sweden No
Germany † Yes 1860-72 2.5 cm
1879-85 2.0 cm
Australia Yes 1867-93 3.0 cm
Japan No
Source: [102].
† There were two downturns and one upturn in heights among German birth cohorts between
1860 and 1885. There was a downturn of 2.5 cm among German birth cohorts between 1860 and
1872, an upturn of 3.3 cm among German birth cohorts between 1872 and 1879, and another
downturn of 2.0 cm among German birth cohorts between 1879 and 1885. The net downturn,
therefore, between 1860 and 1885 was 1.2 cm.
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Table 1.7: Determinants of First Board Adoption Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deaths per 1,000† -0.185∗ -0.194∗ -2.698 -3.018
(1847) (0.090) (0.096) (2.271) (2.370)
Population Growth Rate† -2.530 -2.152 -0.764 -0.895
(1841-51) (2.252) (2.295) (0.491) (0.510)
Population Density† 0.056 0.040 0.047 -0.442
(1847) (0.086) (0.087) (0.974) (1.058)
Percent in Agriculture† 0.143∗∗ 0.161∗∗ 1.571 1.306
(1847) (0.054) (0.057) (1.428) (1.501)
Coal Dummy 1.337 2.135 0.744 1.366
(1851) (1.036) (1.204) (1.110) (1.284)
Cotton Dummy 1.746 1.107 1.800 1.211
(1851) (1.310) (1.542) (1.476) (1.709)
Fraction Water -2.926 -3.604 -0.624 -1.588
(1851) (5.147) (5.303) (5.428) (5.563)
RV per Capita† -1.070∗∗ -1.220∗∗ -3.065∗ -3.896∗
(1847) (0.401) (0.432) (1.418) (1.537)
PL Expenditure per Capita† 2.711 4.358 0.515 1.096
(1851) (4.059) (5.161) (1.203) (1.488)
Fraction Mun. Borough 0.630 1.164 0.776 1.502
(1851) (1.528) (1.563) (1.733) (1.823)
Census Division Dummies X X
Variables with “†” in Logs X X
Observations 272 272 272 272
R-Squared 0.080 0.116 0.065 0.113
Notes: Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) report the results of Equation 1.5. Columns (2) and (4)
include regional fixed effects (i.e., census division dummies). In Columns (5) and (6) the cross
symbol (i.e., “†”) denotes that the variable is in logs.
∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 1.9: Adjusted Effect of LBs of Health on Mortality
Adoption
Year
First
Year
Second
Year
Third
Year
Fourth
Year
( j=0) ( j=1) ( j=2) ( j=3) ( j=4)
Cumulative
Effect
-0.025 -0.073∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.142∗∗
(0.031) (0.037) (0.045) (0.052) (0.059)
Incremental
Effect
-0.025 -0.048∗∗ -0.034∗ -0.013 -0.022
(0.031) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Notes: The first row reports the results of the calculation defined by Equation 1.2 for each post-
adoption event-year (i.e., each event-year between j=0 and j=4). “Cumulative effect” refers to
the total mortality effect of the adoption of a union-wide local board of health by the jth event-
year. The second row reports one-year differences of the estimates in the first row. “Incremental
effect” refers to the total mortality effect of the adoption of a union-wide local board of health
in the jth event-year. All standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 1.13: Effect of LBs of Health on Mortality (DiD vs. Event-Study)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Difference-in-Differences Estimates
BFRAC × POST -0.015 0.029 -0.018 -0.012
(0.021) (0.028) (0.015) (0.017)
Observations 12,488 12,488 12,488 12,488
R-Squared 0.051 0.089 0.711 0.753
Panel B. Event-Study Estimates
BFRAC × EY=-4 -0.075∗∗ -0.092∗ -0.061∗ -0.052∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.026)
BFRAC × EY=-3 -0.043 -0.052∗ -0.051 -0.040
(0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.022)
BFRAC × EY=-2 0.000 -0.023 -0.022 -0.023
(0.038) (0.032) (0.033) (0.029)
BFRAC × EY=0 -0.035 -0.023 -0.023 -0.008
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
BFRAC × EY=1 -0.062∗ -0.050 -0.051∗ -0.038
(0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024)
BFRAC × EY=2 -0.062∗ -0.056∗ -0.062∗ -0.055∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025)
BFRAC × EY=3 -0.061∗ -0.050 -0.059∗ -0.051∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025)
BFRAC × EY=4 -0.071∗∗ -0.037 -0.069∗∗ -0.056∗
(0.028) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 12,488 12,488 12,488 12,488
R-Squared 0.052 0.090 0.712 0.754
Year FEs X X X
Union FEs X X
Controls X
Notes: Panel A reports estimates of the effect of the adoption of a local board of health on the
rate of morality using a difference-in-differences model (i.e., a model of the form DRut = β0 +
pi (BFRACut × POSTut) + β1BFRACut + ut, where POSTt is a dummy variable that takes a value
of 1 if union u had adopted a board by year t and 0 otherwise). Panel B reports estimates of the
effect of the adoption of a local board of health on the rate of mortality using an event-study
model (i.e., a model of the form of Equation 1.1).
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Figure 1.3: Fraction of Union Population Under a Local Board
Source: Local board locations, populations, and adoption dates derive from the Return
of Local Boards (1868). Union populations derive from Decennial Census Reports (1841-71).
Union ”polygons” used in the construction of these maps have been provided through www.
VisionofBritain.com and use historical material which is copyright of the Great Britain
Historical GIS Project and the University of Portsmouth.
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Figure 1.5: English Local Government Areas
Source: Panel A illustrates the boundaries of the parishes in the county of Berkshire in 1851.
Panel B illustrates the boundaries of the Poor Law unions in the county of Berkshire in 1851, as
well as each parish contained therein. Panel C illustrates the location of each of the three local
boards of health adopted in Berkshire between 1848 and 1870. Solid black shading indicates
that a parish is wholly within the jurisdiction of a local board. Striped black shading indicates
that a parish is only partly within the jurisdiction of a local board.
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Figure 1.8: Location of Municipal Boroughs
Notes: The rightmost map plots the location of municipal boroughs according to the 1851 Cen-
sus Report. Civil parishes colored black are either entirely or partially under the jurisdiction
of a municipal borough (i.e., any place regulated by the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835,
not to be confused with a “parliamentary borough,” which returned members to Parliament,
though there is significant overlap between the two borough ”types”). Civil parishes colored
white contain no part of any municipal borough. The leftmost map plots quintiles of popula-
tion density by civil parish in 1871. Quintile cutoffs, from light to dark, are as follows. The
first quintile consists of parishes with fewer than 0.11 persons per acre; the second, between
0.11 and 0.17 persons per acre; the third, between 0.17 and 0.23 persons per acre; the fourth,
between 0.23 and 0.42 persons per acre; and the fifth, greater than 0.42 persons per acre. Parish
populations, areas, and “polygons” used in the construction of these maps have been provided
through www.VisionofBritain.com and use historical material which is copyright of the Great
Britain Historical GIS Project and the University of Portsmouth.
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Figure 1.9: Booth’s Poverty Maps
Notes: Pictured above is a sample of Charles Booth’s poverty maps from Life and Labour of the
People of London, Vol. I (1889). Residences are colored according to the general economic con-
dition of their inhabitants. Red shading denotes middle-class or well-to-do residences. Beige
shading denotes mixed residences (i.e., “some comfortable, others poor”). Blue shading de-
notes poor to very poor residences (i.e., “chronic want”). Black shading denotes the lowest class
residences (i.e., “vicious, semi-critical”). See [21].
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CHAPTER 2
HARDLY WORTH CHAINING UP? THE EFFECT AND
COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF WELFARE REFORM IN ENGLAND, 1857-85
2.1 Introduction
”If paupers are made miserable, paupers willdecline in multitude. It is a se-
cret known to all rat-catchers” [29, p. 175].1 This was not an exceptional, or
even uncommon, opinion in England in the middle of the nineteenth century.
There was, and had long been, consternation among reformers regarding the
relatively high rate at which English men and women applied for and received
welfare benefits, and the relatively high tax burden associated with those bene-
fits. The English welfare system—hardly a system, by modern standards—was
called the Poor Law. It was administered by local geographical units called Poor
Law unions, of which there were approximately 600. Each Poor Law union was
required by the Law to provide benefits to any needy, or any apparently needy,
applicant within its jurisdiction, but was free to decide the form that those bene-
fits took. Benefits took two forms. Outdoor relief was cash or in-kind allowances
of food, fuel, or clothing. Indoor relief was room and board in a workhouse.
Inmates of workhouses were separated by age, sex, and fitness for work, and
often, but not always, compelled to complete menial tasks such as spinning,
weaving, or oakum picking.2 Workhouses were made ”as like prisons as possi-
ble, to establish therein a discipline so severe and repulsive as to make them a
1Note that ”pauper” is synonymous with ”welfare recipient.” Note also that Carlyle was
caricaturing the opinion of adversaries of the ”old,” pre-1834 English Poor Law. This system
was replaced by the ”new,” post-1834 English Poor Law by the Poor Law Amendment Act.
2Although ”attempts to employ the poor profitably [in workhouses] were widespread in the
eighteenth century, they were invariably failures.” See [24, p. 22].
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terror to the poor and prevent them from entering” [107, p. 267]. Workhouses
were a tool, however inhumane, by which Poor Law administrators believed
that they could disincentivize poverty-inducing behavior, distinguish the ”truly
needy” from the apocryphally needy, and, in so doing, reduce the rate of overall
relief recipiency. If a relief applicant to whom the workhouse was offered re-
fused the offer, then the Poor Law union to which that applicant applied would
have fulfilled its obligation without relieving, and without paying for the relief
of, that applicant.
In this essay, I leverage variation in the change in the fraction of paupers
relieved indoors between 1865 and 1880 across 576 English Poor Law unions
to estimate whether and to what extent conditions attached to relief recipiency
(i.e., the workhouse) affected the rate of relief recipiency. At least as early as
1869, a pro-workhouse movement called the Crusade Against Outrelief advo-
cated for the elimination of outdoor relief to all able-bodied relief applicants.
Among the Crusade’s most ardent advocates were administrators of Poor Law
unions. As such, the average Poor Law union relieved 63 percent more of its
paupers in the workhouse in 1880 than it did in 1865. Nearly one-quarter of
all Poor Law unions doubled (or more than doubled) the fraction of paupers
that they relieved in the workhouse. This Crusade was, in effect, a de facto,
decentralized welfare reform. Since Poor Law unions were administratively au-
tonomous and, on average, relatively small in size (85 square miles in 1861)
and population (32,000 persons in 1861), the Crusade-era Poor Law provides an
historically unique source of policy variation.
I make three main contributions. First, I introduce a new panel dataset of
576 English Poor Law unions between 1857 and 1887, assembled, among other
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sources, from decennial census reports, reports of Parliament, reports of the
Poor Law Board, reports of the Local Government Board, and Knight’s Local
Government Directory.3 These data include population; population density; coal
and cotton-textile production; the percent of adults working in agriculture, in-
dustry, and manufacturing; the number of paupers relieved indoors and out-
doors by age, sex, and fitness for work; the capacity of and conditions within
workhouses; the number of calories and grams of fat, protein, and carbohy-
drates provided to workhouse inmates; and the tax rate levied on ”ratepayers.”
Second, I use a difference-in-differences model to demonstrate that the work-
house was very effective. I find that a 50 percent increase in the fraction of
paupers relieved indoors would have reduced the pauperism rate by 13.2 per-
cent. Put differently, approximately three in four welfare applicants to whom
the workhouse was offered as a ”test” refused the offer. The workhouse was,
nevertheless, insufficiently effective to meaningfully reduce costs. Since work-
houses were expensive to build, to staff, and to maintain, indoor relief was at
least 50 percent more expensive per pauper than outdoor relief [74, p. 608].
Third, I use a triple-difference model to demonstrate that the relationship be-
tween workhouse use and pauperism was roughly independent of the disagree-
ableness of the workhouse. I find little evidence that workhouses deficient in
ventilation, water supply, general sanitation, or diet were uniquely effective.
This is consistent with a stigma-type story of welfare—it was the stigma of en-
tering a workhouse, not the considerable physical or psychological toll of living
in a workhouse (which varied across Poor Law unions), that ultimately screened
and/or deterred would-be paupers from relief rolls.
3”The firm of C. Knight & Co., Poor Law Publishers of 90 Fleet Street, supplied [Poor Law
unions] with books and forms under the Poor Law Commission—[Mr. Knight] having done
much, with Mr. Chadwick and Sir G. Cornwall Lewis, in promoting the passing of the Poor Law
Amendment Act, under the provisions of which the Poor Law—now the ’Local Government
Board’ at Gwydyr House—was formed and its orders consolidated.” See [79, pp. 419-20].
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The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide
a brief history of the English Poor Law—its origins, its administrative features,
and its evolution during the Crusade—and an explanation of what I call the
”workhouse effect.” In Section 2.3, I introduce my dataset and empirical strat-
egy, discuss identification and potential threats to identification, interpret my
results, and investigate what could have caused the Crusade. In Section 2.4, I
conclude.
2.2 Institutional Background
2.2.1 The English Poor Law
The Poor Relief Act of 1601 (also called the Old Poor Law) first established the
principle of compulsory taxation for the relief of the poor as ”an essential por-
tion of...[English] domestic policy” [85, p. 187]. In every parish in England, of
which there were roughly 15,000, overseers of the poor were appointed to assess
the property value of all dwellings, to impose a tax (a ”poor rate”) on all owners
and occupiers of these dwellings proportional to their value, and to distribute
the revenues therefrom to the needy in the form of cash or in-kind payments.
Although the Act required that ”a stock of flax, hemp, wool, thread, iron, and
other necessary ware” be kept in order to ”set to work” able-bodied relief ap-
plicants, the overwhelming majority of all relief was outdoor relief. The ease
with which relief was (or, at least, could be) obtained was the single greatest
misgiving around which debate over reform of the Old Poor Law revolved.
The workhouse was the sticking point. A formal ”workhouse test” appeared
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in English law at least as early as the Workhouse Test Act of 1722, which ”en-
couraged parishes to relieve able-bodied paupers in workhouses” and to deny
relief to relief applicants that refused to enter the workhouse [24, p. 24]. The
workhouse test, it was believed, could reduce the number of paupers for whom
parishes were responsible. But most parishes were insufficiently populous to
marshal the tax revenue necessary to construct, staff, and stock a functioning
workhouse. The average parish consisted of only 500 persons in 1801. To
solve this population problem Gilbert’s Act of 1782 permitted (but did not com-
pel) parishes to combine into ”Gilbert’s Unions” for the purpose of maintain-
ing a shared workhouse. All told, 963 parishes combined to form 65 Gilbert’s
Unions, but ”the grouping of parishes [into Gilbert’s Unions] was not system-
atic.” Many Gilbert’s Unions consisted of non-contiguous parishes and, there-
fore, their workhouses were very often inconveniently located for ordinary use
[67, pp. 40-41]. Moreover, Gilbert’s Act codified (and, in so doing, legitimized)
the already commonplace practice of outdoor relief to the able-bodied [24, p.
10]. Section 32 of the Act made it lawful to ”properly maintain” any able-bodied
relief applicant who was ”able and willing to work, but who [could not] get em-
ployment.” Relief expenditures exploded thereafter. Lindert (2004) estimates
that relief expenditures, as a proportion of national product, increased by up-
wards of 150 percent between 1750 and 1830 [66, p. 46]. The belief that easy ac-
cess to outdoor relief was responsible for this increase, and for the correspond-
ing increase in local poor rates, precipitated attempts to amend the Old Poor
Law.4
4Malthus (1798) objected to the Old Poor Law because it enabled the English population to
grow too quickly. ”It is better,” he wrote, ”that [population] should be checked from a foresight
of the difficulties attending a family and a fear of dependent poverty than that it should be
encouraged, only to be repressed afterwards by want and sickness.” Though it ”alleviated the
intensity of individual misfortune, [it] spread the general evil over a much larger surface...[by]
increasing the population without increasing the food for its support.” Ricardo (1817), likewise,
concluded that ”the clear and direct tendency of the [Old Poor Law] is not, as the legislature
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The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 (also called the New Poor Law) was
a watershed. The objective of the Act, not unlike some of its predecessors, was
twofold: first, to relieve only the genuinely needy, and second, to minimize the
incidence of neediness. The Act can be summarized in six parts:
Poor Law Unions. All parishes were combined into Poor Law unions. This was
the Act’s key innovation. The average Poor Law union, in 1857, consisted of
between 15 and 20 parishes and between 2,000 and 3,000 persons. A small num-
ber of Poor Law unions consisted of a single populous parish (e.g., Liverpool,
Manchester). A small number of others consisted of more than 50 relatively
unpopulous parishes.
Boards of Guardians. All Poor Law unions established a board of guardians.
According to Section 54 of the Act, guardians were responsible for ”ordering,
giving, and directing all relief to the poor.” Parish overseers were stripped of
the authority ”to grant relief, except in cases of sudden and urgent necessity,
without an order of the board” [73, p. 158]. Guardians were allocated to (and
elected by taxpayers within) each parish ”with due regard to the circumstances
of the parish” (e.g., population, industrial composition, etc.).5
Workhouses. All Poor Law unions built workhouses. According to Section 23 of
the Act, Poor Law unions were required to ”build a workhouse or workhouses,
benevolently intended, to amend the condition of the poor, but to deteriorate the condition
of both poor and rich; instead of making the poor rich, they are calculated to make the rich
poor.” Other opponents of the Old Poor Law considered it ”a bounty on indolence and vice”
by ”putting the thrifty in the same position as the unthrifty,” thereby ”discouraging thrift.” The
preamble of the Friendly Societies Act of 1819 suggested that ”the habitual reliance of poor peo-
ple upon parochial relief, rather than upon their own industry, tends to the moral deterioration
of the people; it is desirable that encouragement should be afforded to persons desirous of mak-
ing provision for themselves...out of the fruits of their own industry.” See [76], [95], [72, p. 140],
and [4, pp. 227-228].
5Only taxpayers owning or occupying property valued at £25 per year were eligible for elec-
tion to the board of guardians. See [73, p. 158]. County magistrates were also eligible to serve
as ex officio board members in the Poor Law unions in which they lived.
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and to purchase or hire land for the purpose of building the same thereon, or to
purchase or hire a workhouse or workhouses, or any building or buildings for
the purpose of being used as or converted into a workhouse or workhouses.”
Common Funds. All Poor Law unions established a common fund. According
to Section 28 of the Act, parishes contributed to the common fund of the Poor
Law union to which they belonged in proportion to the number of paupers that
they relieved in the common union workhouse. If, for example, a particular
parish sent disproportionately many paupers to the workhouse, and was there-
fore disproportionately responsible for the cost of the workhouse, then it would
bear a disproportionate share of the tax burden. The common fund was ear-
marked for ”the purchasing, building, hiring, or providing, altering, or enlarg-
ing any workhouse..., and for the future upholding and maintenance of such
workhouse..., and for the payment or allowance of the officers of such union,
and for the providing of utensils and materials for setting the poor on work
therein.”
Poor Law Commission. Three Poor Law commissioners were appointed by the
monarch, with the ”advice and consent” of Parliament. According to Sections
1 and 2 of the Act, Poor Law commissioners were empowered to ”require the
attendance of all such persons as they may think fit to call before them upon
any question or matter connected with or relating to [the Poor Law]...and ex-
amine all such persons upon oath” in order to ”carry the Act into execution.”
The Poor Law Commission was eventually replaced by the Poor Law Board in
1847, which, in turn, was eventually replaced by the Local Government Board
in 1871.
Assistant Commissioners. Nine assistant Poor Law commissioners were ap-
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pointed by the Poor Law Commission. According to Section 12 of the Act, assis-
tant Poor Law commissioners, like Poor Law commissioners, were empowered
to ”summon before them such persons as they may think necessary for the pur-
pose of being examined upon oath.” Assistant Poor Law commissioners also
determined which parishes would belong to which Poor Law unions, and the
number of guardians to which each parish was entitled.
The Act did not abolish the parish. Parishes continued to levy and collect
poor rates. Instead, the Act subordinated the parish to the Poor Law union and
the Poor Law union to the Poor Law Commission. But the Poor Law Commis-
sion was institutionally weak—very weak. Its first order, for example, man-
dated that ”no [outdoor relief] be given to any able-bodied male pauper who
is in employment...and in receipt of earnings” [3, p. 162]. This order was ig-
nored. Subsequent orders mandated similar restrictions on outdoor relief and
were likewise ignored, avoided, or only inconsistently applied by Poor Law
unions.6 Poor Law unions were, in effect, independent administrative units.
”The tendency everywhere,” wrote one Poor Law inspector in 1856, ”is to sub-
stitute outdoor relief for indoor relief whenever the guardians may legally do
so” [43, p. 57]. One legal loophole was ”to find some trifling ailment in the fam-
ily so that medical relief could be given...on the ostensible grounds of sickness
or accident” [33, p. 73]. By 1859, less than 10 percent of able-bodied paupers
and less than 15 percent of all paupers were relieved in workhouses. It was not
until the middle of the 1860s, when a group of reformers, some of whom were
themselves guardians of Poor Law unions, established a ”Crusade Against Out-
relief,” that the original intent of the Poor Law Amendment Act began to be
realized. Foremost among the proponents of this Crusade was the Charity Or-
6These orders included the Outdoor Labour Test Order of 1842, the Outdoor Relief Pro-
hibitory Order of 1844, and the Outdoor Relief Regulation Order of 1852.
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ganization Society.
The Society was founded in London in 1869. The Goschen Minute—its
founding document—warned of the dangers of easy access to outdoor relief,
especially ”to supplement insufficiency of wages.” Too safe a safety net would
”supplant the full recognition of the necessity for self-reliance and thrift” [5,
pp. 9-12].7 The Society believed that it was essential to ”investigate the circum-
stances of the destitute carefully” and, whenever possible, to ”substitute charity
for poor relief” [74, p. 606]. Charity could discriminate between the ”deserving
poor” and the ”undeserving poor.” The Poor Law could not. For that reason,
the Society preferred private charity to public poor relief, and indoor relief to
outdoor relief.
The Society, their Crusade, and the policy prescriptions for which it advo-
cated were wholeheartedly adopted by many Poor Law unions and all but dis-
regarded by many others between 1865 and 1880 [22, p. 266]. Hurren (2000),
for example, identifies the Brixworth union in Northamptonshire as a charac-
teristic ”Crusade union” [57]. Williams (1981) identifies 41 ”Crusade unions” in
all, more than half of which were in Metropolitan London [114, pp. 104-105].
But this simple taxonomy insinuates that the Crusade was an all-or-nothing
proposition—that Poor Law unions either were or were not ”Crusade unions.”
In fact, the Crusade was adopted by degrees. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 juxtapose a
map of Williams’ ”Crusade unions” with a map of actual percent-changes in
the fraction of paupers relieved indoors between 1865 and 1880. Most Poor Law
unions were ultimately neither out-and-out Crusade unions nor out-and-out
non-Crusade unions, and there was significant inter- and intra-regional varia-
7The Goschen Minute was named for its author, the then-President of the Poor Law Board,
George Goschen.
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tion in the extent to which Poor Law unions eliminated outdoor relief.
2.2.2 The Workhouse Effect
In this essay, I use variation in the change in the fraction of paupers relieved in-
doors between 1865 and 1880 across Poor Law unions to identify the effect of the
workhouse on welfare caseloads. This ”workhouse effect” can be decomposed
into (i) a screening effect and (ii) a deterrence effect.
Screening Effect. I define the screening effect of workhouses as the extent to
which they screened the not-actually-needy from relief rolls. Nichols & Zeck-
hauser (1982), for example, cite the capacity of ”ordeals,” such as work require-
ments, to enhance the target efficiency of relief programs in an environment in
which administrators have imperfect information about the circumstances of
relief applicants [86].8 Only applicants for whom the marginal benefit of a unit
of relief is relatively large will accept an ”ordeal” in exchange for relief, while
”imposters...masquerading as low-ability individuals” (for whom the marginal
benefit of a unit of relief is smaller than the marginal cost of the work required
to obtain an equivalent unit of income) will reject the relief and the ordeal on
which the relief is made conditional [86, pp. 372, 367-377]. In this way, the work-
house was a means-test. Poor Law guardians did not, and could not, know the
circumstances of every relief applicant, but were required to offer relief to all
applicants that appeared needy.
8The shift of the administration of the Poor Law from the hyper-local parish to the relatively
less local Poor Law union rendered the relationship between relief administrators and relief
applicants increasingly anonymous. Before 1834, the circumstances of many relief applicants
in many parishes were well known to overseers via first-hand experience or local social net-
works. After 1834, this was less common. The average Poor Law union consisted of 22 parishes,
54,816 acres, 28,708 persons, and 1,302 paupers in 1857. The workhouse provided an alternative
method to determine the circumstances of unfamiliar relief applicants. See [19] and [20].
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Deterrence Effect. I define the deterrence effect of workhouses as the extent
to which they deterred individuals from behavior that would, over time, make
them needy. Many English reformers believed that any ”shelter deliberately
made into a place of horror” would disincentivize intemperance, immodera-
tion, and profligacy, and, in so doing, would prevent would-be paupers from
becoming dependent in the first place [91, p. 102]. It was ”individual moral
failing,” they believed, that was the primary cause of poverty [56, p. 215]. In
this way, the workhouse was a threat. The likelier it was that an applicant, if
relieved, would be relieved a workhouse, the more credible this threat would
be.
Reformers predicted that the screening and deterrence effects would, to-
gether, if not eliminate pauperism, at least markedly reduce it. Raw data sug-
gest that they were correct—that the ”workhouse effect” was, in fact, large. Fig-
ure 2.3 demonstrates that as the fraction of paupers relieved indoors increased
precipitously and nearly monotonically (38.8 percent between 1868 and 1880
on average across all Poor Law unions), the pauperism rate decreased precipi-
tously and nearly monotonically (31.1 percent between 1868 and 1880 on aver-
age across all Poor Law unions). Figure 2.4, moreover, demonstrates that this
decrease in pauperism was not an artifact of the business cycle—pauperism and
unemployment were roughly acyclical. The estimated unemployment rate de-
creased by 6.0 percentage points between 1868 and 1872 and increased by 5.4
percentage points between 1872 and 1880. Englanders living on the knife’s edge
between indigence and subsistence, for whom the loss of employment would
have been catastrophic, neither appeared in relief rolls en masse during eco-
nomic contractions, nor disappeared from relief rolls en masse during economic
expansions.
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Figures 2.5 and 2.6 decompose the English pauperism rate between 1857
and 1885 into its component parts. The former distinguishes between indoor
relief and outdoor relief. It demonstrates that the decline in pauperism was
driven by a decline in outdoor relief. Approximately 642,000 paupers were re-
lieved outdoors in 1857 and approximately 518,000 paupers were relieved out-
doors in 1885. The latter distinguishes between three classes of paupers: (i) the
able-bodied, (ii) the non-able-bodied, and (iii) lunatics, insane persons, and idiots. It
demonstrates that the decline in outdoor relief was common to both the able-
bodied and the non-able-bodied. The small but persistent increase in the rate of
outdoor relief to ”lunatics” is largely a matter of accounting. Relief to ”lunatics”
in union-operated asylums was considered outdoor relief, even though union-
run asylums were effectively specialized workhouses—inmates of asylums did
not receive cash or in-kind transfers. The increase in the rate of outdoor relief to
”lunatics” was, nevertheless, independent of the effect of the Crusade.
Was the workhouse effect large enough to reduce total relief costs? The an-
swer is not straightforward. The cost per pauper of indoor relief was approxi-
mately 50 percent greater than the cost per pauper of outdoor relief.9 Indoor
relief required land on which to build a workhouse, labor and other inputs
with which to maintain a workhouse, and personnel with whom to operate a
workhouse. Figure 2.7, which plots expenditure statistics published by the Poor
Law Board and the Local Government Board, yields ambiguous conclusions.
Between 1870 and 1880, nominal expenditures on indoor and outdoor relief de-
creased by 13 percent, real expenditures on indoor and outdoor relief decreased
9MacKinnon (1987) estimates that the average annual cost of outdoor relief was between
£2.5 and £5.5 per pauper and that the average annual cost of indoor relief was between £5.5 and
£20 per pauper. Also note that while unions were responsible for ”the complete maintenance”
of indoor paupers (i.e., room and board), relief to outdoor paupers often only supplemented
”whatever other income the pauper received, or was assumed to receive.” See [74, p. 608] and
[101, p. 4].
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by 9.5 percent, and total real expenditures (including the costs associated with
workhouse construction, maintenance, and personnel) increased by 5.5 percent.
MacKinnon (1987) calculates that the elasticity of the pauperism rate with re-
spect to the fraction of paupers relieved indoors must be greater than approx-
imately 0.20 in order for the workhouse to have reduced relief expenditures
[74].10 I estimate this elasticity in the following section.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
2.3.1 Data & Summary Statistics
I construct a panel dataset of 576 English Poor Law unions between 1857 and
1885 using Decennial Census Reports, the British Parliamentary Papers, Local
Government Directories, and a variety of other publications. A detailed de-
scription of the way in which this dataset is constructed (and the precise source
or sources from which each variable is derived) can be found in the Data Ap-
pendix. Variables included are population, population density (i.e., population
per acre), the pauperism rate (i.e., paupers per population), the fraction of pau-
pers relieved indoors (i.e., indoor paupers per total paupers), the percent of
adults working in agriculture, workhouse capacity, and the average agricul-
tural laborer’s wage (by county). I also obtain the percent of adults working in
”manufacturing” in 1851, the percent of adults working in ”industry” in 1861,
10MacKinnon (1987) calculates a separate elasticity threshold for each English census division
(of which there were ten). A rough average of these regional estimates, excluding Metropolitan
London, is 0.15. I round this average to 0.20 because her calculations omit many costs associated
with indoor relief (i.e., land, labor, raw materials, personnel). I demonstrate in Section 2.3.2 that
this is a significant omission.
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the sanitary condition of workhouses in 1867 (i.e., whether the workhouse had
a ventilation deficiency, a water supply deficiency, or a general sanitary defi-
ciency), and the diet of able-bodied male workhouse inmates in 1864-68 (i.e.,
the average number of calories and grams of fat, protein, and carbohydrates
consumed each day) in each English Poor Law union. Lastly, I obtain the poor
rate levied in 1856 in each English parish and the Poor Law unions in which
these parishes were situated.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present summary statistics by English census division.
Population was growing overall and in every census division between 1851 and
1891, but most rapidly in the high-wage, industrial north where coal extrac-
tion and cotton-textile production was concentrated (i.e., Census Divisions VIII,
IX, and X). This is also true of the fraction of paupers relieved indoors and of
workhouse capacity. With the exception of Metropolitan London, the Crusade
Against Outrelief was disproportionately, but not exclusively, a northern, ur-
ban phenomenon. Likewise, large-scale workhouse construction, renovation,
and/or expansion was especially necessary in Poor Law unions in which to-
tal population and the fraction of that population relieved in workhouses was
growing especially rapidly, hence workhouse construction, renovation, and/or
expansion was also disproportionately a northern, urban phenomenon.
In the analysis that follows, I discard all 29 Metropolitan London Poor Law
unions (i.e., Census Division I). I do so for three reasons. First, the Return of
Poor Law Inspectors (1868), from which I obtain the capacity of workhouses in
1867, does not include Metropolitan London. Second, many Metropolitan Lon-
don Poor Law unions were either dissolved and incorporated into other Poor
Law unions or divided to form new Poor Law unions between 1857 and 1885.11
11The Clerkenwell Poor Law union and the St. Luke’s Poor Law union, for example, were
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Third, Metropolitan London Poor Law unions were not entirely autonomous.
The Metropolitan Poor Act of 1867 required that all expenses for the salaries
of officers, for the maintenance of patients in asylums, for the maintenance of
pauper children in licensed schools, and for a number of other purpose, be paid
out of a ”Metropolitan Common Poor Fund,” into which every Metropolitan
London Poor Law union was required to contribute.12 This makes these unions
improper units of observation.
2.3.2 OLS Model
How effectively did workhouses screen and/or deter would-be paupers from
relief rolls? And did they, in fact, cut costs? MacKinnon (1987) suggests that
they did. In this section, I replicate her OLS model, illustrate some identification
concerns associated with this model, and illustrate some additional concerns
associated with workhouse capacity data. Formally, I estimate the following
equation.
PRTEu = α0 + α1INFRACu + α2Xu + u (2.1)
The subscript u indexes Poor Law unions. PRTEu denotes the pauperism rate
in Poor Law union u in 1870, INFRACu denotes the fraction of paupers relieved
indoors in Poor Law union u in 1870, Xu is a vector of union-specific covariates
(viz., population density in 1871, the percent of adults employed in agriculture
dissolved and incorporated into the Holburn Poor Law union in 1868.
12See Glenn (1867) for a complete list of expenses to be paid out the Metropolitan Com-
mon Poor Fund [46, pp. 35-38]. These expenses included the maintenance costs of patients
in Metropolitan asylums, the maintenance costs of pauper children in licensed schools, and the
salaries of workhouse officers employed by Metropolitan boards of guardians.
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in 1871, the percent of adults employed in manufacturing in 1871, the average
agricultural laborer’s wage in 1870, and the rate of population growth between
1861 and 1871), and u is an error term.13 All observations are weighted by pop-
ulation and all variables are in logarithms. The coefficient of interest is α1—the
elasticity of the pauperism rate with respect to the fraction of paupers relieved
indoors. If, for example, α1 = 0, then all relief applicants to whom the work-
house was offered accepted the offer, and the Crusade was perfectly ineffective.
If, on the other hand, α1 = −1, then no relief applicants to whom the workhouse
was offered accepted the offer, and the Crusade was perfectly effective (and, for
that matter, workhouses were empty).
Column (1) of Table 2.3 reports the results of Equation 2.1, all of which
are roughly consistent with MacKinnon’s (1987) results. I find that a 10 per-
cent increase in the fraction of paupers relieved indoors would have reduced
the pauperism rate by 3.72 percent (i.e., αˆ1 = −0.372). Since the average non-
Metropolitan London Poor Law union had 30,378 persons in 1865, relieved 1,312
paupers in 1865, relieved 11.7 percent of paupers indoors in 1865, and relieved
17.7 percent of paupers indoors in 1880 (a 51.1 percent increase), αˆ1 implies that
the average Poor Law union relieved 249 fewer total paupers in 1880 than it did
in 1865 as a result of the Crusade. Since, furthermore, 0.372 exceeds MacKin-
non’s (1987) 0.20 threshold by nearly 90 percent, αˆ1 also implies that the work-
house was extraordinarily cost-effective.
Unfortunately, αˆ1 is fraught with potential biases. Among these potential
biases are (i) simultaneity bias and (ii) what I will call workhouse constraint bias.
There is evidence of both. If, for example, high rates of pauperism caused sup-
13Average agricultural wage estimates are county-level estimates, therefore every Poor Law
union within a county will share an average agricultural wage [23].
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port for supposed cost-cutting measures such as the Crusade, and if, in turn,
this support caused high rates of workhouse use, then αˆ1 will be biased toward
zero. Figure 2.8 demonstrates that Poor Law unions with relatively high rates
of pauperism in 1865 were likelier than Poor Law unions with relatively low
rates of pauperism in 1865 to increase the fraction of paupers that they relieved
indoors between 1865 and 1880. This is evidence of simultaneity bias. If, for
example, some significant proportion of workhouses were ”full” at a given time
and, therefore, some significant proportion of relief applicants to whom indoor
relief would have been offered was instead, out of necessity, offered outdoor re-
lief, then αˆ1 will be biased away from zero. INFRACu would fall as relief ap-
plicants, for whom indoor relief was unavailable, piled up, and the relationship
between INFRACu and PRTEu would no longer reflect the effect of INFRACu on
PRTEu. Relief applicants piled up most rapidly during periods of high popu-
lation growth and during recessions.14 Panel A of Table 2.4 decomposes αˆ1 by
population growth. It demonstrates that Poor Law unions with relatively high
rates of population growth yield a much higher estimate of αˆ1 than do Poor
Law unions with relatively low rates of population growth. Panel B of Table 2.4
decomposes αˆ1 by year. It demonstrates that a recession year (i.e., 1863) yields
a much higher estimate of αˆ1 than years of relative prosperity (i.e., 1865, 1870,
1880, and 1885). This is evidence of workhouse constraint bias.
How full were workhouses before the Crusade? Williams (1981) claims that
the Crusade would have been impossible without the considerable ”construc-
tion programme” that occurred [114, pp. 87-88].15 Figure 2.9 corroborates this
14For a given application rate (applications per population), population growth generates
more applications mechanically.
15Workhouse construction was slow. Consider, for example, the case of the St. Martin-in-
the-Fields Poor Law union. In August of 1866, £67,000 was appropriated to the St. Martin-
in-the-Fields Poor Law union by the National Gallery Enlargement Act for the construction of
a new, larger workhouse. Between August of 1866 and May of 1867, land was purchased in
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point. Workhouses in more than one-in-six Poor Law unions were at least 70
percent full on July 1st, 1857, and these Poor Law unions accounted for 31 and
37 percent of all English paupers and persons, respectively. Figure 2.10 demon-
strates that workhouses in Poor Law unions in which the fraction of paupers
relieved indoors increased markedly between 1857 and 1880 were likelier to be
full in 1857—and likelier to be expanded or rebuilt between 1857 and 1880—
than workhouses in Poor Law unions in which the fraction of paupers relieved
indoors increased only slightly, remained unchanged, or decreased between
1857 and 1880. And workhouse construction was not cheap. Between 1857
and 1871, the Poor Law Board authorized £1,264,746 to be spent on the erec-
tion of new workhouses that, combined, would hold 34,204 paupers, and an
authorized additional £2,559,236 to be spent on the ”alteration or enlargement”
of existing workhouses. This amounts to £37 per pauper accommodation (or
approximately $4,000 in 2017 U.S. dollars).16
Workhouses might have been even ”fuller” than my dataset suggests. I dis-
cuss three ways that my dataset understates the extent to which workhouses
were actually space-constrained below.
Workhouse Seasonality. Between 1857 and 1885, no fewer than one-in-ten
English adults worked in agriculture in any given year, and no fewer than
one-in-three English adults worked in agriculture in any given year in the 165
most agriculturally-oriented Poor Law unions.17 Since agricultural work was
Wimbledon, a committee was appointed to ”consider the requirements of the new workhouse,”
and a ”rough sketch” of the new workhouse was submitted to the Poor Law Board. When,
in March of 1868, the St. Martin-in-the-Fields Poor Law Union was subsumed by the adjacent
Strand Poor Law Union, a workhouse architect had yet to be appointed. It was not until June of
1869 that what remained of the £67,000 was re-appropriated to Parliament by the St. Martin-in-
the-Fields Workhouse Fund Appropriation Act. See [96, p. 305] and [13, p. 577].
16See Reports of the Poor Law Board (1858-71) and Report of the Local Government Board (1872).
17By agricultural orientation, I mean the percent of adults working in ”agricultural produc-
tion.”
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seasonal, pauperism in agriculturally-oriented Poor Law unions was seasonal.
During the harvest, pauperism rates were relatively low. After the harvest, pau-
perism rates were relatively high—as employment opportunities waned, any
unnecessary agricultural laborers were compelled to find other work (often in
the city), live off of the few savings that they might have accumulated, or seek
relief (either private or public). The average Poor Law union, for example,
relieved 4.7 percent more paupers and 15.6 percent more indoor paupers on
January 1st of 1881 than it did on July 1st of 1881. Since my dataset consists
only of day-counts of paupers relieved on July 1st of each year, it omits any
off-harvest surge in pauperism and, therefore, systematically understates the
extent to which workhouses in agriculturally-oriented Poor Law unions were,
on average, space-constrained throughout the year.18
Workhouse Inmate Distribution. Poor Law unions were required by the Con-
solidated General Order of 1847 to provide ”proper accommodation” for seven
classes of inmates ”on moral and medical grounds” [99, p. 35].19 Proper accom-
modation meant that each class was assigned to ”that ward or separate building
and yard which may be best fitted for [its] reception...without communication
with those of any other class” [47, p. 69]. Men were separated from women.
Adults were separated from children. The able-bodied were separated from
the infirm. Workhouses, therefore, ”may [have been] crowded in certain parts,
while the total number of inmates may [have been] far below the tolerated max-
18Poor Rates and Pauperism (1857-85), from which I obtain the number of paupers relieved in
each Poor Law union, was published bi-annually. The first report published each year enumer-
ated the number of paupers relieved on January 1st and the second report published each year
enumerated the number of paupers relieved on July 1st.
19The seven classes enumerated in the Consolidated General Order were: (i) infirm men, (ii)
able-bodied men and boys above fifteen years of age, (iii) boys between seven and fifteen years
of age, (iv) infirm women, (v) able-bodied women and girls above fifteen years of age, (vi) girls
between seven and fifteen years of age, and (vii) children of both sexes under seven years of
age.
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imum.”20 Since my dataset does not account for the capacity of class-specific
wards within workhouses, it systematically understates the extent to which the
fullest wards were space-constrained.
Workhouse Quality. MacKinnon (1987) proposes that ”the quality of work-
house facilities would influence the public acceptance of an apparently harsh
policy. Where workhouses were seen to be excessively unsanitary and badly
run, forcing...the poor to enter the workhouse to obtain relief would encounter
considerable opposition” [74, p. 605]. The London infirmary scandals of the
1860s exposed the English public to the less than hygienic and, in some cases,
less than habitable conditions within Metropolitan London workhouses. There
is reason to believe that workhouse habitability problems were hardly an exclu-
sively Metropolitan London problem [54, p. 465].21 Figure 2.11 demonstrates
that approximately one-in-five workhouses was deficient in ventilation, in wa-
ter supply, or in general sanitation. Table 2.5 demonstrates that workhouse diets
were monotonous and often insufficient—the average able-bodied male work-
house inmate received only 1,933 calories per day, almost half of which came
from bread.22 If the English public was, in fact, aware of and antipathetic toward
these workhouse deficiencies, then Poor Law unions may have been politically
incapable of filling their workhouses to capacity, or too close to capacity, lest
they exacerbate the perception of workhouses as inhumane. Since my dataset
does not account for English public opinion, it may systematically understate
the actual, politically-acceptable capacity of workhouses (as distinguished from
the official, physical capacity of workhouses).
20Return of Poor Law Inspectors (1868).
21The Lancet reported in in March of 1868 that ”the national sense of humanity was deeply
shocked [by the London infirmary scandals], and arousing from its usual apathy on pauper
misery, society united in a determined effort to redress the evil” [12].
22See Gazeley & Horrell (2013) for a discussion of ”basic subsistence” [45, p. 767].
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2.3.3 Difference-in-Differences Model
In this section, I introduce a difference-in-differences model (that overcomes the
two biases associated with the OLS model introduced in the previous section),
discuss my identification strategy, and report and interpret the results of this
model. My empirical strategy exploits variation in the change in the fraction of
paupers relieved indoors between 1865 and 1880—the ”Crusade years”—across
Poor Law unions to identify the effect of workhouse use on pauperism. Figure
2.12 illustrates this variation. The fraction of paupers relieved indoors increased
by less than 50 percent in 280 Poor Law unions, by between 50 and 100 percent
in 143 Poor Law unions, and by more than 100 percent in 127 Poor Law unions.
Formally, I estimate the following equation.
PRTEut = β0 + β1(%INFRACCHANGEu × POSTt)
+ β2Xut + γu + µt + ut
(2.2)
The subscript u indexes Poor Law unions and the subscript t indexes years (i.e.,
1857, 1865, 1880, and 1885). %INFRACCHANGEu denotes the percent change
in the fraction of paupers relieved indoors between 1865 and 1880 in Poor Law
union u, POSTt is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if t ≥ 1880 and 0 otherwise,
γu are Poor Law union fixed-effects, and µt are year fixed-effects. All other vari-
ables are defined as in Equation 2.1. All observations are weighted by popula-
tion and all variables except %INFRACCHANGEu and POSTt are in logarithms.
The coefficient of interest is β1—the elasticity of pauperism with respect to the
fraction of paupers relieved indoors.
Column (2) of Table 2.3 reports the results of Equation 2.2. I find that a 10
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percent increase in the fraction of paupers relieved indoors would have reduced
the pauperism rate by 2.64 percent (i.e. βˆ1 = −0.264). This estimate is large. But
it is considerably smaller than the OLS estimate from the previous section. βˆ1,
therefore, suggests that αˆ1 is biased upward, and that the Crusade was less cost-
effective than presumed—note that it exceeds (in absolute value) MacKinnon’s
(1987) 0.20 threshold by only 32 percent. Columns (3), (4), and (5) of Table 2.3
report the results of three alternate specifications of Equation 2.2 that attempt
to account for sectorial, regional, and local employment shocks unaccounted
for by year fixed-effects. Column (3) includes interactions of year dummies
with two sectorial dummies (i.e., coal and cotton-textiles). Column (4) includes
interactions of year dummies with three regional dummies (i.e., north, south,
and midlands). Column (5) includes the rate of population change.23 βˆ1 is robust
across these specifications.
It is clear from Tables 2.1 and 2.2 that levels of INFRACu were not ran-
domly assigned (statistically speaking) to Poor Law unions. Industrial Poor
Law unions had, on average, higher levels of INFRACu than non-industrial
Poor Law unions. It is, moreover, clear from Figure 2.8 that changes in INFRACu
were not randomly assigned (statistically speaking) to Poor Law unions. Poor
Law unions with relatively high rates of pauperism in 1865 had, on average,
greater percent-increases in INFRACu (i.e., %INFRACCHANGEu) between 1865
and 1880 than Poor Law unions with relatively low rates of pauperism in 1865.
But identification of β1 requires neither the random assignment of INFRACu
nor the random assignment of %INFRACCHANGEu. It requires, rather, that
%INFRACCHANGEu is unrelated to relative pauperism trends (not levels) before
23For 1857, I measure the rate of population change between 1851 and 1861. For 1865, I mea-
sure the rate of population change between 1861 and 1871. For 1880, I measure the rate of
population change between 1871 and 1881. For 1885, I measure the rate of population change
between 1881 and 1891.
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1865. Figure 2.13 suggests that this requirement is met. The average pauperism
rate among high-%INFRACCHANGEu Poor Law unions trended very nearly
identically to the average pauperism rate among low-%INFRACCHANGEu
Poor Law unions prior to 1865 (with the notable exception of the years 1861-
65). The large asymmetric spike in average pauperism in the years 1861-65 is
an artifact of the Lancashire Cotton Famine—a short but severe recession con-
centrated in Lancashire and Cheshire.24 Figure 2.14, which re-plots Figure 2.13
omitting the 37 cotton-oriented Poor Law unions in Lancashire and Cheshire,
confirms this point: the asymmetric spike disappears. Since Equation 2.2 uses
only the years 1857, 1865, 1880, and 1885, the Lancashire Cotton Famine should
not bias my results.25 In order to formally test whether %INFRACCHANGEu
is, in fact, unrelated to relative pauperism trends before 1865, I estimate the
following event-study model (which is identical to Equation 2.2 except that it
disaggregates POSTt by year).
PRTEut = κ0 +
∑
τ
piτ(%INFRACCHANGEu × YEARt)
+ κ1Xut + γu + µt + ut
(2.3)
The subscript u indexes Poor Law unions and the subscript t indexes years.
In this case, I use the years 1857, 1860-66, 1868, 1870, 1872, 1876, 1878, 1880,
and 1885. YEARt is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if t = τ and 0 otherwise.
24Between 1861 and 1865, during the American Civil War, a Union blockade of Confeder-
ate ports dissevered Britain from its principal supplier of raw cotton, ”bringing four years of
distress to the towns in the cotton manufacturing districts” [60, p. 380]. These districts were
concentrated in Lancashire and Cheshire.
25Note that by omitting all years between 1865 and 1880, I do not observe Poor Law unions
in the midst of the ”construction programme” that accompanied the Crusade and, in so doing,
I minimize the likelihood of workhouse constraint bias. By 1880, Poor Law unions had already
increased (or not increased) the fraction of paupers that they relieved indoors and, therefore,
had presumably already accommodated the size of their workhouse to the greater (if greater)
number of paupers that they relieved indoors.
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All other variables are defined as in Equation 2.2. All observations, as before,
are weighted by population, and all variables except %INFRACCHANGEu and
YEARt are in logarithms. The coefficients of interest are the set of piτ. I omit
YEAR1870, therefore pˆiτ represents the estimated difference between pauperism
rates in high-%INFRACCHANGEu Poor Law unions and pauperism rates in
low-%INFRACCHANGEu Poor Law unions in year τ relative to 1870. Figure
2.15 plots these coefficients. As in Figure 2.13, there is an asymmetric spike in
relative pauperism rates in the years 1861-65. Figure 2.16 plots the same coef-
ficients using a re-regression that omits the 37 Poor Law unions in Lancashire
and Cheshire. As in Figure 2.14, this spike disappears. Since the pattern of
pˆiτ before τ = 1865 is relatively flat and centered around zero, Equation 2.3 sug-
gests that %INFRACCHANGEu is unrelated to relative pauperism trends before
1865 and, hence, Equation 2.3 suggests that β1 is identified (i.e., that the parallel
trends requirement is met).
What do these results reveal about the decisions of relief applicants to whom
the workhouse was offered as a test? What proportion of relief applicants ac-
cepted this test? What proportion rejected it? If, in a given Poor Law union, the
fraction of paupers relieved indoors increased by (100× θ)%, then some number
of relief applicants to whom outdoor relief was offered under the ”old” policy
would have, instead, been offered indoor relief under the ”new” policy. I call
these applicants ”marginal applicants.” I calculate the estimated proportion of
marginal applicants that accepted a workhouse offer using the following for-
mula.
%ACCEPT =
No. of Marginal ApplicantsACCEPT
No. of Marginal ApplicantsTOTAL
=
în − in
out − ôut (2.4)
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in and out denote the actual number of indoor and outdoor paupers relieved
in 1865 and în and ôut denote the counterfactual number of indoor and outdoor
paupers that would have been relieved in 1865 if the fraction of paupers relieved
indoors was (100 × θ)% greater. Note that the number of marginal applicants is
equivalent to the difference between the actual and counterfactual number of
outdoor paupers (i.e., out − ôut ≥ 0) and the number of marginal applicants that
accepted indoor relief is equivalent to the difference between the actual and
counterfactual number of indoor paupers (i.e., în − in ≥ 0).26 I calculate în and
ôut using the following formulae.
în = [ ̂PAUPERS] × [ ̂INFRAC]
= [POP × P̂RTE] × [ ̂INFRAC]
= [POP × (1 − βˆ1θ) × PRTE] × [(1 + θ) × INFRAC]
(2.5)
ôut = [ ̂PAUPERS] × [1 − ̂INFRAC]
= [POP × P̂RTE] × [1 − ̂INFRAC]
= [POP × (1 − βˆ1θ) × PRTE] × [1 − ((1 + θ) × INFRAC)]
(2.6)
POP, PAUPERS, PRTE, and INFRAC denote total population, total paupers, to-
tal paupers per population, and the fraction of paupers relieved indoors in 1865,
respectively. Hats denote counterfactuals. I calculate în, ôut, and %ACCEPT for
each English Poor Law union using observables, βˆ1, and θ = 0.493 (the average
percent-increase in the fraction of paupers relieved indoors between 1865 and
1880 among English Poor Law unions). I then average %ACCEPT across all
English Poor Law unions. The final row of Table 2.3 reports these averages.
26I assume that all relief applicants to whom outdoor relief was offered accepted the offer.
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I find that one-in-four—between 25.4 and 26.1 percent of—marginal appli-
cants accepted a workhouse offer. This is a significantly larger workhouse
acceptance rate than was anticipated by Poor Law authorities. In 1834, for
example, an administrator in the Lambeth Poor Law union anticipated that
”not...more than one out of five” able-bodied relief applicants would accept a
workhouse offer [4]. In 1837, the Poor Law Commission anticipated that ”not
more than four or five out of a hundred able-bodied paupers, to whom it is
offered, will accept relief in the house” [6, p. 114]. In 1872, the Local Govern-
ment Board anticipated that ”not more than one of ten of those, to whom the
workhouse is offered as a test, will avail themselves of the offer” [2, p. 95].
The difference between what actually happened and what was anticipated to
happen most likely accounts both for the initial enthusiasm of advocates of the
Crusade and for the ultimately insignificant savings that the Crusade achieved.
2.3.4 Migration Bias
Did the Crusade affect inter-union migration? If would-be paupers were wont
to emigrate from Poor Law unions in which the probability of relief in a work-
house increased markedly between 1865 and 1880, or were wont to immigrate
to Poor Law unions in which the probability of relief in a workhouse increased
only slightly, remained unchanged, or decreased between 1865 and 1880, then
the estimates presented in Section 2.3.3 will be biased upwards—in this case,
some proportion of the contraction in the pauperism rate in ”Crusade unions”
would represent a reallocation of paupers between Poor Law unions, not a re-
duction in pauperism. In this section, I discuss the laws that governed the
conditions under which migrants were eligible to remain in and receive poor
101
relief from destination parishes (i.e., the Settlement Laws), the enforcement of
these laws (or the lack thereof), and the likelihood that inter-union differences
in workhouse use actually engendered inter-union migration.
The Settlement Laws purported to prevent the poor from ”settling them-
selves in those parishes...with the largest commons...and the most woods,” but
their origins, according to Nicholls (1898), lie in the desire of Metropolitan mem-
bers of Parliament to consign ”the continually increasing number of poor within
the cities of London and Westminster” to the country parishes whence they
came [85, p. 281]. The most consequential of these Laws, up to and including
the period of the Crusade, were as follows.
Settlement and Removal Act of 1662. This Act enabled local magistrates to
remove any entrant into their parishes that was ”likely to [become] charge-
able to the parish...upon complaint made by churchwardens or overseers of the
poor...within forty days of [that entrant’s] arrival.” Even an earnest, industrious
laborer ”driven from his place by want of work, deficiency of wages, or any
other cause [was], on his entering another parish, liable to be seized...on the
ground that he [was] likely to be chargeable—his only certain exemption from
such liability being the occupation of a tenement of not less than £10 yearly
value” [85, p. 283].27 In effect, any English migrant who appeared indigent, or
likely to become indigent, could be removed and sent back to his or her parish
of birth.
Poor Removal Act of 1795. This Act amended the Settlement and Removal Act
of 1662 so that no English migrant ”could be removed from a parish unless he
27Other, less common exemptions to the Settlement and Removal Act of 1662 included mar-
riage to a resident of the destination parish, holding government office in the destination parish,
and employment in the destination parish for more than 365 consecutive days.
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[or she] applied to the parish for relief” [24, p. 72]. Removal now required a
formal application for relief, not just the appearance of indigence.
Poor Removal Act of 1846. This Act amended the Poor Removal Act of 1795 so
that any English migrant could acquire a ”settlement” after five years of contin-
uous residency in a destination parish. A settlement entitled parish newcomers
to poor relief and protected parish newcomers from removal. Before 1846, no
duration of residency was sufficient to guard against removal. Removal now
required a formal application for relief before five years had elapsed.
Irremovable Poor Act of 1861. This Act amended the Poor Removal Act of
1846 so that any English migrant could acquire a ”settlement” after three years
of continuous residency. Removal now required a formal application for relief
before three years had elapsed.
Union Chargeability Act of 1865. This Act amended the Irremovable Poor Act
of 1861 so that any English migrant could acquire a ”settlement” after only one
year of continuous residency. Removal now required a formal application for
relief before one year had elapsed.
In principle, the Settlement Laws made it extraordinarily risky for ordinary
English laborers (who, at some point or another, might have found themselves
only one injury, one illness, one bad harvest, or one economic downturn away
from penury), to emigrate from the Poor Law unions in which they were born.
Few among them could afford to wait for five years, three years, or even one
year for poor relief. In practice, however, the Settlement Laws were imperfectly
enforced, and inter-union migration was not uncommon [113, p. 149]. Not
all relief applicants in contravention of the Settlement Laws were investigated,
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”nor was...an investigation always followed by removal, even when there was
clear legal ground for it” [51, p. 134]. There were ”many loopholes which [pre-
vented] the law from being enforced in its entirety, and research has shown that
they were constantly used” [77, p. 39].
In order to impute the characteristics of the migrants who should have been,
but were not, removed from the Poor Law unions to which they immigrated,
I explore the characteristics of the migrants who were removed from the Poor
Law unions to which they immigrated. One Parliamentary report—the Return of
Persons Removed (1843)—suggests that the overwhelming majority of removed
migrants (i) travelled a great distance and (ii) were employed upon removal.28
Of the 350 persons removed from the Stockport Poor Law union in 1841, for
example, only 130 were born in England and only 31 were born in Cheshire. Of
the 98 ”households” removed from the Stockport Poor Law union in 1841, only
5 had unemployed ”heads” at the time of their removal. Migrants were not, on
the whole, local itinerants travelling from Poor Law union to Poor Law union
in search of marginally friendlier terms under which to receive poor relief. For
the typical migrant, migration was risky, costly, and long-distance. As such, it
is unlikely that the Crusade affected inter-union migration.
2.3.5 Triple-Difference Model
Did the workhouse effect vary with workhouse quality? Were relief applicants,
for example, more likely to reject relief if the workhouse in which they would
be relieved was especially disagreeable? In this section I explore this question
using a triple-difference model that incorporates five measures of workhouse
28See Parl. Papers, 45 (1843), pp. 5-33.
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quality. Formally, I estimate the following equation.
PRTEut = Ω0+Ω1(%INFRACCHANGEu × POSTt ×WHQu)
+Ω2(%INFRACCHANGEu × POSTt)
+Ω3(POSTt ×WHQu) + Ω4Xut + γu + µt + ut
(2.7)
As before, the subscript u indexes Poor Law unions and the subscript t indexes
years (i.e., 1857, 1865, 1880, and 1885). WHQu denotes one of five measures
of workhouse quality: (i) an indicator for ventilation deficiency, (ii) an indi-
cator for water supply deficiency, (iii) an indicator for general sanitation defi-
ciency, (iv) average daily calories fed to workhouse inmates, and (v) the ratio
of the amount of meat fed to workhouse inmates to the estimated amount of
meat consumed by ”poor labourers” in the county in which the workhouse
was situated. All other variables are defined as in Equation 2.2. The coeffi-
cient of interest is Ω1—the difference between the workhouse effect in Poor Law
unions with quality-deficient workhouses and the workhouse effect in Poor
Law unions with quality-sufficient workhouses. Note that each of these five
distinct triple-difference regressions uses only the subset of English Poor Law
unions for which WHQu is available.29
Table 2.6 reports the results of Equation 2.7. The signs of the estimates sug-
gest that workhouse quality mattered—that the workhouse effect was greater
in Poor Law unions in which the workhouse was deficient in ventilation (Ωvnt1 =
29The Return of Poor Law Inspectors (1868) yields information about the sufficiency of the ven-
tilation in 324 workhouses (and 321 non-Metropolitan workhouses), about the sufficiency of the
water supply in 324 workhouses (and 321 non-Metropolitan workhouses), about the general
sanitary condition in 235 workhouses (all of which are non-Metropolitan workhouses), about
the diets consumed by inmates in 180 workhouses (and 177 non-Metropolitan workhouse), and
about the amount of meat consumed by inmates in 180 workhouses (and 177 non-Metropolitan
workhouses). See Data Appendix for a more thorough discussion of these data.
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−0.232) or water supply (Ωwtr1 = −0.061) and smaller in Poor Law unions in
which the diets of workhouse inmates were richer in calories (Ωcal1 = 0.070) or
meat (Ωmeat1 = 0.062). But none of the estimates of Ω1 are statistically distin-
guishable from zero at a 95 percent confidence level. This result (i.e., Ω1 = 0) is
consistent with a stigma-type story of welfare—that it was the indignity of en-
tering the workhouse, not the quality of the workhouse, that screened and/or
deterred would-be paupers from relief rolls. That the workhouse effect did not,
according to my estimates, depend upon workhouse quality corroborates Mof-
fit’s (1983) conclusion that ”stigma appears to arise mainly from the act of wel-
fare recipiency per se, and not to vary with the amount of the benefit” [84, pp.
1033-1034].
2.3.6 What Caused the Crusade?
Little has been written about why the Crusade occurred when it did. MacKin-
non (1987) hypothesizes that the Union Chargeability Act of 1865, which equal-
ized poor rates across parishes within Poor Law unions, galvanized support
among taxpayers, especially affluent taxpayers, for policies that might offset the
excess tax burden they stood to bear. Rate equalization meant that relatively rich
parishes (in which there was a relatively large tax base and/or a relatively small
number of relief recipients) subsidized relatively poor parishes (in which there
was a relatively small tax base and/or a relatively large number of relief recip-
ients).30 Poor rates in relatively rich parishes rose. Poor rates in relatively poor
30Before 1865, each parish contributed to the common fund of the Poor Law union to which
it belonged in proportion to the number of paupers that it sent to the workhouse (and was
responsible for its own outdoor relief). The Union Chargeability Act of 1865 eliminated the
common fund and, with it, proportional parish poor rates. After 1865, each parish in each Poor
Law union paid the same poor rate. The years 1861 through 1865 were unusual exceptions. The
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parishes fell. If the English upper class felt disproportionately disadvantaged
by the Act—as, in fact, it was—and if it responded to this disproportionate dis-
advantage by wielding its disproportionate political power to restrict outdoor
relief, then there would have been a relationship between the distribution of
wealth across parishes within Poor Law unions before 1865 and the change in
workhouse use by Poor Law unions after 1865.31 My dataset enables a direct
test of this hypothesis. Formally, I estimate the following equation.
%INFRACCHANGEu = θ0 + θ1UCAu + θ2Xu + u (2.8)
As before, the subscript u indexes Poor Law unions. UCAu denotes one of two
measures of the impact of the Act: (i) the standard deviation of parish poor
rates in Poor Law union u in 1856, which proxies the overall impact of the Act on
Poor Law union u, and (ii) the difference between the minimum parish poor rate
levied in Poor Law union u in 1856 and the poor rate that would have prevailed
in Poor Law union u in 1856 under so-called ”union chargeability,” which prox-
ies the impact of the Act on the richest and, presumably, most politically influ-
ential parish in Poor Law union u. All other variables are defined as in Equation
2.2. The coefficient of interest is θ1—the effect of pre-1865 poor rate dispersion
on post-1865 Crusade adoption.
Table 2.7 reports the results of Equation 2.8. They suggest that there was
no relationship—or, at least, only a negligible relationship—between the Act
Poor Removal Act of 1861 required that each parish contribute to the common fund of the Poor
Law union to which it belonged in proportion to its rateable value (i.e., property wealth), not in
proportion to the number of paupers that it sent to the workhouse.
31According to MacKinnon (1987), the Union Chargeability Act generated ”the incentive for
wealthier groups to consider more carefully how to reduce relief expenditures” [74, p. 613].
Note that Poor Law guardians were almost always wealthy since the Poor Law Amendment
Act of 1834 imposed a property qualification on candidacy for election to the board.
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and the Crusade. If the Act did cause the Crusade, then θˆ1 should be large and
statistically significant. It is neither. A one-standard-deviation increase in parish
poor rate dispersion is associated with a 0.4 percent increase in the fraction of
paupers relieved indoors (θˆstd1 = 0.004). A ten-percentage-point increase in the
tax rate of the least-taxed parish is associated with a 3.0 percent increase in the
fraction of paupers relieved indoors (θˆrich1 = 0.003). Figure 2.17, furthermore,
demonstrates that the Act had little impact north of the River Trent, where, in
industrial Poor Law unions in Lancashire, Cheshire, Yorkshire, and Durham,
the Crusade was very popular. This evidence is hardly dispositive—it does not
rise to the level of causal evidence—but it is, perhaps, a persuasive first pass.
2.4 Conclusion
The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 endowed all English Poor Law unions
with the administrative power (and the legislative mandate) to restrict the ease
with which poor relief could be obtained by applicants. Between 1834 and 1865,
there was little substantive change. Between 1865 and 1880, many, but not all,
Poor Law unions began to exercise this power, some to a greater degree than
others. This policy revolution—the Crusade Against Outrelief—is a useful nat-
ural experiment from which a number of lessons can be learned. What is the
relationship, for instance, between the conditions attached to welfare recipiency
and the overall rate of welfare recipiency? Do these conditions, on balance, re-
duce relief costs? Does this relationship depend on the nature or the severity of
these conditions? And what might cause such a revolution in the first place? I
address each of these questions in this essay.
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First, I find that the workhouse was very effective. Nearly three-quarters of
relief applicants to whom the workhouse was offered as a test refused the offer.
But it was also very costly. Workhouse construction costs, maintenance costs,
and personnel costs all but offset the savings associated with slimmer relief
rolls. In this way, the Crusade was a political success and an economic failure.
Though there were fewer paupers, paupers and would-be paupers were unam-
biguously worse off, and taxpayers were only ambiguously better off. Second,
I find that the decision to accept or reject a workhouse offer was independent
of the disagreeableness of the workhouse. Relief applicants were no less likely
to accept a workhouse offer if the workhouse in which they would be relieved
was deficient in ventilation, water supply, general sanitation, or diet. It was
the stigma of entering the workhouse, not the disagreeableness of workhouse
life, that screened and/or deterred relief applicants from relief rolls. Public ex-
posure as ”a pauper” was undoubtedly difficult, and that was the point of the
Crusade, however cruel. But if workhouses worked because they branded their
inmates with scarlet ”P”s, then workhouses need not have been as inhumane
as they were to function effectively. Lastly, I find no evidence that the Union
Chargeability Act of 1865 was the cause—or even a cause—of the Crusade. The
Poor Law unions most affected by union chargeability did not, on average, be-
have any differently in the ensuing fifteen years than the Poor Law unions least
affected by union chargeability. If the Crusade was, as it claimed, a matter of
pounds, shillings, and pence, it remains to be shown what, precisely, changed
in the late 1860s that so challenged the pocketbooks of its advocates.
The most significant—and surprising—finding of this essay is just how large
the workhouse effect was. The English working class in the middle of the nine-
teenth century was extraordinarily poor by today’s standards. Rowntree (1901),
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for example, finds that nearly half of the ”wage-earning class” of the city of York
was living in either ”primary poverty” or ”secondary poverty” as late as 1901.32
Yet the Crusade successfully excised a subset of this class—the most vulnerable
subset of this class—from relief rolls in large numbers. An equivalent welfare re-
form in England today—or in any affluent, twenty-first century society—would
almost certainly excise an even larger subset. With far fewer people living at
or below the poverty line (as defined by Rowntree), far fewer people are living
without savings on which to fall back. The average Victorian laborer had little,
if any, savings, but three-in-four to whom the workhouse was offered still said
”no.”
32Rowntree (1901) defines primary poverty as ”families whose total earnings are insufficient
to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency” and sec-
ondary poverty as ”families whose total earnings would be sufficient for the maintenance of
merely physical efficiency were it not that some portion of them is absorbed by other expendi-
ture, either useful or wasteful” [98, pp. 86-87]. He finds that 27.84 percent and 45.77 percent of
wage-earners in York were living in primary and secondary poverty, respectively, in 1901.
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Table 2.3: Effect of INFRAC on Pauperism Rate
OLS Difference-in-Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INFRAC† -0.372∗∗
(0.085)
%INFRACCHANGE ×
POST
-0.264∗∗ -0.269∗∗ -0.265∗∗ -0.262∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035)
Percent Agriculture† 0.229∗ 0.026 0.057 0.045 0.030
(0.100) (0.081) (0.059) (0.068) (0.082)
Population Density† 0.170∗∗ 0.027 -0.037 0.023 0.114
(0.064) (0.084) (0.069) (0.068) (0.083)
Agricultural Wage† -1.040∗∗ 0.627∗∗ 0.462∗∗ 0.579∗∗ 0.606∗∗
(0.169) (0.183) (0.157) (0.178) (0.180)
Constant -1.832∗∗ -4.921∗∗ -5.558∗∗ -4.948∗∗ -3.915∗∗
(0.706) (0.605) (0.466) (0.584) (0.514)
Cotton × Year FEs X
Coal × Year FEs X
Region × Year FEs X
Population Change X X
Observations 547 2,188 2,188 2,188 2,188
R-Squared 0.432 0.881 0.897 0.889 0.885
%ACCEPT 17.5% 25.9% 25.4% 25.8% 26.1%
Notes: Column (1) reports the results of Equation 2.1. Column (2) reports the results of Equation
2.2. Columns (3)-(5) report the results of modified versions of Equation 2.2. Robust standard er-
rors are reported in parentheses. INFRAC is the proportion of paupers relieved in workhouses.
%INFRACCHANGE is the percent change in the proportion of paupers relieved in workhouses
between 1865 and 1880. Agricultural wages are county-level averages. Regions are defined as
North, South, and Midlands. The cross symbol (i.e., “†”) denotes that the variable is in logs.
∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 2.4: Workhouse Constraint Bias
All
Unions
High Growth
Unions
Low Growth
Unions
Panel A. Via Population Growth
1865 Estimate of α1 -0.321∗∗ -0.527 -0.276∗∗
(0.070) (0.328) (0.049)
Observations 547 31 516
Avg. Occupancy Rate 43.2% 60.0% 42.4%
Panel B. Via Exogenous Increase in Pauperism Rate
1863 Estimate of α1 -0.532∗∗
(0.074)
1865 Estimate of α1 -0.321∗∗
(0.070)
1870 Estimate of α1 -0.372∗∗
(0.085)
1880 Estimate of α1 -0.350∗∗
(0.054)
1885 Estimate of α1 -0.320∗∗
(0.061)
Notes: In Panel A, the results of Equation 2.1 are reported by population growth. Each column
represents a separate regression. I define “high growth” Poor Law unions, of which there were
31, as any Poor Law union that grew by at least 20,000 persons between 1861 and 1871. I define
“low growth” Poor Law unions, of which there were 516, as any Poor Law union that grew by
less than 20,000 persons between 1861 and 1871. Average occupancy rates are defined as indoor
paupers per workhouse capacity. In Panel B, the results of Equation 2.1 are reported by year.
Each row represents a separate regression, and each row uses year-specific data.
∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 2.5: Daily Dietary Intake of Able-Bodied Male Workhouse Inmates
% of Daily
Calories from. . .
County N Cals(kcals)
Protein
(g)
Carbs
(g)
Fat
(g) Bd. Mt. Pot. Ch.
Berkshire 9 1,831 109 265 55 53% 13% 5% 9%
Buckingham 7 1,886 108 275 58 50% 11% 5% 7%
Cambridge 4 1,978 122 291 59 46% 14% 9% 6%
Cornwall 1 2,549 116 378 77 37% 10% 6% 4%
Devon 1 1,953 86 325 45 42% 13% 18% 0%
Dorset 5 1,872 120 284 54 52% 10% 5% 10%
East Riding 10 1,843 106 268 56 48% 13% 4% 0%
Hampshire 23 1,851 109 265 58 49% 12% 5% 9%
Hertford 1 1,886 101 295 52 45% 16% 11% 0%
Kent 14 1,632 84 246 50 58% 2% 1% 12%
Lancashire 3 2,352 117 287 96 31% 7% 8% 1%
Lincoln 14 1,929 112 274 60 46% 14% 7% 5%
Middlesex 3 2,001 125 265 69 42% 14% 7% 7%
Norfolk 1 1,926 115 285 62 49% 1% 5% 9%
North Riding 11 2,053 121 288 67 45% 11% 5% 1%
Nottingham 8 2,427 131 310 92 37% 9% 6% 1%
Oxford 9 2,115 121 299 71 44% 10% 5% 6%
Surrey 9 1,842 100 267 56 48% 11% 6% 8%
Sussex 19 1,747 102 257 54 51% 9% 3% 10%
West Riding 12 2,277 129 304 81 42% 10% 5% 2%
Wiltshire 16 1,893 105 292 53 55% 8% 6% 9%
Total 180 1,933 110 277 62 48% 10% 5% 7%
Sources: Poor Law (Workhouse Dietaries) (1864), Dietaries of the Inmates of Workhouses (1866), Work-
house Dietaries (1867), Return of Poor Law Inspectors (1868), [14].
Notes: Column (1) reports the number of Poor Law unions in each county for which workhouse
dietary data are available. Columns (2)-(5) report the average daily intake of calories, protein,
carbohydrates, and fat by able-bodied male paupers across English Poor Law unions. Columns
(6)-(9) report the average percent of calories that were derived from bread, meat, potatoes, and
cheese, respectively, across English Poor Law unions. See Data Appendix for an example of a
“daily dietary” (i.e., breakfast, dinner, and supper).
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Table 2.6: Effect of INFRAC on Pauperism Rate (by Workhouse Quality)
Ve
nt
ila
ti
on
(P
oo
r
=
1)
W
at
er
(P
oo
r
=
1)
Sa
ni
ta
ti
on
(P
oo
r
=
1)
C
al
or
ie
s
(Z
-S
co
re
s)
M
ea
t
(W
H
/
C
ty
.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
%INFRACCHANGE -0.232 -0.061 0.008 0.070 0.062
× POST ×WHQ (0.131) (0.110) (0.093) (0.064) (0.104)
%INFRACCHANGE -0.256∗∗ -0.285∗∗ -0.277∗∗ -0.311∗∗ -0.343∗∗
× POST (0.042) (0.044) (0.048) (0.073) (0.129)
POST ×WHQ 0.228 0.096 -0.045 -0.025 -0.054
(0.126) (0.139) (0.106) (0.047) (0.079)
Percent Agriculture† -0.016 -0.033 -0.010 0.058 0.025
(0.074) (0.075) (0.084) (0.091) (0.088)
Population Density† -0.140 -0.146 -0.091 -0.161 -0.169
(0.116) (0.130) (0.145) (0.104) (0.109)
Agricultural Wage† 0.721∗∗ 0.677∗∗ 0.587∗∗ 0.215 0.191
(0.143) (0.140) (0.187) (0.216) (0.210)
Constant -4.696∗∗ -4.555∗∗ -4.610∗∗ -3.761∗∗ -3.381∗∗
(0.397) (0.397) (0.519) (0.524) (0.524)
Observations 1,284 1,284 940 708 708
R-Squared 0.896 0.892 0.894 0.894 0.893
Notes: Columns (1)-(5) report the results of Equation 2.7. Each column represents a separate
triple-difference regression. In columns (1)-(3), WHQ is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if
the ventilation, the water supply, or the general sanitation in the workhouse, respectively, was
deficient, and a value of 0 otherwise. In column (4), WHQ denotes the number of calories fed to
workhouse inmates (in z-scores). In column (5), WHQ denotes the ratio of the amount of meat
fed to workhouse inmates to the estimated amount of meat consumed by “poor labourers”
in the county in which the workhouse was located. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. The cross symbol (i.e., “†”) denotes that the variable is in logs.
∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 2.7: Effect of the Union Chargeability Act on Crusade Adoption
UCA = Standard Deviation
of Parish Poor Rates
UCA = Average Minus
Minimum Poor Rate
(1) (2)
UCA 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Percent Agriculture† 0.012 0.011
(0.013) (0.013)
Population Density† 0.024∗∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Agricultural Wage† 0.120∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.032) (0.032)
Population Change† -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Cotton Dummy 0.037∗ 0.416∗
(0.017) (0.129)
Coal Dummy -0.022 -0.021
(0.011) (0.011)
Constant -0.288∗∗ -0.278∗∗
(0.095) (0.094)
Observations 547 547
R-Squared 0.129 0.135
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the results of Equation 2.8. Each column represents a separate
OLS regression. In column (1), UCA measures the standard deviation of parish poor rates within
Poor Law unions in 1856. In column (2), UCA measures the difference between the average poor
rate and the poor rate in the least-taxed parish within Poor Law unions in 1856. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. The cross symbol (i.e., “†”) denotes that the variable is in
logs.
∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Figure 2.1: Williams’ (1981) “Crusade Unions”
Sources: Great Britain Historical GIS Project (2011), [114].
Notes: This figure plots the 41 English Poor Law unions that Williams (1981) defines as Crusade
unions (i.e., “unions that restricted out-relief,” using the criterion that they relieved less than
30 percent of all paupers outdoors on January 1st, 1893). The inset depicts and magnifies the
Metropolitan London census division (also pictured in red in the main panel).
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Figure 2.2: Percent Change in INFRAC (1865-80)
Sources: Poor Rates and Pauperism (1857-85), Great Britain Historical GIS Project (2011).
Notes: This figure plots quintiles of the percent change in the fraction of paupers relieved indoors
(i.e., indoor paupers per total paupers) between 1865 and 1880 across English Poor Law unions.
Note that 68 Poor Law unions in the first quintile had a negative change in INFRAC (i.e., they
relieved a smaller fraction of paupers indoors in 1880 than they did in 1865). The inset depicts
and magnifies the Metropolitan London census division (also pictured in red in the main panel).
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Figure 2.17: Impact of the Union Chargeability Act of 1865
Sources: Return of the Rate in the Pound (1861), Great Britain Historical GIS Project (2011).
Notes: The figure plots two measures, by quintle, of the impact of the Union Chargeability
Act of 1865. The leftmost panel plots the overall impact of the Act, as measured by the standard
deviation of parish poor rates within each English Poor Law union in 1856. The rightmost figure
plots the concentrated impact of the Act on rich parishes, as measured by the difference between
the minimum poor rate levied among parishes within each English Poor Law union in 1856 and
the common poor rate that would have prevailed among parishes within each English Poor Law
union in 1856 under “union chargeability.” Darker shading represents a greater impact.
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CHAPTER 3
WEALTH AND WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION: EVIDENCE FROM
ENGLAND, 1881
3.1 Introduction
”Despite all of the achievements of the century passed, poverty continues to
exist, with its normal concomitants. Class antagonism based on differences of
wealth shows little sign of lessening, [and] greed [has] well-nigh dominated so-
ciety” [100, p. 138]. This was written in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in
1903. It suggests that wealth generated greed (or vice versa), and that, ipso facto,
very wealthy people or places were uniquely unamenable to wealth redistribu-
tion. Were classes, in fact, antagonistic? Did wealth itself affect attitudes toward
the redistribution of wealth from one class (e.g., taxpayers) to another (e.g., wel-
fare recipients)? Statistically speaking, these are complicated questions. Wealth
is mechanically correlated with poverty. Wealth is mechanically correlated with
the capacity to redistribute. And charity almost certainly confounds the rela-
tionship between wealth and public wealth redistribution. Charitable contribu-
tions derived overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, from the very wealthy, and,
for this reason, the very wealthy might have regarded public wealth redistribu-
tion as unnecessary or even counterproductive. In this essay, I isolate plausibly
exogenous variation in wealth in England in 1881 in order to estimate the effect
of wealth on public wealth redistribution (i.e., on welfare generosity).
Between 1601 and 1948, the English welfare system was the Poor Law. It
was administered locally by approximately 600 Poor Law unions, each of which
was, for all intents and purposes, autonomous, and in each of which a board
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of guardians determined the generosity with which welfare was apportioned
to welfare applicants. Some Poor Law unions were generous. Others were
not. Poor Law unions were themselves agglomerations of parishes, smaller ge-
ographical units of which there were approximately 14,000. Guardians were al-
located to each parish in each Poor Law union. More guardians were allocated
to more populous parishes and less guardians were allocated to less populous
parishes, but every parish, however populous, was guaranteed one guardian,
therefore the least populous parishes possessed more guardians per capita than
the average parish. It happened, hardly by accident, that the least populous
parishes were disproportionately wealthy. In this way, wealth was systemati-
cally over-represented by boards of guardians. But the degree to which wealth
was over-represented by boards of guardians was, I demonstrate, arbitrary. I
use this variation as an instrument for wealth.
The United States Senate provides a useful analogy. The Senate is notewor-
thy for its ”unrepresentativeness” [89, 62, 78, 115].1 A voter in North Dakota, for
example, is over-represented by the Senate relative to a voter in California. Since
every state is entitled to two senators, less populous states possess more sena-
tors per capita than more populous states. Moreover, since less populous states
tend to be poorer, on average, than more populous states, one might say that
the Senate under-represents income. In 2018, per capita income in the United
States was $53,712, yet average per capita income across states (weighting states
equally, and disregarding the District of Columbia) was $51,963 [87]. The Senate
is a macrocosm of English boards of guardians. The United States is an agglom-
eration of states. Poor Law unions were agglomerations of parishes. But the
1Note that the Senate was designed as a body that would represent states directly, and citizens
only indirectly. It was ”a compromise between the opposite pretentions of the large and the small
states.” See [75].
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Senate is only one-half of one of three branches of government, whereas boards
of guardians were governments unto themselves. And there is only one United
States, whereas there were hundreds of Poor Law unions, therefore there is am-
ple variation in both wealth and welfare generosity with which to estimate the
effect of the former on the latter.
Much has been written about the relationship between wealth inequality (or
the ”prospect of upward mobility”) and welfare generosity. Benabou & Ok
(2001) and Meltzer & Richard (1981), for example, suggest that greater inequal-
ity should or will yield greater wealth redistribution [18, 82]. But little, if any-
thing, has been written about the relationship between wealth itself and welfare
generosity. Victorian England provides a fecund empirical setting in which to
study this question. First, the Poor Law, as a redistributive program, did not
compete or interact with other redistributive programs (e.g., Medicaid, EITC,
SNAP, etc.). It was the only redistributive program in England in 1881. Sec-
ond, the Poor Law was administered hyper-locally. It was neither a national-
nor regional- nor county-level program. The average Poor Law union had only
41,995 persons in 1881. If one were to divide the United States in 2018 into
41,995-person units, there would be 7,834 such units, more than twice as many
such units as there are counties in the United States in 2018. The average Poor
Law union was only 86 square miles in 1881. If one were to divide the United
States in 2018 into 86-square-mile units, there would be 44,148 such units, more
than fourteen-times as many such units as there are counties in the United States
in 2018. Third, the Poor Law provides straightforward quantitative measures of
welfare generosity. I use two such measures: (i) the proportion of welfare re-
cipients relieved in workhouses and (ii) average relief (in pounds) granted to
welfare recipients not relieved in workhouses.
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I make three main contributions. First, I introduce a new dataset of 13,869
English parishes and 576 English Poor Law unions assembled, among other
sources, from Census Reports and reports of Parliament. I match each parish
to the Poor Law union to which it belonged. Parish-level data include popula-
tion, rateable value (i.e., property wealth), and number of Poor Law guardians.
Union-level data include population, population density, coal and cotton-textile
production, distance from urban and ”urbanizing” centers, percent of adults
working in agriculture, percent of population that lived in a municipal bor-
ough, percent of Parliamentary representatives that belonged to a conservative
political party, percent of population that was non-Anglican Protestant, per-
cent of population that attended church services, fraction of welfare recipients
relieved in workhouses, and Poor Law expenditure. Second, I use an instru-
mental variables model to demonstrate that wealth caused neither an increase
nor a decrease in welfare generosity. Relatively wealthy Poor Law unions were
no more or less likely to relieve paupers in workhouses or to issue larger or
smaller payments to paupers not relieved in workhouses than relatively poor
Poor Law unions. My instrument isolates unique, plausibly exogenous vari-
ation in wealth, and hence enables me to identify this causal effect (or lack
thereof). I conclude that classes were not, in fact, as antagonistic as the afore-
mentioned quote in the QJE suggested. Third, I construct a new, parish-level
measure of wealth skewness using per capita parish wealth and the proportion
of parish population that was eligible to vote in Poor Law guardian elections
between 1873 and 1875.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I provide
a brief outline of the English Poor Law, of the election of boards of guardians,
and of the allocation of guardians across parishes within Poor Law unions. In
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Section 3.3, I introduce my dataset, discuss the assumptions associated with my
instrument, estimate an instrumental variables model, and interpret my results.
In Section 3.4, I introduce the aforementioned measure of wealth skewness and
the way in which it was constructed. In Section 3.5, I conclude.
3.2 Institutional Background
3.2.1 The English Poor Law
Welfare in England took two forms: (i) outdoor relief and (ii) indoor relief. Out-
door relief was cash or in-kind payments of food, fuel, or clothing. Indoor relief
was room and board in a workhouse. Workhouses were deliberately made ”as
like prisons as possible”—they were often insufficiently lit, ventilated, or sani-
tized; inmate classes (e.g., men, women, and children) were separated from one
another; and diets were meager and monotonous [107, p. 267]. Relief applicants
to whom indoor relief was offered were wont to reject the offer out of hand and,
for this reason, indoor relief was the preferred form of welfare among reform-
ers seeking to reduce the size of welfare rolls. These reformers grew in number
alongside welfare rolls (and welfare expenditures) in the late-eighteenth and
early-nineteenth centuries.2
In 1834, Parliament passed the Poor Law Amendment Act. The Act agglom-
erated parishes (the administrative unit of the Poor Law until 1834) into Poor
Law unions. Since workhouses required relatively large up-front capital out-
2Welfare expenditure as a percent of GDP more than doubled in England and Wales between
1750 and 1820. See [66, p. 46].
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lays, they also required a relatively large tax base and, therefore, a relatively
large population.3 In most cases, parishes were insufficiently populous to afford
these outlays. Combined with adjacent parishes, however, workhouse costs
could be shared. By 1881, 172,849 welfare recipients—22.4 percent of all wel-
fare recipients and 0.7 percent of all people—were relieved in workhouses. This
increase in indoor relief would have been impossible without the ”construction
programme” that occurred, and the ”construction programme” that occurred
would have been impossible without the Poor Law union [114, pp. 87-88]. I
discuss the parish and the Poor Law union below.
Parishes. The English parish was ecclesiastical in origin, but accrued, over cen-
turies, a great many civil functions, including the administration of the Poor
Law (until 1834). The so-called ”ancient” parish was replaced in the nineteenth
century by the civil parish and the ecclesiastical parish.4 For the purposes of this
essay, ”parish” refers to civil parish, of which there were 13,869 in 1881. Figure
3.1 maps them. With some exceptions, parishes were very small—1,691 had a
population of less than 100, 8,080 had a population of less than 500, and 10,510
had a population of less than 1,000. Figure 3.2 plots the distribution of parish
population.
Poor Law Unions. The first Poor Law union to be formed was Abingdon in
Berkshire. By 1881, there were 591.5 Figure 3.3 maps them. Most Poor Law
3The Poor Law was financed locally.
4Civil and ecclesiastical parishes were rarely coterminous. By 1901, ”the total number of
[civil] parishes in England and Wales (excluding London) was 14,900, while the number of ec-
clesiastical parishes was 14,080. In only 5,175 cases did the civil and ecclesiastical boundaries
coincide.” See [116, pp. 1-9].
5Note that the dataset that I describe in Section 3.3 includes only 576 of these 591 Poor Law
unions. It excludes the Poor Law unions for which there were irreconcilable boundary changes
between 1851 and 1881. In 1869, all so-called Gilbert’s Unions were abolished, and the parishes
of which they consisted were re-allocated to adjacent Poor Law unions. Many Gilbert’s Unions
were geographically disjunct, and it is, therefore, difficult to reconcile the pre- and post-1869
boundaries of the Poor Law unions that were affected by this re-allocation. Since I include some
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unions consisted of between 10 and 40 parishes, but 29 consisted of a single
populous parish, and 29 others consisted of more than 50 unpopulous parishes.
Figure 3.4 plots the distribution of parishes per union. Each Poor Law union
was required to build and maintain a workhouse and elect a board of guardians
responsible for ”ordering, giving, and directing all relief to the poor.”6 Guardian
elections were held by parishes. Each parish was entitled to a certain, pre-
determined number of guardians on its Poor Law union’s board.
3.2.2 Parish Representation
Parish representation depended on (i) the allocation of parishes to Poor Law
unions and (ii) the allocation of guardians to parishes. The more parishes allo-
cated to a particular Poor Law union, the less (relative) representation any one
parish in that Poor Law union would have on that Poor Law union’s board of
guardians. The more guardians allocated to a particular parish, the more (rela-
tive) representation that parish would have on its Poor Law union’s board of
guardians. The Poor Law Amendment Act delegated the duty of parish and
guardian allocation to the Poor Law Commission, which, in turn, re-delegated
the duty to its Assistant Commissioners.7
Allocation of Parishes to Unions. Section 26 of the Poor Law Amendment Act
pre-1869 variables in my dataset, I drop the 15 Poor Law unions that were affected by such
boundary changes.
6Section 54 of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 stripped parish ”overseers of the poor”
of the authority ”to grant relief, except in cases of sudden and urgent necessity, without an order
of the board.” See [73, p. 158].
7The Poor Law Commission was a three-man body tasked with ”carrying [the] Act into ex-
ecution.” It was ”empowered...to appoint such persons as they may think fit to be Assistant
Commissioners.” It had appointed nine such Assistant Commissioners by December of 1834
and fifteen by August of 1835. Among them were ”one or two ex-army officers, several barris-
ters, one or two solicitors, and two or three ’private gentlemen.’” See [73, p. 162] and [67, p.
3].
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stipulated that the Poor Law Commission ”shall...declare so many parishes as
they may think fit to be united for the administration of the laws for the relief
of the poor, and such parishes shall be deemed a union for such purpose.” Par-
liament ”left it to the Commissioners’ unfettered discretion to determine what
parishes should be federated,” and ”whatever the principles of the Commis-
sioners may have been, their practice was probably considerably modified by
the pressure of local interests” [28, p. 63]. Most often, Poor Law unions took the
form of a circle, with ”a market town as a centre, and comprehending those sur-
rounding parishes whose inhabitants [were] accustomed to resort to the same
market” [3]. There was no limit on the geographical size of Poor Law unions,
but ”ten miles [from the far end to the near] was considered [convenient], and
that distance was rarely exceeded” [85, pp. 292-293]. In this way, inconvenience
”was brought to a minimum” [67, p. 44].
Allocation of Guardians to Parishes. Section 38 of the Poor Law Amendment
Act stipulated that the Poor Law Commission ”shall determine the number of
guardians which shall be elected in [each parish], having due regard to the cir-
cumstances of each parish, provided always that one or more guardians shall be
elected for each parish.” There was ”no proportion set forth in the Act between
the population of a parish and the number of guardians to represent it.” Repre-
sentation was far from proportional [58, p. 91]. Instead, ”there was drastic and
consistent underrepresentation for populous parishes [and] overrepresentation
of the more sparsely populated rural parishes,” which ”ensured control of the
boards by the large agricultural landowners” [26, p. 42].
Table 3.1 demonstrates how this worked. Twenty parishes were agglom-
erated to form the Rye Union in 1835. Two of these parishes had fewer than
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150 people (i.e., Broomhill, East Guldeford). Four of these parishes had more
than 1,000 people (i.e., Beckley, Brede, Northiam, Rye). Since each parish, how-
ever small, was guaranteed at least one guardian, the least populous parishes
were allocated more representatives per head of population than the most pop-
ulous parishes. The least populous parishes also tended to be the wealthiest.
Broomhill, for example, had 0.37 percent of the Rye Union’s population and
5.56 percent of the Rye Union’s guardians—its ”guardian-share,” therefore, ex-
ceeded its ”population-share” by a factor of 15. Broomhill was also nearly twice
as wealthy as the next wealthiest parish. In this way, the allocation of parishes
to Poor Law unions and of guardians to parishes distorted the representation of
parishes (and of wealth) on boards of guardians.
This mis-representation was not unique to any one parish or Poor Law
union. It was systematic. Figure 3.5 plots the guardian- and population-share of
every English parish. The 9,494 over-represented parishes (above the 45-degree
line) had an average population of 627 and an average population-share of 1.72
percent. The 3,994 under-represented parishes (below the 45-degree line) had an
average population of 3,894 and an average population-share of 9.87 percent.
Figure 3.6 plots average parish guardian-shares within one hundred evenly-
spaced population-share bins. Binning reveals a clear, nearly linear relationship
between guardian- and population-share. Parishes containing less than five per-
cent of the population of the Poor Law union to which they belonged were, on
average, over-represented. Parishes containing more than five percent of the
population of the Poor Law union to which they belonged were, on average,
under-represented—and the greater their population-share, the greater their
under-representation. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 demonstrate that over-represented
parishes were disproportionately small and disproportionately wealthy.
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3.2.3 Guardian Elections
In this section I examine guardian elections, of which 1,842 were held between
1873 and 1875. Figure 3.9 maps them. Elections were held at most once per year
and would only be held when the number of candidates exceeded the num-
ber of seats (i.e., when seats were ”contested”). Only the wealthy could run.
Section 38 of the Poor Law Amendment Act tasked the Poor Law Commission
to ”fix a [property] qualification without which no person shall be eligible [to
be elected].” This property qualification could not exceed ”£40 annual rental,”
but the Commission ”often selected a figure of £25, which certainly disqualified
the majority of [taxpayers] in many parishes.”8 In some extreme cases—in the
Brackley Union, for example—the proportion of qualified candidates to total
seats was less than ten to one [26, p. 44].
The franchise for the election of Poor Law guardians was distinct from the
franchise for the election of members of Parliament, which, in turn, was distinct
from the franchise for the election of town councilors in municipalities. Ulti-
mately, what made the Poor Law electoral system ”a glaring anomaly” among
other English electoral systems was (i) plural voting and (ii) voting papers [27, p.
210].
Plural Voting. Section 40 of the Poor Law Amendment Act stipulated that own-
ers of property valued at less than £50 ”shall have and be entitled to give one
vote” and of property valued at more than £50 ”shall have [an additional] one
vote for every £25...so nevertheless that no [owner] shall be entitled to give more
than six votes;” and stipulated that occupiers of property valued at less than £200
8”Annual rental” refers to the assessed annual value of the property either owned or occu-
pied by, in this case, the person seeking election. See [27, p. 203].
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”shall each have a single vote..., at £200 or more, but under £400, shall each have
two votes..., and at £400 or more shall each have three votes.”9 Since taxpayers
could be both owners and occupiers of property, the wealthiest taxpayers could
have as many as nine votes—as many as six votes as owners of property and as
many as three votes as occupiers of property. This scale was modified in 1844
so that the wealthiest taxpayers could have as many as twelve votes.10 But only
taxpayers could vote. The poor were, in effect, disenfranchised. Among those
ineligible to vote were paupers (i.e., welfare recipients), non-occupiers (i.e., the
homeless), occupiers of un-rated property (i.e., occupiers of the least valuable
houses/apartments), and occupiers of property for which only the landlord’s
name appeared in the ”rate book” (i.e., ”compound tenants” for whom the land-
lord tendered all taxes and, in so doing, appropriated all votes associated with
occupancy) [59, pp. 63-66]. Plural voting was not eliminated until 1894.
Voting Papers. Section 40 of the Poor Law Amendment Act stipulated that votes
”be given or taken in writing.” So-called ”voting papers” were distributed by
parish officials to all eligible voters ”in the quiet and seclusion of [their] own
homes” and collected and tallied thereafter [59, p. 124]. Each paper listed the
candidates and included ”a place for the voter to write his (or her) choice of
the listed candidates, and the number of votes to which the voter was entitled”
[27, p. 203]. Voting papers were not, strictly speaking, secret—they ”could be
examined and challenged by any elector in the union” [27, p. 203]. Although
the secret ballot was introduced in municipal and Parliamentary elections by
the Ballot Act of 1872, guardian elections continued to be conducted via voting
9The scale of voting for owners of property was ”taken directly from” the Select Vestries
Act (1818), which was ”intended to restrict and moderate the public meeting of inhabitants
by excluding non-ratepayers and by giving a preponderating weight to such of the wealthier
citizens as were present.” See [111, p. 166].
10See the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1844.
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paper until 1894.
Table 3.2 provides an overview of all Poor Law guardian elections held be-
tween 1873 and 1875.11 The number of eligible voters (to whom voting papers
were distributed) as a percent of total population was 13.3, as a percent of ”fam-
ilies and separate occupiers” was 61.9, and as a percent of ”inhabited houses”
was 74.5.12 Voter turnout was high, but hardly universal—80.6 percent of vot-
ing papers distributed were actually collected. Elections, moreover, were rela-
tively rare.13 Elections occurred, on average, only once every 22.2 years. As of
November of 1893, for example, nearly one-in-three board chairmen had served
as board chairmen for ten or more years [1].
3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Data & Summary Statistics
I construct a dataset of 576 Poor Law unions and 13,286 parishes using a variety
of sources, including decennial Census Reports and the British Parliamentary
Papers. Each parish is matched to the Poor Law union to which it belonged.
11Columns (1) through (5) of Table 3.2 distinguish between five types of English parishes:
13,189 elected their own guardians, 490 were combined into pairs that elected common
guardians, 63 were divided into ”wards” that elected separate guardians, 20 were unrepre-
sented, and 107 were ”incorporated” and, therefore, did not hold guardian elections. This yields
13,648 ”electoral units” in England. In this essay, I use ”electoral unit” and ”parish” interchange-
ably and, for all intents and purposes, they were interchangeable. See Data Appendix for a more
detailed explanation.
12Records of the number of voting papers distributed and collected in guardian elections are
incomplete in the Return of Contested Elections of Guardians (1876), and the 1881 Census Report
does not enumerate the total population, the number of ”families and separate occupiers,” or
the number of ”inhabited houses” within subdivisions of parishes. It is, therefore, impossible to
compare voting records with population (or family, or housing) records in 503 of 1,842 elections.
13See Table 3.2, Footnote c.
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A detailed description of the way in which this dataset is constructed (and the
precise source or sources from which each variable is derived) can be found in
the Data Appendix. I divide all variables into (i) parish-level variables and (ii)
union-level variables.
Parish-Level Variables. These variables include population in 1881, rateable
value (i.e., property wealth) in 1881, and the number of Poor Law guardians in
1876. Table 3.3 reports the averages of each of these variables across all parishes
within each English region. Note that the average Metropolitan London parish
was more than ten times more populous and nearly ten times more wealthy
than the average English parish. Also note that the average Northern parish was
more populous and wealthier than the average Southern or Midland parish.
Union-Level Variables. These variables include area (in acres) in 1881, popu-
lation in 1881, population density in 1881, whether coal or cotton-textile pro-
duction was a ”special occupation pursued” in 1851, percent of adults work-
ing in agriculture in 1881, percent of population that lived in a municipal bor-
ough in 1881, percent of members of Parliament that belonged to a conservative
party in 1880, percent of population that belonged to any non-conformist (i.e.,
non-Anglican Protestant) church in 1851, percent of population that attended
church services of any denomination in 1851, distance (in km) from an ”urban
center” (i.e., any of the 20 Poor Law unions that contained, were contained by, or
were coextensive with an urban sanitary district of more than 100,000 persons in
1881), distance (in km) from an ”urbanizer” (i.e., any of the 20 Poor Law unions
within which population grew by more than 75,000 persons between 1851 and
1881), pauperism rate (i.e., paupers per population) in 1881, fraction of paupers
relieved indoors (i.e., indoor paupers per total paupers) in 1881, and expendi-
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ture (in £) dedicated to outdoor relief per outdoor pauper in 1877-78. Table 3.4
reports the averages of each of these variables across all Poor Law unions within
each English region. Note that Metropolitan London Poor Law unions, as with
Metropolitan parishes, were disproportionately populous. Note also that con-
servatism, agriculture, religiosity (i.e., church attendance), and pauperism per
capita were concentrated in Southern Poor Law unions, and non-conformism
and coal and cotton-textile production were concentrated in Northern Poor Law
unions.
3.3.2 Instrumental Variable
My empirical strategy is to isolate exogenous variation in wealth to estimate the
causal effect of wealth on welfare generosity. The relationship between wealth
and welfare generosity is susceptible to obvious confounders. Wealth is corre-
lated with poverty. Wealth is correlated with the capacity to redistribute (both
publicly and privately). It is impossible to redistribute wealth that is not ex-
pendable. Wealth is almost certainly correlated with other parish- or union-
level characteristics for which there is little or no credible data. These compet-
ing confounders render OLS analysis problematic. If poverty or the capacity to
redistribute or any other parish- or union-level characteristic is correlated with
welfare generosity, an ordinary OLS regression of welfare generosity on wealth
will yield, at best, a conclusion that is wobbly and, at worst, a conclusion that is
outright misleading. In order to overcome this problem, I construct an instru-
ment for wealth. In this essay, I measure wealth as rateable value. All English
property was assessed (or ”rated”) annually by parish administrators to calcu-
late the total tax base on which a tax (the so-called ”poor rate”) could be levied.
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This poor rate financed the Poor Law. My empirical strategy depends on three
main assumptions: (i) the definition of the instrument, (ii) the relevance of the in-
strument, and (iii) the exclusion restriction.
Definition of the Instrument. I assume that boards of guardians represented
the ”effective wealth,” not the ”actual wealth,” of Poor Law unions. Guardians
were elected by parishes to represent the interests of those parishes. Generous
parishes elected generous guardians. Parsimonious parishes elected parsimo-
nious guardians. But guardians were not allocated to parishes in proportion to
their population and, therefore, the interests of parishes were not represented
by boards of guardians in proportion to their population. I define effective and
actual wealth according to the following formulae.
EFFECTIVEu =
(
Gp1u
Gu
)(
RVp1u
POPp1u
)
+ · · · +
(
GpNu
Gu
)(
RVpNu
POPpNu
)
(3.1)
ACTUALu =
(
RVu
POPu
)
=
(
POPp1u
POPu
)(
RVp1u
POPp1u
)
+ · · · +
(
POPpNu
POPu
)(
RVpNu
POPpNu
)
(3.2)
The subscript u indexes Poor Law unions and the superscripts p1 through pN
index parishes 1 through N in Poor Law union u. Gpnu denotes the number of
Poor Law guardians allocated to parish n in Poor Law union u, Gu denotes the
sum of the number of Poor Law guardians allocated to the N parishes in Poor
Law union u, RVpnu denotes the rateable value in parish n of Poor Law union u,
RVu denotes the sum of the rateable value in the N parishes in Poor Law union
u, POPpnu denotes the population in parish n of Poor Law union u, and POPu de-
notes the sum of the population in the N parishes in Poor Law union u. Note
that both effective and actual wealth are weighted averages. Effective wealth
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weights parishes according to their guardian-share and actual wealth weights
parishes according to their population-share. The difference between effective
and actual wealth represents the excess (or deficit) in effective wealth generated
by the mis-representation of parishes within Poor Law unions. I decompose ef-
fective wealth into actual wealth and the difference between effective and actual
wealth according to the following formula.
EFFECTIVEu = ACTUALu + (EFFECTIVEu −ACTUALu)
= ACTUALu + DIFFERENCEu
(3.3)
Figures 3.10 through 3.13 illustrate the difference between effective and actual
wealth. Figure 3.10 maps per capita wealth in each English parish. Figures
3.11, 3.12, and 3.13 map effective wealth, actual wealth, and the difference be-
tween effective and actual wealth in each English Poor Law union. Note that
the over-representation of the wealthiest parishes within Poor Law unions was
systematic, but that the degree to which the wealthiest parishes within Poor Law
unions were over-represented was arbitrary. I isolate this arbitrary variation by
instrumenting EFFECTIVEu with DIFFERENCEu.
Relevance of the Instrument. I assume that DIFFERENCEu is correlated with
EFFECTIVEu. Figure 3.14 illustrates this correlation. It is mechanical. Since
I decompose EFFECTIVEu into ACTUALu and DIFFERENCEu, DIFFERENCEu
is mechanically correlated with EFFECTIVEu. Figure 3.15 illustrates that
DIFFERENCEu, as a share of EFFECTIVEu, varied markedly across Poor Law
unions: wealthy parishes were more or less mis- or over-represented across Poor
Law unions. DIFFERENCEu makes up, on average, 23.8 percent of EFFECTIVEu.
But DIFFERENCEu is negative in 13 Poor Law unions. In these Poor Law
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unions, relatively richer parishes were, on average, actually under-represented
(i.e., their population-shares, on average, exceeded their guardian-shares). And
DIFFERENCEu is zero in 26 Poor Law unions. These Poor Law unions con-
sisted of a single parish and, as such, these parishes were, by definition, neither
be over- nor under-represented. And DIFFERENCEu makes up more than 50
percent of EFFECTIVEu in 42 Poor Law unions. In these Poor Law unions, the
over-representation of wealthy parishes was so egregious that the wealth repre-
sented by their boards of guardians was more than double their actual wealth.
Exclusion Restriction. I assume that DIFFERENCEu affects welfare generos-
ity only through EFFECTIVEu—that DIFFERENCEu is uncorrelated with any
other variable that affects EFFECTIVEu. Although this assumption is, in prin-
ciple, untestable, my dataset suggests that it holds in practice. Figure 3.16 il-
lustrates that few union-level variables (among an admittedly incomplete set of
union-level variables) in my dataset are correlated with DIFFERENCEu. Table
3.5 quantifies these pairwise correlations. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.5 il-
lustrate that EFFECTIVEu is correlated with many—indeed, nearly all—union-
level variables, but that DIFFERENCEu is not. This is the point of the instru-
ment. It is, by design, randomly (or approximately randomly) distributed across
Poor Law unions.
3.3.3 IV Model & Results
In this section, I estimate a two-stage least squares regression. In the first stage,
I predict EFFECTIVEu (the treatment variable) using DIFFERENCEu (the instru-
mental variable). In the second stage, I use the predicted values of EFFECTIVEu
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to estimate the effect of effective wealth on welfare generosity. Formally, I define
the first and second stages according to the following formulae.
EFFECTIVEu = α0 + α1DIFFERENCEu + α2Xu + u (3.4)
WGENu = β0 + β1EFFECTIVEu + β2Xu + µu (3.5)
The subscript u indexes Poor Law unions. EFFECTIVEu and DIFFERENCEu are
defined as before. WGENu denotes welfare generosity. WGENu takes two forms:
(i) the proportion of paupers relieved in workhouses in union u and (ii) average
relief (in £) granted to paupers not relieved in workhouses in union u. I run
separate regressions for each. Xu is a vector of union-level covariates. u and µu
are error terms. Each observation is weighted by population. The coefficient of
interest is β1—the effect of effective wealth on welfare generosity.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.6 report the results of Equation 3.4. These re-
sults confirm that the relationship between DIFFERENCEu and EFFECTIVEu is
strong. The first-stage F-statistic exceeds 1,000. Columns (3) through (6) of Table
3.6 report the results of Equation 3.5. These results are twofold. First, there was
no causal relationship between wealth and workhouse use. Relatively wealth-
ier Poor Law unions were no more or less likely to relieve welfare applicants
in workhouses than relatively poorer Poor Law unions. Second, the causal re-
lationship between wealth and payments to outdoor paupers was positive, but
was negligibly small. The difference in EFFECTIVEu between the Poor Law
union at the 25th percentile and the Poor Law union at the 75th percentile was
£4.32. This difference, given β1, yields a difference in payments to outdoor pau-
pers of less than two-and-a-half shillings per outdoor pauper per year, or the
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equivalent of only two quarts of ”good mutton soup” per outdoor pauper per
year [16, pp. 90-91].
All told, these results are surprising. Wealth did not meaningfully affect wel-
fare generosity. In this narrow sense, there was not class antagonism. Wealthy
people or places in England in 1881 were not disproportionately likely to use
the workhouse or to pay less per day to paupers not relieved in workhouses.
Moreover, the relationship between church attendance (irrespective of denomi-
nation) and welfare generosity is noteworthy. Poor Law unions in which church
attendance was especially high were decidedly less likely to relieve paupers in
workhouses and spent decidedly more per outdoor pauper per year. Although
this relationship cannot be called causal, it might be suitable for further study.
3.4 A New Measure of Wealth Skewness
The guardian election data that I introduce in Section 3.2.3 enable me to con-
struct a crude but hyper-local measure of wealth skewness. Formally, I define
wealth skewness according to the following formula.
SKEWp = P RVPERCAPp − P %ELIGp (3.6)
The subscript p indexes parishes. P RVPERCAPp denotes the percentile of rate-
able value per capita into which parish p fell and P %ELIGp denotes the per-
centile of eligible voters per capita in guardian elections into which parish p fell.
Since SKEWp is defined as the difference between percentiles, it is a measure of
relative wealth skewness—it pits parishes against one another. For a given per-
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centile of eligible voters per capita, a greater percentile of rateable value per
capita implies relatively greater wealth skewness. Take, for example, the Eas-
ingwold parish in the Easingwold Poor Law union in Yorkshire and the Ben-
fieldside parish in the Lanchester Poor Law union in Durham. Both parishes
fell into the 50th percentile of eligible voters per capita, but fell into the 75th
and 8th percentile, respectively, of rateable value per capita. As such, it must
be that the Easingwold parish had a greater proportion of very wealthy people
than the Benfieldside parish and, therefore, that the wealth distribution of the
Easingwold parish must be more rightwardly skewed than the wealth distri-
bution of the Benfieldside parish. Conversely, for a given percentile of rateable
value per capita, a lower percentile of eligible voters per capita implies rela-
tively greater wealth skewness. Take, for example, the Battersea parish in the
Wandsworth and Clapham Poor Law union in Surrey and the East Leake parish
in the Loughborough Poor Law union in Leicester. Both parishes fell into the
50th percentile of rateable value per capita, but fell into the 1st and 94th per-
centile, respectively, of eligible voters per capita. As such, it must be that the
Battersea parish had a greater proportion of very wealthy people than the East
Leake parish and, therefore, that the wealth distribution of the Battersea parish
must be more rightwardly skewed than the wealth distribution of the East Leake
parish.
Panel A of Table 3.7 reports average SKEWp (by region) across all parishes
that held at least one guardian election between 1873 and 1875 (of which there
were 1,078). Only in these parishes do I observe guardian election data and,
therefore, only in these parishes can I calculate SKEWp. I find that wealth skew-
ness was singularly high among parishes in Metropolitan London and was sig-
nificantly higher among parishes in the South of England than among parishes
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in the Midlands or in the North of England.14 But there is reason to doubt these
regional averages. The parishes that held at least one guardian election were
patently unrepresentative of their respective regions. They were disproportion-
ately poorer and more populous. In order to impute SKEWp for parishes that did
not hold at least one guardian election, I estimate the relationship between eli-
gible voters per capita and various parish characteristics using parishes that did
hold at least one guardian election. Formally, I estimate the following formula.
%ELIGp = µ0 + µ1Xp + µ2Xup + p (3.7)
The subscript p indexes parishes and the superscript u indexes Poor Law unions.
Xp is a vector of parish-level variables. These include population, population-
share, number of Poor Law guardians, and guardian-share. Xup is a vector
of union-level variables. These include population density, coal production,
cotton-textile production, distance from urban centers, distance from ”urbaniz-
ers,” percent of adults in agriculture, percent municipal borough, percent con-
servative, percent non-conformist, percent church attendance, and pauperism
rate. Union-level variables are common across all parishes within a Poor Law
union. Figure 3.17 demonstrates that these variables, collectively, constitute
a useful but imperfect predictor of eligible voters per capita. Xp and Xup ex-
plain 13.45 percent of the variation in %ELIGp. I re-construct P %ELIGp using
%ELIGp for parishes with guardian election data and %̂ELIGp for parishes with-
out guardian election data. I then re-construct RVPERCAPp using all parishes.
This yields a new, modified version of SKEWp.
14Since SKEWp is a relative measure of wealth skewness, average SKEWp is, by construction,
approximately zero across all parishes.
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Panel B of Table 3.7 reports average SKEWp (by region) across all parishes.
This new, modified version of SKEWp suggests, as before, that wealth skewness
was singularly high among parishes in Metropolitan London, but that, unlike
before, wealth skewness was significantly higher among parishes in the North
of England than among parishes in the South of England. Figure 3.18 maps
SKEWp by parish. It demonstrates that East Anglia, the South West Peninsula,
and the rural North of England were, on the whole, more egalitarian than Lon-
don, Metropolitan London, and the industrial North of England.
3.5 Conclusion
The trouble with estimating the effect of wealth on almost anything is that
wealth is correlated with almost everything. Wealth is correlated with poverty.
Wealth is correlated with charity. Wealth is correlated with the capacity to re-
distribute. As such, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of wealth on welfare
generosity and the effect of poverty, charity, and the capacity to redistribute,
among other variables, on welfare generosity. In this essay, I make three main
contributions. First, I introduce a new dataset of English Poor Law unions that
includes economic variables, political variables, religious variables, and geo-
graphical variables. I also match each English parish to the Poor Law union
to which it belonged. Second, I isolate variation in wealth in England in 1881
that is plausibly unrelated to variables that are related to welfare generosity.
My instrumental variables regression suggests that there is no relationship be-
tween wealth and welfare generosity. Third, I construct a new parish-level mea-
sure of wealth skewness that is made possible by a new dataset of Poor Law
guardian elections. Although admittedly crude, this measure demonstrates that
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Metropolitan London and industrial areas in the North of England were more
unequal than the rest of England.
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3.6 Tables & Figures
Table 3.1: Proposed Guardian Allocation of the Rye Union (1835)
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)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Beckley 1,447 2 1.38 12.71 11.11 2.01
Brede 1,046 2 1.91 9.18 11.11 2.04
Broomhill 42 1 23.80 0.37 5.56 53.52
Guldeford 126 1 7.94 1.11 5.56 27.82
Icklesham 604 1 1.66 5.30 5.56 5.83
Iden 517 1 1.93 4.54 5.56 4.94
Northiam 1,448 2 1.38 12.72 11.11 2.42
Peasemarsh 920 1 1.09 8.08 5.56 1.99
Playden 297 1 3.37 2.61 5.56 4.15
Rye 3,715 4 1.08 32.62 22.22 1.20
Udimore 454 1 2.20 3.99 5.56 3.23
Winchelsea 772 1 1.30 6.78 5.56 1.83
Total 11,388 18 1.58 100 100 †
Source: [3].
† Union-wide rateable value per capita can be calculated in two ways. If one weights each
parish’s rateable value by its population share (or, equivalently, if one divides total union rateable
value by total union population), then the ratable value per capita of the Rye union in 1835 was
£2.70 per person. I call this “actual” rateable value per capita. If, on the other hand, one weights
each parish’s ratable value by its guardian share, then the rateable value per capita of the Rye
union in 1835 was £6.73 per person. I call this “effective” rateable value per capita—it is the
wealth that is represented by or embedded in the union’s board of guardians.
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Table 3.3: Parish Attributes (by Region)
Metro
London†
South
England†
The
Midlands†
North
England†
All
England
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Population 47,656 1,154 1,303 2,471 1,823
RV per Capita 14.82 8.52 11.40 12.17 10.57
Guardians 7.24 1.38 1.34 1.34 1.39
Obs. 79 4,803 4,958 3,363 13,203††
Sources: Return of Contested Elections of Guardians (1876), Decennial Census Report (1881), Poor Rate
Valuation (1882).
Notes: This table reports the average population, the average rateable value (i.e., property
wealth) per capita, and the average number of Poor Law guardians across English parishes
within English regions.
† I define “Metro London” as the Metropolitan London Census Division (i.e., Census Division
I), “South England” as the South Eastern, Eastern, and South Western Census Divisions (i.e.,
Census Divisions II, IV, V), ”The Midlands” as the South Midlands, West Midlands, and North
Midlands Census Divisions (i.e., Census Divisions III, VI, VII), and “North England” as the
North Western, Yorkshire, and Northern Census Divisions (i.e., Census Divisions VIII, IX, X).
See Data Appendix for an explanation of English local government areas.
†† I drop the 83 almost infinitesimally small parishes (geographically speaking) that made up
the City of London Poor Law union. This accounts for the difference between the 13,203 parishes
that I observe above and the 13,286 parishes that are in my “full” dataset.
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Table 3.7: Wealth Skewness (by Region)
Metro
London†
South
England†
The
Midlands†
North
England†
All
England
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Parishes with Poor Law Elections
Skewness 50.69 0.38 -5.67 -0.70 0.00
Population 71,953 10,779 10,536 13,431 22,562
RV per Capita 7.74 5.60 5.96 5.82 6.37
Obs. 45 317 364 352 1,078††
Panel B. All Parishes
Skewness ††† 33.53 -9.96 2.27 10.22 -0.01
Population 47,656 1,131 1,294 2,471 1,817
RV per Capita 14.82 8.55 11.34 12.17 10.57
Obs. 79 4,714 4,939 3,363 13,095††
Sources: Return of Contested Elections of Guardians (1876), Decennial Census Report (1881), Poor Rate
Valuation (1882).
Notes: The above table reports average wealth skewness (as defined in Equation 3.6), average
population, and average rateable value (i.e., property wealth) per capita across English parishes.
Panel A reports these averages across parishes that held at least one guardian election between
1873 and 1875. Only in these parishes do I observe guardian election data and, therefore, only
in these parishes can I calculate wealth skewness directly. Panel B reports the same averages
across all English parishes. In this case, I calculate “predicted” wealth skewness in parishes that
did not hold a guardian election between 1873 and 1875. See Section 3.4 for calculations.
† I define “Metro London” as the Metropolitan London Census Division (i.e., Census Division
I), “South England” as the South Eastern, Eastern, and South Western Census Divisions (i.e,.
Census Divisions II, IV, V), “The Midlands” as the South Midlands, West Midlands, and North
Midlands Census Divisions (i.e., Census Divisions III, VI, VII), and “North England” as the
North Western, Yorkshire, and Northern Census Divisions (i.e., Census Divisions VIII, IX, X).
See Data Appendix for an explanation of English local government areas.
†† I drop the 83 infinitesimally small parishes—geographically speaking—that made up the
City of London Poor Law union. I also combine all parishes that were divided into wards for
the purposes of guardian elections. These modifications account for the difference between the
13,095 parishes that I observe in the above table and the 13,286 parishes that make up my “full”
dataset.
††† Predicted wealth skewness.
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Figure 3.1: English Civil Parishes
Source: Great Britain Historical GIS Project (2011).
Notes: Pictured above are the boundaries of every parish in England in 1881, of which there
were 13,869. The inset depicts and magnifies the county of Suffolk (also pictured in red in the
main panel).
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Figure 3.3: English Poor Law Unions
Source: Great Britain Historical GIS Project (2011).
Notes: Pictured above are the boundaries of every Poor Law union in England in 1881, of which
there were more than 600, and the boundaries of the parishes of which they consisted. The
average English Poor Law union consisted of 23 parishes (see Figure 3.4). The inset depicts and
magnifies the county of Suffolk (also pictured in red in the main panel).
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Figure 3.9: Guardian Elections (1873-75)
Source: Contested Election of Guardians (1876), Great Britain Historical GIS Project (2011).
Notes: Pictured above are the boundaries of every Poor Law union in England and every con-
tested guardian election in England between 1873 and 1875. Since guardian elections were held
at the parish level, parishes are shaded. Darker shading implies a greater number of contested
elections. Parish boundaries are not otherwise pictured. Note that it was only possible to have
multiple elections per year (and, hence, more than three elections between 1873 and 1875) in
parishes that were subdivided into wards. The inset depicts and magnifies the county of Suf-
folk (also pictured in red in the main panel).
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Figure 3.10: Rateable Value per Capita (by Parish)
Source: Poor Rate Valuation (1882), Great Britain Historical GIS Project (2011).
Notes: Pictured above is the rateable value per capita (i.e., property wealth) of each parish in
England in 1881, of which there were 13,869. Darker shading implies more property wealth per
capita. The inset depicts and magnifies the county of Suffolk (also pictured in red in the main
panel).
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Figure 3.11: Effective Rateable Value per Capita (by Union)
Source: Poor Rate Valuation (1882), Great Britain Historical GIS Project (2011).
Notes: Pictured above is the “effective” rateable value per capita (i.e., property wealth) of each
union in England in 1881, of which there were more than 600. I define “effective” rateable value
per capita as the weighted average of a union’s parishes’ rateable value per capita, with weights
proportional to each parish’s representation on its union’s board of guardians. Darker shading
implies more “effective” property wealth per capita. The inset depicts and magnifies the county
of Suffolk (also pictured in red in the main panel).
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Figure 3.12: Actual Rateable Value per Capita (by Union)
Source: Poor Rate Valuation (1882), Great Britain Historical GIS Project (2011).
Notes: Pictured above is the “actual” rateable value per capita (i.e., property wealth) of each
union in England in 1881, of which there were more than 600. I define “actual” rateable value
per capita as a union’s total rateable value divided by its total population. Darker shading
implies more “actual” rateable value per capita. The inset depicts and magnifies the county of
Suffolk (also pictured in red in the main panel).
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Figure 3.13: Diff. b/w Effective and Actual RV per Capita (by Union)
Source: Poor Rate Valuation (1882), Great Britain Historical GIS Project (2011).
Notes: Pictured above is the difference between the “effective” and “actual” rateable value
per capita (i.e., property wealth) of each union in England in 1881, of which there were more
than 600. I define “effective” rateable value per capita as the weighted average of a union’s
parishes’ rateable value per capita, with weights proportional to each parish’s representation
on its union’s board of guardians. I define “actual” rateable value per capita as a union’s total
rateable value divided by its total population. Darker shading implies a larger difference be-
tween “effective” and “actual” property wealth per capita. The inset depicts and magnifies the
county of Suffolk (also pictured in red in the main panel).
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Figure 3.18: Wealth Skewness
Notes: Pictured above is wealth skewness (as defined in Equation 3.6) by parish. The leftmost
panel plots actual wealth skewness for parishes that held at least one guardian election between
1873 and 1875. Only in these parishes do I observe guardian election data and, therefore, only in
these parishes can I calculate wealth skewness directly. The rightmost panel includes predicted
wealth skewness for all other English parishes. See Section 3.4 for calculations.
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APPENDIX A
DATA APPENDIX FOR THE MORTALITY EFFECTS OF LOCAL BOARDS
OF HEALTH IN ENGLAND, 1848-70
The dataset that I construct consists of 576 English poor law unions between
1848 and 1870. In this section I demonstrate in greater detail the method by
which each variable is constructed, the source or sources from which each vari-
able derives, and the procedure by which these sources are transcribed and com-
bined. I refer to primary sources by the abbreviations enumerated below.
A.1 Primary Sources
Abbr. Source Title Year(s) Source Citation†
RRG Annual Reports of the Registrar-General 1849-72
DCR Decennial Census Reports 1841-71
RHS Annual Reports of the Home Secretary 1858-70
RLB1 Return of Boards Acting Under the PHA 1868 PP, 58 (1867-68), pp. 789-823
RLB2 Return of No. & Names of Local Boards 1870 PP, 55 (1870), pp. 711-752
RLB3 Return of Districts where PHA is in Force 1867 PP, 59 (1867), pp. 141-167
RLB4 Return of Local Boards of Health 1857 PP, 41 (1857), pp. 3-23
RSC Religious Supplement to the 1851 Census 1853 PP, 89 (1852-53), pp. 279-422
RV1 Return of Gross Estimated Property Rental 1861 PP, 54 (1861), pp. 141-167
RV2 Return of Rateable Value 1869 PP, 53 (1868-69), pp. 33-58
PLB 4th Annual Report of the Poor Law Board 1851 PP, 23 (1852), pp. 43-74
GHC Guide to the House of Commons 1857 [7]
† PP refers to the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers.
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A.2 Variables
Mortality Rate, or DRut, is defined as the number of deaths per 1,000 popula-
tion (i.e., the ”crude” mortality rate) in union u and year t. I obtain the total
deaths in each union in each year between 1848 and 1870 from RRG and the to-
tal population in each union in 1841, 1851, 1861, and 1871 from DCR. I (linearly)
interpolate union population between census years.
Local Board Share, or BFRACut, is defined as the share of the total population of
union u in year t that fell under the jurisdiction of a local board of health. Since
the boundaries of local boards of health, of which more than 600 were adopted
between 1848 and 1870, did not match the boundaries of poor law unions, it is
necessary to determine the unions with which each local board of health inter-
sected and the extent of each intersection. I obtain the names of the constituent
parishes of poor law unions from DCR, the names and 1861 populations of the
constituent parishes or parts of parishes of all local boards of health adopted
between 1848 and 1866 from RLB1, and the names and 1861 populations of the
constituent parishes or parts of parishes of all local boards of health adopted
between 1867 and 1870 from RLB2. I also obtain the adoption years of all local
boards of health adopted between 1848 and 1866 from RLB3. I do not observe
the exact adoption years of local boards of health adopted between 1867 and
1870, and therefore I exclude all 20 unions within which at least one local board
of health was adopted between 1867 and 1870. For all remaining unions, I de-
fine POPu as the population of union u in 1861, POPuh as the 1861 population of
the constituent parishes or parts of parishes of local board of health h that fell
under the jurisdiction of union u, and AYh as the year in which local board of
health h was adopted. I calculate the proportion of union u’s population that fell
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under the jurisdiction of a local board of health in year t in the following way:
BRACut =
∑
h
(
1(AYh ≥ t) × POPuh
POPu
)
(A.1)
Population Density is defined as the population per area (in acres) in union u
in year t. I obtain the total acreage in each union from DCR. Union population
is obtained as before.
Percent in Agriculture is defined as the percent of persons aged twenty and
upwards (i.e., ”adults”) that were employed in agriculture in union u and year
t. I obtain these data for 1841, 1851, and 1861 from DCR. I obtain these data for
1881 from a machine-readable version of the 1881 Census Enumerators’ Books
made available by the UK Data Archive via the Vision of Britain website. I
(linearly) interpolate these data between census years.
Coal Production Dummy is defined as whether or not coal production was ”a
special occupation pursued” within union u in 1851. These data are obtained
from DCR.
Cotton-Textile Production Dummy is defined as whether or not cotton-textile
production was ”a special occupation pursued” within union u in 1851. These
data are obtained from DCR.
Fraction Water is defined as the proportion of union u’s total area (in acres) that
consisted of water (i.e., harbors, creeks, rivers, etc.) in 1851. I obtain both the
total acreage and the total water-acreage in each union in 1851 from DCR. In the
case of unions bordering on the sea coast, ”a certain proportion of the beach or
sands” was included as water-acreage.
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Rateable Value per Capita is defined as the amount of owned or occupied prop-
erty that is rated to the relief of the poor (i.e., assessed for local taxation) per pop-
ulation in union u and year t. This is tantamount to property wealth per popu-
lation. I obtain rateable value in 1856 and 1868 from RV1 and RV2, respectively.
I (linearly) interpolate these data between 1856 and 1868 and (linearly) extrap-
olate these data between 1848 and 1856 and between 1868 and 1870. Union
population is obtained as before.
Poor Law Expenditure per Capita is defined as the amount expended per pop-
ulation by the board of guardians representing union u in 1851. Expenses in-
cluded cash or in-kind welfare benefits (i.e., outdoor relief), the provision of
room and/or board in a workhouse (i.e., indoor relief), and any fees and salaries
associated with the maintenance of workhouses, the cost of all of which was
passed along to union ratepayers (i.e., taxpayers) in the form of a so-called ”poor
rate.” I obtain total expenditure in each union from PLB. Union population is
obtained as before.
Church Attendance is defined as the proportion of union u’s population that
attended a church service of any denomination on the 30th of March, 1851. I
obtain total church attendance in each union from RSC. Union population is
obtained as before. Although a day-count may over- or under-state average
church attendance, Eli & Slater (1994) demonstrate that there is little evidence
of any widespread falsification or manipulation of church attendance data by
religious actors on behalf of their denominations in order to buoy attendance
numbers, lest their denominations be cast in poor light [35].
Fraction Non-Conformist is defined as the proportion of religious sittings in
union u in 1851 that were classified as non-Anglican Protestant (e.g., Presbytar-
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ian, Baptist, Unitarian, Wesleyan Methodist, etc). I obtain the number of Angli-
can, non-Anglican Protestant, Roman Catholic, and total sittings in each union
in 1851 from Table H of RSC. I then divide non-Anglican Protestant sittings by
total sittings.
Fraction Conservative is defined as the proportion of union u’s political rep-
resentatives (i.e., MPs) that were affiliated with a conservative political party
in 1852, after that year’s general election. I obtain the party affiliation of all
496 English members of Parliament—broadly defined as liberal, conservative,
or liberal-conservative (i.e., Peelite)—from GHC. Since the distinction between
conservative and Peelite was a matter of international trade (and, hence, irrel-
evant in terms of public health), I re-classify all liberal-conservatives as conser-
vatives. As with the boundaries of local boards of health, the boundaries of
parliamentary constituencies, of which there were 282 in England and Wales
in 1851, did not match the boundaries of poor law unions. It is therefore nec-
essary to determine the unions with which each constituency intersected and
the extent of each intersection. I obtain the names and populations of the con-
stituent parishes of every parliamentary constituency in 1851 from DCR and
match these parishes to unions. I then define POPu as the population of union u
in 1851, POPuc as the population of parliamentary constituency c that fell under
the jurisdiction of union u in 1851, MPSc as the number of members of Parlia-
ment representing constituency c in 1852, and CONcm as a dummy that takes
a value of 1 if member m of constituency c was affiliated with a conservative
political party in 1852. I calculate the proportion of union u’s political represen-
tatives that were affiliated with a conservative political party in the following
way:
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CFRACu =
∑
c
(
POPuc
POPu
(∑
m
CONcm
MPSc
))
(A.2)
The inner sum represents the proportion of the members of Parliament repre-
senting constituency c that were conservative. The outer sum weights each con-
stituency c by the proportion of the population of each union u that it contained.
Fraction Municipal Borough is defined as the proportion of union u’s popula-
tion that fell under the jurisdiction of a municipal borough. As with the bound-
aries of local boards of health and of parliamentary constituencies, the bound-
aries of municipal boroughs, of which there were 176 in England in 1851, did
not match the boundaries of Poor Law unions. It is, therefore, necessary to de-
termine the Poor Law unions with which each municipal borough intersected
and the extent of each intersection. I obtain the names and 1851 populations
of the constituent parishes of every municipal borough in 1851 from DCR and
match these parishes to Poor Law unions. I then define POPu as the popula-
tion of union u in 1851 and POPub as the population of municipal borough b
that fell under the jurisdiction of union u in 1851. I calculate the proportion of
union u’s population that fell under the jurisdiction of a municipal borough in
the following way:
MFRACu =
∑
b
(
POPub
POPu
)
(A.3)
Census Division Dummies are regional indicators that I employ as fixed effects.
DCR defines ten regions of England that do not change between 1841 and 1871.
Table A.1 enumerates the counties or parts of counties of which each census
division was comprised.
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Board Borrowing, as shown in Table 1.5, refers only to the amount that Local
Boards of Health borrowed from the Exchequer. It, therefore, excludes all bor-
rowing from private sources and all expenditures that were not borrowed. I
obtain total borrowing by local boards of health from the Exchequer between
1848 and 1857 from RLB4 and annual borrowing by local boards of health from
the Exchequer between 1858 and 1870 from RHS.
A.3 Changes in Union Boundaries
There were a small number of boundary changes among unions between 1848
and 1870, each of which took either one or the other of two forms. First, some
unions were dissolved and incorporated into other unions. In 1869, for exam-
ple, the two parishes that comprised the Brinton Union in the county of Nor-
folk joined the Walsingham Union. In these cases, I agglomerate the dissolved
union (e.g., Brinton) and the union or unions into which it was incorporated
(e.g., Walsingham) in all years prior to the boundary change. Second, some
unions were divided into multiple unions. In 1861, for example, nine parishes
were withdrawn from the Wirral Union in the county of Cheshire to form the
Birkenhead Union. In these cases, I agglomerate the parent union (e.g., Wirral)
and the union or unions into which it was divided (e.g., Birkenhead) in all years
after the boundary change.
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A.4 Supplementary Tables
Table A.1: Census Divisions
CD # CD Name Counties
I Metropolis Kent†, Middlesex†, Surrey†
II S. Eastern Berkshire, Kent†, Southampton, Surrey†, Sussex
III S. Midland Beds., Bucks, Cambs., Herts., Hunts., Middlesex†,Northants., Oxon.
IV Eastern Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk
V S. Western Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Somerset, Wiltshire
VI W. Midland Gloucs., Heref., Mon.††, Shrops., Staffs., Warks., Worcs.
VII N. Midland Derby, Leicester, Lincoln, Nottingham, Rutland
VIII N. Western Chester, Lancaster
IX York East Riding, North Riding, West Riding
X Northern Cumberland, Durham, Northumberland, Westmorland
XI Wales Excluded from Dataset
† Indicates that only part of county is included in the corresponding census division.
†† The classification of Monmouth is inconsistent across sources. Some, including DCR, classify
Monmouth as a part of Census Division XI (i.e., Wales). Others classify Monmouth as a part of
Census Division VI (i.e., West Midlands). I use the latter classification.
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APPENDIX B
DATA APPENDIX FOR HARDLY WORTH CHAINING UP? THE EFFECT
AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF WELFARE REFORM IN ENGLAND,
1857-85
The dataset that I construct consists of 576 English Poor Law unions. In this
section I demonstrate in greater detail the method by which each variable is
constructed, the source or sources from which each variable derives, and the
procedure by which these sources are transcribed and combined. I refer to pri-
mary sources by the abbreviations enumerated below.
B.1 Primary Sources
Abbr. Source Title Year(s) Source Citation†
DCR Decennial Census Reports 1851-91
RWA Return of Workhouse Accommodation 1855 PP, 46 (1854-55), pp. 13-36
RRP Return of the Rate in the Pound 1861 PP, 54 (1861), pp. 1-274
RPLI Return of Poor Law Inspectors 1868 PP, 61 (1867-68), pp. 171-864
WHD1 Poor Law (Workhouse Dietaries) 1864 PP, 52 (1864), pp. 695-723
WHD2 Dietaries of the Inmates of Workhouses 1866 PP, 35 (1866), pp. 321-627
WHD3 Workhouse Dietaries 1867 PP, 60 (1867), pp. 87-89
RMO Report of Med. Officer of Privy Council 1864 PP, 28 (1864), pp. 1-793
PRP Poor Rates and Pauperism 1857-85†† See Section B.4
LGD Knight’s Local Government Directory 1881, 86 [9, 11]
GBGIS Great Britain Historical GIS Project 2011 [93]
† PP refers to the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers.
†† Years included are 1857, 1860-66, 1868, 1870, 1872, 1874, 1876, 1878, 1880, 1885.
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B.2 Variables
Local Government Areas. Victorian England was subdivided into geograph-
ically nested administrative and/or statistical areas. From smallest to largest,
these areas were (i) the civil parish, (ii) the Poor Law union, (iii) the registration
county, and (iv) the census division. My dataset consists of 13,869 civil parishes,
576 Poor Law unions, 42 registration counties, and 10 census divisions. The av-
erage population of each of these areas in 1881 was 1,813, 41,793, 588,081, and
2,418,899, respectively. I match each English Poor Law union to the registration
county and census division to which it belonged, and to the civil parishes of
which it was composed, using DCR. I also obtain the GIS identifiers of each En-
glish Poor Law union from GBGIS. This enables me to plot variables geograph-
ically. Table B.1 enumerates all 10 English census divisions and the registration
counties or parts of registration counties of which they were composed.
Population & Area. I obtain the population and the area (in acres) of each En-
glish Poor Law union in 1851, 1861, 1871, 1881, and 1891 from DCR. These data
yield the population density of each English Poor Law union. The average pop-
ulation density of English Poor Law unions in 1851, 1861, 1871, 1881, and 1891
was 6.03, 6.59, 7.25, 7.52, and 7.71 persons per acre, respectively. I (linearly)
interpolate these data between census years.
Percent in Manufacturing/Industry. I obtain the proportion of the adult popu-
lation in each English Poor Law union that worked in ”manufactures” in 1851
and that worked in ”industry” in 1861 from PRP. Note that this classification
change (from the more narrowly defined ”manufacturing” to the less narrowly
defined ”industry”) precludes the use of these data in a panel. Table B.2 enumer-
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ates the occupational classes and/or sub-classes included in these definitions
and the number and percent of persons working in each of them (according to
DCR).
Percent in Agriculture. I obtain the proportion of the adult population in
each English Poor Law union in 1851 and 1861 that worked in ”agricultural
production” from DCR.1 I obtain the proportion of the adult population in
each English Poor Law union that worked in ”agricultural production” in 1881
from GBGIS. The 1881 occupational data is based on data provided through
www.VisionofBritain.org.uk and uses statistical material which is copyright of
the Great Britain Historical GIS Project, Humphrey Southall and the University
of Portsmouth. I (linearly) interpolate these data between census years.
Coal & Cotton-Textile Production. I obtain indicators for whether coal produc-
tion or cotton-textile production were ”special occupations pursued” in each
English Poor Law union in 1851 from DCR, according to which roughly 15 per-
cent of unions specialized in coal and roughly 7 percent of unions specialized
in cotton-textiles. Coal unions (of which there were 89) were disproportionately
concentrated in the West Midlands and in the North of England (i.e., Census
Divisions VI and X) and cotton-textile unions (of which there were 39) were dis-
proportionately concentrated in North Western England (i.e., Census Division
VIII).
1Hunt (1973) notes that ”several minor occupations moved in and out of the ’agricultural’
classification from one census to the next,” and that ”though it is impossible to say how much
this affects the accuracy of the [occupational census data], the accuracy of the census probably
improved over time.” He also notes that ”other errors occurred at first source due to ignorance
or what the Registrar General in 1891 termed, ’the foolish but very common desire of persons to
magnify the importance of their occupational condition.’ [The Registrar General] was skeptical,
for example, about the high proportion of hawkers and costermongers who returned themselves
as employers of labour and drew attention also to lads and girls who were actually engaged in
the manufacture of false teeth but who returned themselves as dentists” [55].
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Wages of Agricultural Laborers. I obtain county-level estimates of the average
weekly wage paid to agricultural laborers in the years 1850, 1861, 1867-70, and
1880 from [23]. These estimates should adequately proxy the circumstances of
unskilled laborers. Note that all English Poor Law unions in the same regis-
tration county have, by construction, identical agricultural wage estimates. I
(linearly) interpolate these data between the given years.
Indoor & Outdoor Paupers. I obtain the number of paupers that received in-
door relief and the number of paupers that received outdoor relief in each En-
glish Poor Law union on July 1st of 1857, 1860-66, 1868, 1870, 1872, 1874, 1876,
1878, 1880, and 1885 from PRP. I also obtain the proportion of paupers of each
type (i.e., indoor, outdoor) that belonged to each sex (i.e., male, female, child)
and each class (i.e., able-bodied, non-able-bodied, ”lunatics, insane persons, and
idiots”) in each Poor Law union on July 1st of 1857, 1865, 1880, and 1885 from
PRP.
Poor Rates. I obtain the poor rate levied in each English civil parish in 1856
from RRP. Poor rates were determined by (i) expenditures and (ii) rateable value.
The Clophill Parish in the Ampthill Union in Bedford, for example, spent £340
for the relief of the poor, possessed £2,893 in rateable value, and levied a poor
rate of 2 shillings and 4.25 pence per pound. Since each pound was equivalent
to 20 shillings and each shilling was equivalent to 12 pence, the effective tax rate
in the Clophill Parish was 11.75 percent.
Workhouse Capacity. I obtain the capacity (i.e., the ”accommodation”) of the
workhouses in each English Poor Law union in 1854 from RWA and in 1880 and
1885 from LGD, and the capacity of the workhouses in 467 English Poor Law
unions in 1867 from RPLI. Workhouse capacities were determined according
200
to the cubic footage of the wards therein. According to Webb & Webb (1910),
”ordinary wards were to be at least ten feet high and eighteen feet wide,” with
a minimum of ”300 cubic feet required for each healthy person in a dormitory”
[112, p. 135]. These dimensions, however, were neither mandated nor enforced.
They were a rule-of-thumb. The workhouses in 58 Poor Law unions (almost
half of which were in Metropolitan London) had more inmates on July 1st, 1880
than official capacity.
Sanitary Condition of Workhouses. I obtain the sanitary condition of the
workhouses in a subset of English Poor Law unions from RPLI, which reports
whether the ventilation was deficient in 324 workhouses, whether the water
supply was deficient in 324 workhouses, and whether the ”general sanitary
condition” was deficient in 235 workhouses. This source reproduces the sep-
arate responses of seven Poor Law inspectors (each of whom was assigned to
inspect a separate district of England) to an October 1866 Circular Letter of the
Poor Law Board that requested a report containing, among other things, an as-
sessment of ”the ventilation, light, water supply, and the general sanitary state
of the workhouse.” Some inspectors answered simply ”good” or ”bad.” Others
provided categorical answers (e.g., very good, fair, inadequate, not good, bad,
etc.). Others provided descriptive answers (e.g., ”there is an abundant supply of
excellent water”). In order to quantify these disparate types of answers, I regard
”adequate,” ”fair,” ”tolerable,” or any synonym thereof as ”good,” and I regard
any mention of inadequacy, insufficiency, or defectiveness as ”bad.” Table B.3 is
a facsimile of part of a table in RPLI that enumerates the sanitary condition, as
reported by Sir John Walsham (the Poor Law inspector that presided over the
”Eastern District”), of the workhouses in all 13 Poor Law unions in Kent in 1867.
Answers that I regard as ”bad” are bolded and italicized.
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Diet of Workhouse Inmates. I obtain ”daily dietaries” of the able-bodied male
inmates of workhouses in 113 Poor Law unions in Berkshire, Buckingham,
Dorset, Kent, Middlesex, Oxford, Southampton, Surrey, Sussex, and Wiltshire
in 1867 from RPLI; of workhouses in 59 Poor Law unions in Cambridge, Lin-
coln, Nottingham, and the East, North, and West Ridings of Yorkshire in 1866
from WHD2; and of workhouses in 8 Poor Law unions in Cornwall, Devon,
Hertford, Kent, Lancashire, and Norfolk in 1864 from WHD1.2 These sources
enumerate the amount, by weight, of each type of food (e.g., porridge, suet
pudding) that was given to able-bodied male workhouse inmates at each meal
(e.g., breakfast, dinner, supper) on each day of the week. Table B.4 is a facsimile
of part of a table in WHD1 that enumerates the ”daily dietaries” of able-bodied
male inmates of the workhouse in the City of London Poor Law Union in 1864. I
obtain detailed recipes for the ”proper preparation” (according to an April 1867
Circular Letter of the Poor Law Board) of each type of food from WHD3.3 This
yields the amount, by weight, of each ingredient in each type of food. I obtain
the number of calories and grams of protein, fat, and carbohydrates per unit of
each ingredient from [14], and I use this ingredient-specific nutritional informa-
tion to calculate the average daily nutritional intake (i.e., calories, protein, fat,
carbohydrates) of able-bodied male inmates of the workhouses in each of the
180 English Poor Law unions for which I have ”daily dietaries.” I also obtain
2The Poor Law Commission stipulated that the diet fed to workhouse inmates must be ”less
eligible” than ”the ordinary diet of any class of able-bodied laborers living within the same dis-
trict.” An order of the Poor Law Commission (or, later, of the Poor Law Board) was required to
authorize or amend the diet fed to workhouse inmates in every Poor Law union. 501 such or-
ders were issued between 1835 and 1848. After 1848, orders were required by the Consolidated
General Order (1848) to include ”the opinion of the medical officer of the workhouse...under the
seal of the Poor Law Board. This process was necessarily attended with considerable delay and
some trouble.” See Parl. Papers, 30 (1835), p. 171; Parl. Papers, 19 (1842), p. 66; Parl. Papers, 25
(1848), p. 12, 16.
3Recipes were probably inexactly followed. Dr. Edward Smith, then Medical Officer of the
Poor Law Board and one of ten Poor Law inspectors, wrote in 1866 that there is ”diversity in the
composition and consequent nutritive values of foods having the same designation in different
workhouses.” See WHD2, p. 339; WHD3, p. 87.
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county-level estimates of the average weekly meat consumption, by weight, of
English agricultural laborers in 1863 from RMO. These estimates derive from a
study of 407 agricultural laborers in England, Wales, and Scotland undertaken
by Dr. John Simon, then Medical Officer of the Privy Council, and they enable
a crude but one-to-one comparison of the consumption habits of workhouse
inmates with the consumption habits of the working poor in their immediate
environs.
B.3 Changes in Union Boundaries
There were a small number of boundary changes among English Poor Law
unions between 1857 and 1885, each of which took one of two forms. First, some
unions were dissolved and incorporated into other unions. In 1869, for example,
the Brinton Union was dissolved and incorporated into the Walsingham Union.
In such cases, I agglomerate the dissolved union (e.g., Brinton) and the union
or unions into which it was incorporated (e.g., Walsingham) in all years prior to
the boundary change. Second, some unions were divided into multiple unions.
In 1861, for example, the nine northernmost parishes of the Wirral Union were
withdrawn to form the new Birkenhead Union. In such cases, I agglomerate the
parent union (e.g., Wirral) and the new union or unions formed therefrom (e.g.,
Birkenhead) in all years after the boundary change.
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B.4 Poor Rates & Pauperism
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1857), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1857.” Parl. Papers, 32 (1857, Session 2), pp. 461-520.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1860), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1860.” Parl. Papers, 58 (1860), pp. 121-174.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1861), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1861.” Parl. Papers, 53 (1861), pp. 121-174.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1862), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1862.” Parl. Papers, 48 (1862), pp. 121-174.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1863), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1863.” Parl. Papers, 51 (1863), pp. 121-174.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1864), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1864.” Parl. Papers, 51 (1864), pp. 603-656.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1865), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1865.” Parl. Papers, 48 (1865), pp. 439-492.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1866), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1866.” Parl. Papers, 62 (1866), pp. 265-318.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1868), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1868.” Parl. Papers, 60 (1867-68), pp. 697-750.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1870), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1870.” Parl. Papers, 58 (1870), pp. 395-448.
204
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1872), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1872.” Parl. Papers, 51 (1872), pp. 157-210.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1874), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1874.” Parl. Papers, 56 (1874), pp. 713-766.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1876), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1876.” Parl. Papers, 62 (1876), pp. 507-560.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1878), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1878.” Parl. Papers, 64 (1878), pp. 741-794.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1880), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1880.” Parl. Papers, 61 (1880), pp. 737-790.
Poor Rates and Pauperism (1885), ”Return (B.)—Paupers Relieved on 1st July
1885.” Parl. Papers, 67 (1884-85), pp. 283-336.
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B.5 Supplementary Tables
Table B.1: Census Divisions
CD # CD Name Counties
I Metropolis Kent†, Middlesex†, Surrey†
II S. Eastern Berkshire, Kent†, Southampton, Surrey†, Sussex
III S. Midland Beds., Bucks, Cambs., Herts., Hunts., Middlesex†,Northants., Oxon.
IV Eastern Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk
V S. Western Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Somerset, Wiltshire
VI W. Midland Gloucs., Heref., Mon.††, Shrops., Staffs., Warks., Worcs.
VII N. Midland Derby, Leicester, Lincoln, Nottingham, Rutland
VIII N. Western Chester, Lancaster
IX York East Riding, North Riding, West Riding
X Northern Cumberland, Durham, Northumberland, Westmorland
XI Wales Excluded from Dataset
† Indicates that only part of county is included in the corresponding census division.
†† The classification of Monmouth is inconsistent across sources. Some, including DCR, classify
Monmouth as a part of Census Division XI (i.e., Wales). Others classify Monmouth as a part of
Census Division VI (i.e., West Midlands). I use the latter classification.
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Table B.2: Manufactures v. Industry
Class† Description (Sub-Class) Persons†† % of Pop.††
Panel A. “Manufactures” in 1851a
XII Animal Substances
Wool (6) 294,773 1.406%
Silk (7) 141,451 0.675%
Others Included (2, 3, 4, 5)b 54,832 0.262%
XIII Vegetable Substances
Flax, Cotton (12) 750,002 3.578%
Timber, Bark, Wood (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) 141,388 0.675%
Cane, Rush, Straw (10) 49,900 0.238%
Others Included (3, 11, 13)c 65,993 0.315%
Total 1,007,283 4.806%
Panel B. ”Industry” in 1861d
X Art & Mechanic Productions 953,289 4.751%
XI Textile Fabrics & Dress 2,231,617 11.121%
XII Food & Drinks 430,220 2.144%
XIII Animal Substances 56,092 0.280%
XIV Vegetable Substances 144,184 0.719%
XV Minerals 1,012,997 5.048%
Total 4,828,399 24.062%
† The 1851 Census organized all occupations into 17 classes and 80 sub-classes. The 1861 Cen-
sus re-organized these occupational categories in three ways. First, classes and sub-classes were
renamed “orders” and “sub-orders.” Second, one new “order” (viz., Textile Fabrics & Dress)
and six new “sub-orders” were created. Third, “orders” were aggregated into six new higher-
level occupational categories (viz., Professional, Domestic, Commercial, Agricultural, Indus-
trial, and Indefinite/Non-Productive). These higher-level occupational categories were (con-
fusingly) called “classes.”
†† Refers to total population, not adult population.
a The 1851 Census provides this information for England and Wales.
b Sub-classes 2, 3, 4, and 5 were defined as Grease et al., Skins, Feathers & Quills, and Hair &
Fur, respectively.
c Sub-classes 3, 11, and 13 were defined as Guns & Resins, Hemp, and Paper, respectively.
dThe 1861 Census provides this information for Great Britain (i.e., England, Wales, Scotland,
and “Islands in the British Seas”). These islands were the Isle of Man, the Island of Jersey, and
the Island of Guernsey.
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Table B.3: Sanitary Condition of WHs in Kent (1867)
No. Union Ventilation Water General Beds, &c.†
1. Aylesford Good Good Good Yes
2. Blean Good Inadequate Good Yes
3. Bridge Bad Good Good Fairly
4. Canterbury Good Good Good Yes
5. Dartford Fair Good Good Yes
6. Eastry Not Good Good Good Yes
7. Faversham Good Good Good Yes
8. Gravesend Fair Good Pretty Good Yes
9. Hoo Not Good Good Pretty Good Fairly
10. Medway Fair Good Good Yes
11. Milton Fair Good Not Good Fairly
12. Sheppey Fair Good Fair Yes
13. Thanet Fair Good Fair Yes
† This column refers to the question: “Are the beds, bedding, furniture, and utensils sufficient
and in good order?” I discard these data since few workhouse inspectors gave definitive an-
swers to this question. I retain only data pertaining to the ventilation, water supply, and “gen-
eral sanitary state” of workhouses.
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Table B.4: Daily Dietaries in City of London WH (1864)
Breakfast Dinner Supper
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Units oz. pt. pt. oz. oz. oz. lb. pt. oz. oz. oz. pt.
Monday 7 11/2 - 4 - - - 11/4 - 6 11/2 1
Tuesday 7 11/2 - - 5 - 3/4 - - 6 11/2 1
Wednesday 7 11/2 - - - 14† - - - 6 11/2 1
Thursday 7 11/2 - - 5 - 3/4 - - 6 11/2 1
Friday 7 11/2 - 4 - - - 11/2 - 6 11/2 1
Saturday 7 11/2 - 7 - - - - 2 6 11/2 1
Sunday 7 11/2 - - 5 - 3/4 - - 6 11/2 1
† The “proper preparation” of 16 ounces of suet pudding, according to WHD3, consisted of 7
ounces of flour, 11/4 ounces of suet (i.e., fat from beef or mutton), and 2 ounces of skimmed milk,
water, and salt. The suet was to be “cut into moderately small pieces, and distributed evenly
throughout the pudding.”
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APPENDIX C
DATA APPENDIX FOR WEALTH ANDWEALTH REDISTRIBUTION:
EVIDENCE FROM ENGLAND, 1881
The dataset that I construct consists of 576 English Poor Law unions and
13,869 English civil parishes. In this section I demonstrate in greater de-
tail the method by which each variable is constructed, the source or sources
from which each variable derives, and the procedure by which these sources
are transcribed and combined. I refer to primary sources by the abbrevia-
tions enumerated below.
C.1 Primary Sources
Abbr. Source Title Year(s) Source Citation†
CR51 Census Report 1851
CR81 Census Report 1881
RWS Religious Supplement to the 1851 Census 1853 PP, 89 (1852-53), pp. 1-437
PRV Poor Rate Valuation 1882 PP, 58 (1882), pp. 59-292
CEG Contested Election of Guardians 1876 PP, 63 (1876), pp. 147-346
LGB Report of the Local Government Board 1879 PP, 28 (1878-79), pp. 1-660
PRP1 Poor Rates and Pauperism (January) 1881 PP, 78 (1881), pp. 515-568
PRP2 Poor Rates and Pauperism (July) 1881 PP, 78 (1881), pp. 569-622
GBGIS Great Britain Historical GIS Project 2011 [93]
GHC Guide to the House of Commons 1882 [10]
† PP refers to the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers.
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C.2 Local Government Areas
Pairs and Subdivisions of Parishes. The vast majority of English civil
parishes (i.e., 13,189 of 13,869, or more than 95 percent) elected their own
Poor Law guardians in 1881. The rest were subdivided into ”wards,” each
of which elected their own guardians, or were combined into pairs, each
of which elected their guardians jointly. In this essay I use CEG in order
to identify which parishes were subdivided and which parishes were com-
bined. Furthermore, I treat wards, parishes, and ”electoral units” as distinct
from one another. I combine wards, when parishes were so subdivided, and
treat them as a single unit. I leave ”combined parishes” combined. This
yields 13,624 observations at the parish-level.
Poor Law Unions. The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 agglomerated
English civil parishes into Poor Law unions, an administrative unit dedi-
cated to the erection and maintenance of workhouses in which to relieve
”able-bodied” relief applicants. Between 1834 and 1881, Poor Law unions
acquired a number of other administrative and statistical responsibilities,
including, for example, the administration of vaccinations to children and,
on behalf of the Registrar General, the recording of all English births, deaths,
and marriages. In this essay I use CEG to match all 13,624 parish-level ob-
servations to the Poor Law unions (of which there were 576) to which they
belonged.
Hundreds. English hundreds (also called ”wapentakes” in Derby, Lincoln,
Leicester, Nottingham, and Rutland, and called ”wards” in Cumberland,
Durham, Northumberland, and Westmorland) pre-dated Poor Law unions
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as the principal intermediary geographical unit between the parish and the
county. Indeed, English hundreds pre-dated even the Norman Invasion,
and were enumerated in Domesday. See [103, p. 107] and [67, pp. 18-24].
The importance of the hundred had eroded to next to naught by the middle
of the nineteenth century as a result of the introduction of the petty ses-
sional division (for local judicial matters) and the Poor Law union (for local
statistical and administrative matters). In this essay I use CR51 to match all
13,624 parish-level observations to the hundreds (of which there were 705)
to which they belonged.
Registration Counties. English registration counties were agglomerations
of English Poor Law unions established as a matter of statistical convenience
in the wake of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 (i.e., the Act that begat
the Poor Law union) and the Registration Act of 1836 (i.e., the Act that begat
the registration district). Since the boundaries of Poor Law unions regularly
crossed the boundaries of the so-called ”shires” or ”ancient counties” (i.e.,
centuries-old Anglo-Saxon subdivisions of England), it was practicable to
modify the old shire system to conform to the new Poor Law system. In
this essay I use CR81 to match all 576 union-level observations (and, conse-
quently, all 13,624 parish-level observations) to the registration counties (of
which there were 42) to which they belonged.
Census Divisions. English census divisions were agglomerations of English
registration counties established by the 1851 Census ”for the convenient ex-
position of the facts relating to population, and the determination of the
relation of these facts to others in equally large masses” [65, pp. 20-21]. In
this essay I use CR81 to match all 576 union-level observations (and, con-
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sequently, all 13,624 parish-level observations) to the census divisions (of
which there were 11) to which they belonged. Table C.1 enumerates each of
these divisions and the registration counties or parts of registration counties
of which they were comprised.
Parliamentary Constituencies. English Parliamentary constituencies were
subdivisions of England within which constituents were entitled to elect
members of Parliament. They could take one of two forms: (i) Parliamen-
tary boroughs or (ii) Parliamentary divisions. Parliamentary boroughs con-
sisted of large (or, in some cases, formerly-large) towns that elected their
own members of Parliament. Parliamentary divisions consisted of coun-
ties or subdivisions of counties, minus any Parliamentary boroughs (i.e., the
”rest” of England). The West Cheshire Parliamentary division, for example,
consisted of the western portion of the ancient county of Cheshire (i.e., the
hundreds of Broxton, Eddisbury, Nantwich, and Wirral), excluding the Par-
liamentary boroughs of Birkenhead and Chester. In this essay I use CR81
to match all 13,624 parish-level observations to the Parliamentary boroughs
(of which there were 186) or the Parliamentary divisions (of which there
were 87) to which they belonged. Since Parliamentary constituencies could
contain parts of parishes (i.e., a parish could be split between a Parliamen-
tary borough and a Parliamentary division), I also use CR81 to obtain the
population of each parish that lived within the boundaries of each of its
Parliamentary constituencies.
Municipal Boroughs. English municipal boroughs, also called ”munici-
pal corporations,” were areas within which mayors, town councils, and
the other rudiments of municipal government were elected by so-called
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”burgesses.” Not all municipal boroughs were Parliamentary boroughs, and
vice versa. Of the 259 English boroughs in 1881, 73 were municipal, 39 were
Parliamentary, and 147 were both municipal and Parliamentary. In 92 of
these latter 147, the municipal and Parliamentary boundaries were not iden-
tical. In this essay I use CR81 to match all 13,624 parish-level observations to
the municipal boroughs (of which there were 220) to which they belonged.
Since municipal boroughs, like Parliamentary boroughs, could contain parts
of parishes, I use CR81 to obtain the population of each parish that lived
within the boundaries of a municipal borough. This enables me to deter-
mine the proportion of the population of each parish-level and union-level
observation that lived within the boundaries of a municipal borough.
GIS Identifiers. I use GBGIS to obtain the GIS identifiers of each En-
glish civil parish and each English Poor Law union and to match all 13,624
parish-level observations and all 576 union-level observations in my dataset
thereto. This enables me to plot any of the variables enumerated in the fol-
lowing sections geographically.
C.3 Parish-Level Variables
Population. I obtain the population of each English parish in 1881 from
CR81. The average parish consisted of 1,813 persons, but the average parish
was unrepresentative of parishes in particularly urban or particularly rural
areas. Of the 13,624 parish-level observations in my dataset, 14 were un-
populated, approximately 12 percent consisted of fewer than 100 persons,
approximately 6 percent consisted of more than 5,000 persons, and 27 con-
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sisted of more than 100,000 persons.
Number of Poor Law Guardians. I obtain the number of Poor Law
guardians that represented each English parish in 1876 from CEG. All
parishes were entitled to a certain number of representatives in the board
of guardians of the union to which they belonged. Boards of guardians, on
behalf of union ratepayers, determined the type (i.e., indoor or outdoor) and
amount of relief that would be granted to relief applicants. Note that 81 per-
cent of parishes were entitled to one guardian, 12 percent of parishes were
entitled to two guardians, and 7 percent of parishes were entitled to more
than two guardians. Also note that the size of boards of guardians varied
across unions (from 5 to 111) and, therefore, that the administrative power
of any one guardian (or of any one parish) depended upon the nature of the
union to which he (or it) belonged.
Number of Contested Guardian Elections. I obtain the number of con-
tested guardian elections held in each English parish between 1873 and 1875
from CEG. Since elections could be held at most once per year per parish
(or, more precisely, per electoral unit), and since elections would be held
(i.e., contested) only in the event that the number of guardian candidates
exceeded the number of guardian seats apportioned to a parish, each parish
could have held at most three elections between 1873 and 1875. In all, only
1,135 of 13,869 English electoral units held at least one election during this
period—654 held one election, 255 held two elections, and 226 held three
elections. This amounts to 1,842 total elections.
Number of Voting Papers Distributed and Collected. I obtain the num-
ber of voting papers distributed and collected in 1,339 of 1,842 contested
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guardian elections in English parishes between 1873 and 1875 from CEG.
In every guardian election, voting papers were distributed to all eligible
voters at their places of residence and collected and tallied thereafter. Be-
tween 1873 and 1875, more than 2.3 million voting papers were distributed
and more than 1.8 million voting papers were collected in contested English
guardian elections. Average voter eligibility, as measured by the proportion
of the population to which a voting paper was distributed, was roughly 13
percent. Average voter turnout, as measured by the proportion of eligible
voters from which a voting paper was collected, was roughly 81 percent.
Number of Families and Separate Occupiers. I obtain the number of fam-
ilies and separate occupiers in 1881 in each English parish in which there
was at least one guardian election between 1873 and 1875 from CR81. There
were considerably fewer families than there were persons in England in
1881 since there were considerably fewer adults than there were children
in England in 1881 (e.g., more than 46 percent of the English population
was aged less than 20). Also note that ”separate occupier” might mean a
workhouse in which there could be between 100 and 1,000 persons.
Number of Inhabited Houses. I obtain the number of inhabited houses in
1881 in each English parish in which there was at least one guardian elec-
tion between 1873 and 1875 from CR81. There were considerably fewer
inhabited houses than there were families and separate occupiers in Eng-
land in 1881 since there were considerably fewer inhabited (or inhabitable)
dwellings than there were families in England in 1881 (e.g., in most large
cities, multiple-family dwellings were commonplace).
Rateable Value. I obtain the amount of ratable value (i.e., property wealth)
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in each English parish in 1881 from PRV. I aggregate rateable value per
capita from the parish-level to the union-level in two ways, and in so doing
I define the following two union-level variables: (i) effective ratable value
per capita and (ii) actual rateable value per capita. The former weights
each parish within a union by its guardian-share (i.e., the share of union
guardians that represented a particular parish). The latter weights each
parish within a union by its population-share (i.e., the share of union popu-
lation that lived within a particular parish). I define my instrumental vari-
able as the difference between effective and actual rateable value.
C.4 Union-Level Variables
Area. I obtain the area in acres of each English Poor Law union in 1881
from CR81. The average union consisted of approximately 55,000 acres (or
approximately 85 square miles). The geographical size of unions was rela-
tively uniform across England since unions were conceived so as to enable
administrators and relief applicants to conveniently access their adminis-
trative center (i.e., the workhouse). Nevertheless, the relatively sparsely
populated northernmost counties of England (i.e., Cumberland, Northum-
berland, etc.) tended to have larger unions (and more parishes per union)
than did Metropolitan London. Of the 27 Metropolitan London unions, 25
consisted of fewer than 5,000 acres (and fewer than 10 parishes).
Coal and Cotton-Textile Production. I obtain indicators for whether coal
production or cotton-textile production were ”special occupations pursued”
in each English Poor Law union in 1851 from CR51, according to which
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roughly 15 percent of unions specialized in coal and roughly 7 percent of
unions specialized in cotton-textiles. Coal unions (of which there were 89)
were disproportionately concentrated in the West Midlands and in North
of England (i.e., Census Divisions VI and X) and cotton-textile unions (of
which there were 39) were disproportionately concentrated in North West-
ern England (i.e., Census Division VIII).
Political Affiliation. I obtain the political affiliation (i.e., liberal or conser-
vative) of each English member of Parliament (of which there were 462) in
each English Parliamentary constituency (of which there were 273) in 1880
from GHC. Since the boundaries of Poor Law unions (and the boundaries
of civil parishes) crossed the boundaries of Parliamentary constituencies, I
calculate union-level political affiliation using the following formula.
%CONSu =
∑
p∈u
((∑
c∈p
%CONSc × POPcpuPOPpu
)
× POPpu
POPu
)
(C.1)
%CONSc is the proportion of Parliamentary constituency c’s MPs that were
affiliated with a conservative party. Note that in Parliamentary constituen-
cies entitled to only one member of Parliament (of which there were 97),
%CONSc can only take a value of zero or one. The inner sum represents
the political affiliation of each parish p. It weights the political affiliation of
each Parliamentary constituency in each parish by the proportion of parish
population (i.e., POPpu) that lived in the Parliamentary constituency (i.e.,
POPcpu). The outer sum represents the political affiliation of each union u. It
weights the political affiliation of each parish in each union by the propor-
tion of union population (i.e., POPu) that lived in the parish (i.e., POPpu) in
1881.
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Percent Church Attendance. I obtain the proportion of the population of
each English Poor Law union that attended a church service of any de-
nomination on March 30th, 1851 from RWS. Although a day-count is not
ideal, and may over- or under-state actual or average church attendance
in any particular union, Eli & Slater (1994) demonstrate that there is little
evidence of widespread falsification or manipulation of church attendance
data by religious actors on behalf of their denominations in order to buoy
denomination-specific attendance numbers [35].
Percent Non-Conformist. I obtain the proportion of religious sittings in
each English Poor Law union in 1851 that were classified as non-Anglican
Protestant (e.g., Presbyterian, Baptist, Unitarian, Wesleyan Methodist, etc.)
from Table H of RWS. Available information includes the number of Angli-
can sittings, non-Anglican Protestant sittings, Roman Catholic sittings, and
total religious sittings. I divide non-Anglican Protestant sittings by total sit-
tings to obtain the percent of sittings that I call ”non-conformist.”
Number of Indoor and Outdoor Paupers. I obtain the number of paupers
that were relieved in workhouses (i.e., indoor relief) and the number of pau-
pers that were relieved via cash or in-kind payments (i.e., outdoor relief)
in each Poor Law union on both January 1st and July 1st, 1881 from PRP1
and PRP2, respectively. I define, furthermore, INFRACu as the proportion
of paupers that were relieved indoors. Available information includes the
proportion of paupers that were male, female, and children (i.e., under six-
teen years of age), and the proportion of paupers that were able-bodied, not
able-bodied, and ”lunatics, insane persons, and idiots.”
Expenditure on Outdoor Paupers. I obtain the amount spent (in 1878
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pounds) by each English Poor Law union between March 25th, 1877 and
March 25th, 1878 (i.e., ”Lady Day”) on outdoor relief from LGB. Avail-
able information includes the amount spent on indoor relief, the amount
spent on relief ”for the maintenance of lunatics in asylums or other licensed
houses,” and the amount spent on ”other expenses of or immediately con-
nected with relief.”
Proximity to Urban Centers and Urbanizers. I obtain the distance (in km)
between the geographical center of each English Poor Law union and the ge-
ographical center of the nearest (i) urban center and (ii) urbanizer from GBGIS.
I define urban center as any Poor Law union that contained, was contained
by, or was coextensive with an urban sanitary district of more than 100,000
persons in 1881. There were 20 such urban centers according to CR81. Note
that CR81 suggests that the division of the country into urban and rural
sanitary districts (of which there were 1,005) ”furnishes the best available
basis” for identifying urban centers. Law (1967), for instance, distinguishes
populous areas from genuine urban centers by invoking the importance of
population density and nucleation [64]. I define urbanizer as any Poor Law
union within which population grew by more than 75,000 persons between
1851 and 1881. There were 20 such urbanizers according to CR81. Table C.2
enumerates all urban centers (and their populations in 1881) and all urban-
izers (and the change in their populations between 1851 and 1881).
Percent Agriculture. I obtain the proportion of the adult (i.e., older
than 20) population in each English Poor Law union in 1881 that
worked in agricultural production (as defined by the English census)
from GBGIS. In particular, this work is based on data provided through
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www.VisionofBritain.org.uk and uses statistical material which is copyright
of the Great Britain Historical GIS Project, Humphrey Southall and the Uni-
versity of Portsmouth.
C.5 Trimming the Dataset
Irregular Unions. There are two English Poor Law unions that I deem ”ir-
regular:” (i) London and (ii) Kington. The City of London Poor Law union
(as distinct from the county of Middlesex, or the Metropolitan Census Di-
vision) comprised 688 acres (or, roughly one square mile), 84 parishes, and
51,306 persons in 1881. It was geographically small, disproportionately geo-
graphically subdivided, and contained disproportionately more commercial
property than residential housing. As such, all per capita wealth data per-
taining to the City of London Poor Law union are almost certainly mislead-
ing. The Kington Poor Law union comprised 94,762 acres, 35 parishes, and
12,205 persons in 1881. Its parishes were split between the English county of
Herefordshire and the Welsh county of Radnorshire. As such, parish-level
information pertaining to Kington was absent from most English-specific
sources. I discard each of these two unions. This yields 574 union-level
observations.
Incorporated Unions. There are six English Poor Law unions that were not,
in fact, ”unions:” (i) Exeter, (ii) Plymouth, (iii) Stoke Damerell, (iv) Bristol, (v)
East & West Flegg, and (vi) Norwich were ”incorporations” established by Lo-
cal Acts of Parliament (not by the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834) that
prescribed lifetime-guardianship. In each of these unions, guardian elec-
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tions, when vacancies arose, were to be conducted at the union-level by al-
dermen rather than at the parish-level by eligible voters (see CEG, p. 18). I
discard each of these six unions. This yields 568 union-level observations.
Unpopulated Parishes. There are fourteen English parishes with no
recorded population in 1881, of which two were unrepresented and twelve
were represented by one guardian. Since it is necessary to calculate the rate-
able value per capita of each of the parishes represented in a union’s board
of guardians in order to calculate that union’s ”effective” rateable value per
capita, and since an unpopulated parish with positive rateable value has, by
definition, an undefined ratable value per capita, I impose that population
equals one in each of the twelve represented but unpopulated parishes. Ta-
ble C.3 enumerates all fourteen unpopulated parishes, in ascending order of
total rateable value.
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C.6 Supplementary Tables
Table C.1: Census Divisions
CD # CD Name Counties
I Metropolis Kent†, Middlesex†, Surrey†
II S. Eastern Berkshire, Kent†, Southampton, Surrey†, Sussex
III S. Midland Beds., Bucks, Cambs., Herts., Hunts., Middlesex†,Northants., Oxon.
IV Eastern Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk
V S. Western Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Somerset, Wiltshire
VI W. Midland Gloucs., Heref., Mon.††, Shrops., Staffs., Warks., Worcs.
VII N. Midland Derby, Leicester, Lincoln, Nottingham, Rutland
VIII N. Western Chester, Lancaster
IX York East Riding, North Riding, West Riding
X Northern Cumberland, Durham, Northumberland, Westmorland
XI Wales Excluded from Dataset
† Indicates that only part of county is included in the corresponding census division.
†† The classification of Monmouth is inconsistent across sources. Some, including DCR, classify
Monmouth as a part of Census Division XI (i.e., Wales). Others classify Monmouth as a part of
Census Division VI (i.e., West Midlands). I use the latter classification.
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Table C.2: Urban Centers and Urbanizers
No. Union, County Pop. Union, County Change
1. London, Middlesex† 3,816,156 London, Middlesex† 1,459,147
2. Birmingham, Warwick 246,352 West Derby, Lancs. 322,899
3. Liverpool, Lancs. 210,161 West Ham, Essex 166,374
4. Bolton, Lancs. 192,413 Stockton, Durham 146,261
5. Leeds, WR 190,863 Alston, Warwick 143,017
6. Sheffield, WR 183,138 Chorlton, Lancs. 136,416
7. Bradford, WR 183,032 Salford, Lancs. 94,011
8. Blackburn, Lancs. 175,948 Edmonton, Middlesex 93,836
9. Oldham, Lancs. 168,459 Leeds, WR 89,520
10. Nottingham, Notts. 159,346 Barton Regis, Gloucs. 88,118
11. Newc’stle, Northumb. 150,121 Croydon, Surrey 87,260
12. Manchester, Lancs. 148,805 Blackburn, Lancs. 85,209
13. Sunderland, Durham 139,376 Dewsbury, WR 81,928
14. Portsea Island, Hants. 130,483 Oldham, Lancs. 81,674
15. Leicester, Leicester 122,351 Sheffield, WR 79,536
16. Stoke, Stafford 104,299 Bradford, WR 79,246
17. Brighton, Sussex 99,074 Prestwich, Lancs. 77,770
18. Hull, East Riding 78,236 Bolton, Lancs. 77,701
19. Plymouth, Devon 75,096 Ecclesall Bierlow, WR 76,407
20. Bristol, Gloucs. 57,499 Nottingham, Notts. 75,163
† Per convention, I define “London” as the Metropolitan Census Division. Note that the
Metropolitan Census Division was not coincident with the county of Middlesex. Five Poor Law
unions in the county of Middlesex (i.e., Brentford, Edmonton, Hendon, Staines, and Uxbridge)
were in the South Midland Census Division (not in the Metropolitan Census Division). Six Poor
Law unions not in the county of Middlesex (i.e., Camberwell, Greenwich, Lambeth, St. Olave,
St. Saviour, and Wandsworth & Clapham) were in the Metropolitan Census Division.
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Table C.3: Unpopulated Parishes
No. Parish, Union, County RV (£) Representation
1. Seven Acres, Boston, Lincoln 20 No Guardians†
2. Gorewood, Cerne, Dorset 38 No Guardians†
3. Dallinghoo Weald, Woodbridge, Suffolk 43 1 Guardian
4. Chilton Common, Bridgwater, Somerset 75 1 Guardian
5. Hill End, Clun, Shropshire 102 1 Guardian
6. Monks Riding, Rugby, Warwick 110 1 Guardian
7. Shuff Fen, Boston, Lincoln 135 1 Guardian
8. Monks Risbridge, Risbridge, Suffolk 153 1 Guardian
9. Pryors Hayes, Chester, Cheshire 155 1 Guardian
10. East Woodyate, Wim. & Cran., Dorset 167 1 Guardian
11. Royalty Farm, Boston, Lincoln 179 1 Guardian
12. Friths, Boston, Lincoln 211 1 Guardian
13. Grantham Grange, Grantham, Lincoln 315 1 Guardian
14. Grafton, Chester, Cheshire 428 1 Guardian
†Only 20 parishes in England were unrepresented in their Poor Law union’s board of guardians
(see CEG), of which two had no population (as shown above), 12 had fewer than 100 persons,
and 18 had fewer than 500 persons in 1881.
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